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I. Introduction
Is liberal jurisprudence coherent? Liberal theorists often point to the hypocrisy of
conservative Supreme Court decision-making in terms of the propensity to make politically
favorable decisions under the guise of strict authority to the text, original intent, and the
narrowest interpretation of history and tradition. Conservative justices commonly argue that the
liberal members of the Court use too high a level of generality in their decisions, and deviate
from acceptable legal methodologies to further the liberal political agenda. Yet neither of these
commonly cited arguments are the root cause of the contention between liberal and conservative
methods of interpretation. Rather, the fundamental problem is that liberals are making the same
methodological mistakes as conservatives in the limits they impose on their approach. Liberal
justices have been too specific in terms of deferring constitutional authority to the same overly
narrow traditions—just like the conservatives do. Liberals draw upon these authorities too
narrowly by selecting overly specific evidence to create an outcome-based approach. It appears
both liberals and conservatives alike interpret the Constitution through the same mechanisms, yet
arrive at different political outcomes.
The main contention of this thesis is that a critique of liberal jurisprudence cannot simply
end with the conclusion that it is all politics. It superficially appears that liberal justices are only
marginally more liberal than their conservative counterparts, and as such, embody similar
methodological approaches derived from their shared conservative roots in constitutional theory.
Yet there are significant problems with this narrative. None of the justices “write as if politics
alone dictated their different legal conclusions. Rather, both write as though their understanding
of ‘the Law,’ and their understanding of the appropriate scope of the judicial role, led them to
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their divergent formulations.”1 There must be a more appropriate explanation lurking within the
opinions themselves that incorporates the justices’ political differences along with their
jurisprudential visions. One main question in understanding liberal jurisprudence is:
Does “liberty” receive from even the liberal members of the Court at best a broad
interpretation and a defense grounded in the conservative values of fidelity to the past,
conformity to traditions…and respect for judicial precedent, rather than liberal
commitments to autonomy or radical commitments to liberation?2
This question critiques liberal jurisprudence for its conservative roots, and hints at a solution to
overcoming such conservatism by incorporating larger constitutional principles of autonomy and
liberty into the underlying assumptions guiding liberal methodology. The way for liberals to
avoid drawing upon a methodology that is rooted in conservatism is to subscribe to the
tradition of American constitutional thought that argues that constitutional rights can
exist outside the text or can be implied from the basic constitutional order, the
fundamental narratives of American history and American identity, the common and
honored traditions of the American people, or the deepest meanings of liberty and
equality in a free and democratic republic.3
This methodology, calling for the Court to interpret the vague clauses of the text as instructional
guides for how to look outside the text, is a major distinction between strict conservative
methods of constitutional interpretation and more general liberal methods.
The Court is not a policymaker, nor is it an arbiter of moral or political disputes based on
the justices’ personal value judgments. It is a legal interpreter of the Constitution—a document
outlining not only rules, but also principles, written hundreds of years ago that still legally apply
to the United States today. As such, the Court cannot act with political or moral interests, only

1

West, Robin. “The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 139, No. 5, May 1991, 1381-1382.
2
West, 1381.
3
Brest, Paul, Sanford Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed Amar, Reva B. Siegel. Processes of
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials. (Fifth Edition) New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2006, 1339.
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with the purpose of asserting the Constitution’s legal authority to resolve disputes in
contemporary society in such a way that best remains consistent to the text’s codified rules and
principles.
Why then do liberal justices generally reach politically liberal outcomes, and
conservative justices reach politically conservative outcomes? How can this trend be legitimately
explained on legal grounds?
The answer is not political—it is indeed legal. The explanation resides in the different
methodologies employed by the liberal and conservative justices. And the key to understanding
the legal basis for these differences can be found in the levels of generality underlying liberal and
conservative interpretational techniques.
The differences between the respective liberal and conservative methodologies are
embodied within the issue of how the Constitution’s vague language should be interpreted. This
issue goes back to the first landmark cases in the Court’s history. In McCulloch v. Maryland
(1819), Justice Marshall establishes a precedent regarding how to properly treat the
Constitution’s guarantees of various broad principles. McCulloch looks at the Constitution as
more than just a legal code. It is a document containing deliberately broad, and sometimes vague,
principles, which indicates that the Framers intended for the Court to preserve these ambiguities.
Justice Marshall contends that the Federal government can act within its constitutional right to
create legislation that is not explicitly enumerated in its list of constitutional powers, as long as
such laws further the inherent principles behind these powers. Justice Marshall writes the
following in McCulloch to ground his opinion as being in accordance with the overall purpose of
the Constitution:
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
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would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public.4
His eloquent discussion of the methodology in which the Court should interpret the Constitution
creates an enduring precedent in terms of the expansive quality of the language. The text is not
an exact code that should be followed in its most specific form. It is an outline of transcending
principles that are to be preserved as best as possible throughout the course of the nation’s social
and political evolution. This understanding of the Framers’ intent is compounded with the
acknowledgement that there are also some very specific clauses. If the Framers intended for all
parts of the text to be interpreted in the same way, why then does Article II Section I state that
the President holds office for a term of four years, whereas Article XIV Section I says that no
state can deprive any person of life, liberty, and property? It is simply nonsensical that one
theory of interpretation could account for how to treat the entire Constitution. While the
procedural method for protecting the executive power’s term limits is a concrete rule, the
guarantee of liberty cannot be procedurally interpreted in the same straightforward manner.
Justice Marshall writes that he Constitution’s
nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced
from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers
of the American Constitution is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument,
but from the language.5
He makes this distinction between interpreting principles and concrete procedures to defend his
proposed method of employing a high level of generality in interpreting the Constitution’s vague
clauses.
Why else were some of the limitations found in the 9th section of the 1st article
introduced? It is also in some degree warranted by their having omitted to use any
4
5

McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
ibid.
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restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. In
considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding.6
Justice Marshall sets an important precedent in McCulloch in terms of how to interpret the
language of the text with the correct level of generality. He sets the stage for the Court to justify
decisions based on the assumption that the Constitution calls for an interpretation of principles,
rather than for an exact adherence to a code of rules.
Justice Marshall also discusses the Constitution’s intent to extend liberties, rather than
limit them. The Framers intentionally used such vague language precisely so that the Court could
interpret the text in such a way that would expand rights to the utmost extent.
It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers to insure, so far as human
prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confiding the
choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is
made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.7
With this analytical framework, Justice Marshall interprets the Necessary and Proper Clause as
being a tool to establish the extent of the powers of Congress, rather than to limit them. This
Clause states: “The Congress shall have Power—To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution.”8 In McCulloch, Justice Marshall argues that the creation of a federal bank is
constitutional because it falls under the scope of the implied power to do so, as demonstrated in
the abstract language of the Clause. “Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of
establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument
which…excludes incidental or implied powers and which requires that everything granted shall
6

ibid.
ibid.
8
U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 18.
7
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be expressly and minutely described.”9 While the Constitution may not explicitly permit the
creation of a federal bank, the Necessary and Proper Clause dictates that such a creation is
constitutional because it is for the purpose of furthering its taxation and spending powers.
Justice Marshall elaborates on the legal justification behind his methodology with a
discussion of the meaning behind the Necessary and Proper Clause. He writes that it “is placed
among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers.”10 This is the core of
his argument. The vague language enables the Constitution to act as a guide to ensure certain
principles are upheld, rather than a code of rules that serves to limit governmental powers.
Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish, the powers vested in the Government. It
purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. No reason
has been or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discretion of
the National Legislature under words which purport to enlarge it. The framers of the
Constitution wished its adoption, and well knew that it would be endangered by its
strength, not by its weakness.11
The Framers phrased this Clause in such a way that would grant Congress the power to enact any
and all laws that are “necessary and proper” to furthering the codified constitutional principles
regarding governmental power. If their intention had been to restrict Congress’ powers, the
language of the Clause would have been along the lines of “no laws shall be passed but such as
are necessary and proper.”12 If the intention were for the Necessary and Proper Clause to be
restrictive in nature, its language would have unambiguously taken on such a form. Yet,
the result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is
that, if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain, the powers of Congress, or
to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of
measures to carry into execution the Constitutional powers of the Government.13

9
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With Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the most constitutionally sound methodology to treat
the Constitution’s vague language, the legal differences between liberal and conservative
jurisprudence become more defined.
Conservative jurisprudence commonly has an agenda of limiting rights in cases
concerning personal, familial, and sexual liberty interests in order to remain as loyal to the past
as possible. This is justified by a methodology that only looks to the most specific traditions. By
subscribing to this assumption behind constitutional interpretation that views the text as a
rulebook to be followed as strictly as possible, conservatives are subsequently able to justify
employing the narrowest level of generality in their analyses of tradition. This defends the
political outcome of limiting rights on legal grounds because it interprets the Constitution as a
guide for how to remain as loyal to the traditions of the past as possible. The most specific view
of tradition provides a legal basis upon which to decide a case because it is the closest way to
ensure that society continues to follow the Constitution in its most literal sense. With this
methodology, conservative justices generally arrive at legal outcomes that are likely to conform
with a conservative political agenda of limiting rights to the utmost legally valid extent. The
conservative justices are obviously much more likely to rule against the legitimacy of the right in
question with a methodology that only encompasses the most specific and narrow traditions
associated with that right.
Liberal jurisprudence can be characterized as having the opposite legal agenda. Namely,
liberal jurisprudence aligns itself with a constitutional theory that favors expanding personal
rights in order to best uphold enduring constitutional principles in a contemporary context.
“Law’s attitude is constructive: it aims…to lay principle over practice, to show the best route to a
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better future, keeping the right faith with the past.”14 This agenda is grounded in legal theory
because it advocates an understanding of the Constitution that emphasizes the abstract clauses as
having the broad purpose of upholding underlying principles within an evolving political and
social context. This allows the Court to use a higher level of interpretational freedom to apply
these enduring principles to contemporary circumstances. In order to further this interpretation of
the Constitution, liberal jurisprudence advocates the need for a more general view of tradition.
By interpreting tradition through a wider and more general scope, the Court is able to provide
legal justification in support of expanding rights in such a way that remains most loyal to larger
constitutional ideals of liberty, privacy, and autonomy. The liberal methodology in personal
rights cases interprets the text as a guidebook for the Court to make legal decisions that uphold
certain values, rather than certain literal outdated laws, and to ensure these underlying values
withstand any changes in the political and social structures of society. As such, the agenda of
preserving the constitutional conception of liberty calls for a methodology that looks to a more
general interpretation of tradition. The justification for this level of generality is based on the
underlying values of past traditions, rather than the literal historical legality of the most specific
tradition regardless of whether it may have served a different purpose in a historical time period
characterized by different social and political structures.
With such fundamentally different interpretations of the most appropriate level of
generality, it logically follows that liberal and conservative justices analyze tradition through
contradictory scopes. Yet, there is an imbalance in terms of the consistency in the two
approaches. In conservative jurisprudence, the rule of looking to the most specific tradition is a
concrete guideline, and thus creates consistency and cohesiveness in conservative methodology.

14

Dworkin, Ronald. (2) Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, 413.
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There exists a lower and an upper limit on the scope of interpretation. In liberal jurisprudence,
however, there is a basic consensus that a wider level of generality should be used, but no
consistent approach to answering the question of what level of generality this should be. As such,
a more coherent liberal methodology has not yet emerged. Conservatives confine their scope of
analysis to the most specific end of the spectrum, but liberals have only gone as far as to
establish that their methodology falls somewhere on the spectrum that is more general. This
hinders the ultimate liberal agenda of rights expansion because there does not exist a means to
accomplish such an agenda that is as consistent as the means the conservative have established.

A. Methodology
My goal is to look at four chosen cases to see how the differences in the levels of
generality between liberal and conservative justices actually manifest themselves in their
respective opinions. I focus on methodological patterns in the liberal opinions in search of a
more coherent liberal jurisprudence. This stems from establishing more definitive guidelines for
how best find the level of generality that will maximize the ability to legally justify rights
expansion. I end my discussion by applying my conjecture of the most appropriate level of
generality in liberal jurisprudence to the future of same-sex marriage. This practical application
of how to further the liberal jurisprudential agenda is put to the test when viewed in light of one
of the most timely rights-based issues today.
Part IIA begins by grounding my analysis within a theoretical discussion of the respective
liberal and conservative assumptions behind their methodologies in due process cases involving
substantive individual rights. I provide a basic overview of the fundamental constitutional
theories that define liberal and conservative jurisprudence. These theories include originalism,
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textualism, history and tradition, and the moral reading. Since the justices use these theories in
different ways to derive both narrow and broad interpretations of the Constitution’s authority, it
is necessary to understand what they entail at their cores.
Part IIB narrows the discussion to understanding these theories in relation to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is drawn upon in individual rights cases. I
provide an overview of how the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause is unique in
nature with regard to its high level of ambiguity. As such, the conservatives are able to defend
their overly narrow methodologies, and the liberals are able to defend their more general
methodologies, both based upon the same brief fragment of language.
Part III places this theoretical framework within a case-based context to show how the
aforementioned methods of interpretation are practically employed in liberal and conservative
opinions. Part IIIA focuses on family rights in DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989) and
Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989). Part IIIB focuses on abortion rights in Roe v. Wade (1973). Part
IIIC focuses on gay rights in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). Through this case-based analysis, an
image emerges of how the Court has (or has not) protected privacy rights in the context of family
institutions, procreation choice, and sexual autonomy. The justices argue about how these rights
can be derived from the text itself, and from its guidelines on how to interpret history and
tradition. Through dissecting the language of the opinions in these cases, I evaluate when and
where the liberal justices draw upon the same problematic methodologies as the conservative
justices, and where they deviate and subsequently work towards establishing a more coherent
liberal methodology.
Part IV looks at the methodological patterns in liberal jurisprudence in these rights cases
to discover a solution as to what level of generality should be employed. The goal is not to focus
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on a solution that does justice to my in-depth look at the problem. Rather, it is simply to briefly
discuss the avenues that should be explored to potentially resolve some of the issues of the
inconsistencies of liberal jurisprudence.
Part V concludes with a study of the future of liberal jurisprudence, focusing on the
future of same-sex marriage. The ultimate focus is on same-sex marriage because it is an issue
still being battled within the courts. This conclusion looks at the practical effects that will arise in
upcoming cases from the liberals’ inconsistent approaches.
II. Theoretical Background
A. Basic Overview of the Constitutional Theories that Define Liberal and Conservative
Jurisprudence
Where do the justices derive authority in the Constitution to justify their decision-making
methodologies? Are different interpretive methods more appropriate than others in different
cases? To what extent are these methods intertwined with political goals rather than being purely
legal analyses? Before viewing the major constitutional theories in practice, it is useful to strip
away the “messiness” and understand their core definitions and justifications. Both liberals and
conservatives seek to discover the scope of protected liberty interests in the Constitution through
some combination of the authority of the text, Framers’ intent, history and tradition, and the idea
of a conventional objective morality. In their most basic forms, originalism is the theory of
giving utmost authority to the original intent of the Framers. Proponents of originalism ground
their methodology with the view that the nature of the written Constitution is best understood by
what the Framers intended for the language to mean. Textualism is the theory of giving authority
strictly to the text of the Constitution itself. The theory of deferring authority to history and
tradition recognizes both case-based history through precedents and tradition-based history
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through strongly entrenched social and political norms. By nature, the theory that the
Constitution should be interpreted in light of history and tradition can leave either a lot or a little
room for interpretive freedom.
This breakdown of constitutional theories is not simply a laundry list of the possible
places to derive authority; they take on a co-dependent formation. Adherence to textualism is
necessarily the starting point for all constitutional interpretation. The Court necessarily begins
with the text of the original document itself as an authoritative guide to understanding its rules
and principles. The difference between conservative and liberal methodologies is that
conservatives tend to stop there. Conservative jurisprudence disproportionately places all
legitimacy on textualism and originalism, without taking the contemporary context into account.
The key to understanding liberal jurisprudence is that it starts at the same place, yet looks much
further beyond a strict adherence to the narrowest interpretation of the text, intent, and tradition.
This translates into viewing history and tradition in terms of the enduring underlying principles
in the context of evolving social and political attitudes.
As it is lived across time in political life, the principles and meanings that the words of
the text, as well as the social constructions that the Court has created to help define those
words, inform the Court’s understanding of the meaning of constitutional principles. As
such, the text and the world outside the text mutually construct each other in…the social
construction process.15
This general view of history and tradition explains “the degree to which the constitutional text is
both inward- and outward-looking.”16
Another liberal constitutional theory based upon looking at principles outside the text is
known as the moral reading. The theory of the moral reading of the Constitution defers authority
15

Kahn, Ronald. “Why Lawrence v. Texas Was Not Expected: A Critique of Pragmatic Legalist
and Behavioral Explanations of Supreme Court Decision Making,” in Hirsch, H.N. (ed). The
Future of Gay Rights in America. New York: Routledge, 2005, 231.
16
ibid.
14

to the basic moral principles that pervade the American political and social climate. This theory,
championed by constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin, involves more than the rules concretely
codified by legislatures and judges. It relies on “a system of adjudication that operates in
accordance with moral principles regarding what is just and fair. These legal principles are what
justify the various legal rules within the system.”17 The moral reading recognizes the existence of
abstract, objective moral principles that defines society’s collective moral code, and incorporates
them into the Court’s determination of the scope of protected rights and the limits on
governmental power. In essence, the Bill of Rights intentionally consists of these moral
principles in order to ensure that they encompass all “dimensions of political morality that in our
political culture can ground an individual constitutional right. The key issue in applying these
abstract principles to particular political controversies is not one of reference but of
interpretation, which is very different.”18 Dworkin emphasizes the disciplined nature of this
approach through the constraints of history and integrity, which prevent judges from utilizing
moral principles to express particular moral judgment.19 The notion of integrity holds judges to a
disciplined standard on both vertical and horizontal levels. Vertically, in order to claim a right as
fundamental, a judge must demonstrate that it is consistent with precedent. Horizontally, the
judge must give full weight to that principle in future cases he or she decides or endorses.20
These elements of integrity ensure that a moral reading of the Constitution utilizes morality as a
principle rather than a political leaning.
17

David, Gregory B. “Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe V. Wade.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, No. 3, January 2004, 1224.
18
Dworkin, Ronald. (3) “Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled.”
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, The Bills of Rights in the Welfare State:
A Bicentennial Symposium, Winter 1992, 387.
19
Dworkin, Ronald. (4) Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, 10.
20
Dworkin (3), 394.
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Specifically in terms of privacy rights, Dworkin takes the stance that the implied
fundamental right to privacy exists when the right in question can be justified
on the assumption that decisions affecting marriage and childbirth are so important, so
intimate and personal, so crucial to the development of personality and sense of moral
responsibility, and so closely tied to religious and ethical convictions protected by the First
Amendment, that people must be allowed to make these decisions for themselves,
consulting their own conscience, rather than allowing society to thrust its collective
decision on them.21
Dworkin advocates for the approach that an individual has the constitutional right to privacy
when the circumstance in question holds such value to the individual that it would prove
detrimental to his or her moral character to let the government determine the outcome. While this
outwardly appears to encompass a great level of freedom on the part of the Court, the constraints
of history and integrity still hold true. The assumption is that moral principles retain a certain
degree of consistency within their very nature, as well as within the constraints outlined by
Dworkin. The moral reading would be considerably less grounded if one assumes that the notion
of morality itself is inherently unprincipled. Yet, as Dworkin’s interpretive framework is
practically applied to judicial decision-making, it is evident that consistency within moral
principles rings true.
While liberal applications of the textualist, originalist, and tradition-based interpretational
techniques are made distinctly liberal with a principled outward looking focus on theories such
as the moral reading, conservative justices stick to more narrow forms of textualism and
originalism. Drawing upon Justice Scalia’s originalism as a basis to understand the agenda of
conservative jurisprudence, its embodiment of conservatism becomes evident from where he
derives his conception of the authority of the Constitution. His interpretive method relies on the
Framers, the Federalist Papers, and various other historical sources to discern the original intent
21

Dworkin (4), 50-51.
16

of the Constitution. Justice Scalia defends this method through looking at the fundamental
problems with nonoriginalism. He states that all forms of nonoriginalism de-legitimize judicial
review. Furthermore, he claims that originalism is the only method of interpretation that offers
consistency and predictability. Justice Scalia argues that another defect of nonoriginalism “lies in
the apparent illusory benefit that this interpretive approach allows for an expansion of rights
beyond the original Constitution and that some versions of nonoriginalism are able to keep the
Constitution up to date to reflect current social values.”22 Justice Scalia’s interpretation
fundamentally falls short because his method is not ideologically neutral. This is demonstrated
through his unwillingness to defer to the legislature in areas such as affirmative action, while he
advocates doing so in areas such as abortion.23 His philosophy incorporates conspicuous views
on how he believes the political process should operate.
The inconsistency of Justice Scalia’s originalist ideals on a theoretical level and his actual
commentary on the Court’s opinions creates difficulties in determining his stance on the
legitimacy of looking to implied fundamental rights as justification for deciding a case. “He has
regarded some of the Court’s opinions about fundamental liberties of the body to be an example
of the Court’s deference to the majority, while he has encouraged a back-door defense of
fundamental rights to property.”24 This paradox in itself becomes a conservative moralizing force
because it encompasses Justice Scalia’s conservative political leanings into his opinions.
It is ironic that Justice Scalia implicitly advocates a constitutional reading that draws
upon the existence of implied fundamental rights when referring to the right to own and control

22

Schultz, David A. and Christopher E. Smith. The Jurisprudential Vision of Justice Antonin
Scalia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996, 37.
23
Schultz, 56.
24
Brisbin Jr., Richard A. Justice Scalia and the Conservative Revival. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997, 268.
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property (which he claims is justified by the Fifth Amendment provision of “just
compensation”), yet he denies the legitimacy of these implied rights to privacy in terms of the
right to abortion, the right to die, and the right to receive governmental assistance to preserve
life. He hold that when the state acts in violation of these claims of fundamental liberty, the
Court does not need to adopt a higher scrutiny doctrine in its reading of due process in the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the Court were to always adhere to Justice Scalia’s narrow
interpretation of tradition in cases where there exists the potential to arrive at politically liberal
outcomes, many decisions regarding privacy rights would be overturned. For instance, consider
that the consensual practice of sodomy between homosexual adults has been historically deemed
“immoral” and “unacceptable”. With Justice Scalia’s reading of the Constitution, even the
slightest tradition of prohibiting sodomy is reason enough for the Court to unwaveringly restrict
it. On the other hand, Dworkin’s moral reading derives the polar opposite outcome in the sense
that the moral principles at play constitute a stronger rationale than does Justice Scalia’s
justification based upon an antiquated tradition that is largely irrelevant in the contemporary
political climate.
In Justice Scalia’s so-called “faint-hearted” originalism, he addresses Dworkin’s moral
framework for the right to privacy. He acknowledges the existence of degrees of moral reasoning
embedded within the Court’s methodologies. Justice Scalia argues that it is unreasonable to view
constitutional theory as simply a battle between nonoriginalists and pure originalists, in terms of
the legitimacy of Court decisions made on the basis of the text’s application in light of current
social and political values. While Justice Scalia fundamentally argues that the Court must look to
the original meaning of the text, he also concedes that this original meaning can be read in light
of its underlying principles. He makes this concession with the constraint that such principles
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must be applied in the same ways they would have been when they were adopted.25 This form of
originalism ties back to the moral reading because Justice Scalia advocates a textual
interpretation that is rooted in the moral compass of the past. The main difference is that
conservatives place value on society’s moral code as it existed at the time the Framers wrote the
Constitution, whereas liberals place value on morality as an ever-evolving societal construct.
Liberals argue that this notion of a changing collective morality must be taken into account when
deciding how to best uphold constitutional principles that were written centuries ago, as they
apply in a modern context.
Overall, the various ways in which liberal and conservative theories of constitutional
interpretation are intertwined demonstrate that it is impossible to define liberal and conservative
jurisprudence as wholly separate entities in terms of their respective levels of adherence to
specific theories. Rather, these theories are employed as tools to justify judicial opinions in
accordance with the fundamentally opposing assumptions of liberals and conservatives about
whether the Court’s role is to limit or expand liberty interests.

B. A Closer Look at the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment—What makes
due process cases concerning personal rights so special in highlighting the need for a more
coherent liberal jurisprudence?
How do the aforementioned theories of constitutional interpretation manifest themselves
in due process individual rights cases? As the Due Process Clause is so vague in nature, its
language emphasizes the need for a more general scope of interpretation when dealing with such
intentionally inconclusive and ambiguous language. The Clause has been narrowly interpreted to

25

Balkin, Jack M. (2) “Abortion and Original Meaning,” in Gerhardt, Michael J., Stephen M.
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protect past traditions against short-run departures brought about by temporary majorities who do
not act in accordance with long-standing practices in the nation’s history.26 This is in contrast
with equal protection, which has been interpreted more progressively in its orientation towards
challenging the status quo. The Equal Protection Clause has been regarded as a tool for the Court
to invalidate practices that were considered normal at the time of ratification, yet now act as a
disservice to disadvantaged minorities. In contrast, the history of due process “fairly clearly
direct[s] the Court to traditional, historical sources for ascertainment of the content of the liberty
they protect… [Due process] historically has been the tool of the conservative impulse to
preserve the liberties defined by the past and to protect against overzealous, imprudent change.”27
The nature of due process itself positions the Court to grapple with heightened contention
between the different liberal and conservative notions of how to conform to the past.
As due process contains such general and ambiguous guarantees, the range of legally
valid interpretations can be either quite large or quite small, depending on how the Court treats
the vague language. The liberal justices draw upon a more general interpretation of due process
in deciding personal rights cases through making the distinction between concepts and
conceptions. Dworkin explores the type of legal reasoning that permits such a distinction, as an
integral component of his larger view of law as integrity.
The contrast between concept and conception is here a contrast between levels of
abstraction at which the interpretation of the practice can be studied. At the first level
agreement collects around discrete ideas that are uncontroversially employed in all
interpretations; at the second the controversy latent in this abstraction is identified and
taken up.28
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A concept is a concrete entity in which the Court can agree upon its existence and applicability.
Yet, the key to correctly interpreting a concept in constitutional law is understanding what the
concept actually means and how its meaning can best be applied to the case at hand.
Dworkin illustrates this theory with an example of the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution in an equal protection case. In this hypothetical case, the Court determines that the
Equal Protection Clause refers to the concept of equality. With this determination, the Court
must then decide what equality actually means. To do this, it determines “what conception of
equality best fits and justifies our legal practices—narrowly, the equal protection clause cases but
more broadly, the whole of American constitutional law.”29 Dworkin uses this example to argue
that equality is not a contested concept because it is impossible to establish definitive criteria for
the meaning of concepts such as equality. “The law is full of contested concepts, and one of the
jobs of legal theorists is to determine which conceptions of these concepts are the most
defensible.”30 As such, equality is a concept subject to interpretation.
While this example focuses on equal protection, the interpretive mechanisms involved in
due process-based individual rights cases rely on the concept versus conception distinction as
well. Liberty and justice are concepts, but for the Court to interpret what they actually mean, the
justices must look at what conceptions of liberty and justice most accurately represent both the
Due Process Clause and the field of constitutional law in general. It is impossible to develop a
universally acceptable theory that establishes rules for the concepts of liberty and justice.
However, the Court can
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try to capture the plateau from which arguments about justice largely proceed, and try to
describe this in some abstract proposition taken to define the ‘concept’ of justice for their
community, so that arguments over justice can be understood as arguments about the best
conception of that concept.31
Although this distinction is subject to criticism due to its propensity to enable a high level of
judicial subjectivity, its legitimacy lies in the understanding that the Court is an interpreter of the
most constitutionally accurate conceptions of these concepts, not an interpreter of the justices’
personal convictions relating to them. For this reason, the Court makes decisions on behalf of
society rather than itself. This claim is rooted in the idea that society
share[s] a preinterpretive sense of the rough boundaries of the practice on which our
imagination must be trained. We use this to distinguish conceptions of justice we reject,
even deplore, from positions we would not count as conceptions of justice at all even if
they were presented under that title.32
The concept-conception distinction is a beneficial tool in resolving disagreements about what the
law actually is and what it should be.33
To understand the inherent freedoms and limitations embedded within the Due Process
Clause, the theory of concepts and conceptions plays a meaningful role in defense of liberal
jurisprudence. The distinction between these two ideas allows the Court to employ a higher level
of generality in analyzing tradition on the grounds that “like any interpretation, it can condemn
some of its data as a mistake, as inconsistent with the justification it offers for the rest, and
perhaps propose that this mistake be abandoned.”34 This theory permits the Court to view
tradition in terms of the conception of liberty or justice, for example, with a scope broad enough
to reject any historical legal practices that are inconsistent with the conception in contemporary
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society. “A conception of law might try to show…that the explanation of legislation that
provides the best justification of that institution requires, contrary to now-prevailing practice,
that old and out-of-date statutes be treated as no longer law.”35 This has far-reaching implications
for a more coherent liberal jurisprudence because it provides a leg to stand on for the liberal
justices as they argue in favor of rejecting antiquated laws in favor of more contemporary
applications of the conception of liberty.

III. Evidence—Analyses of the Cases Themselves
A. Family Rights
i. DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989)
DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989) is a controversial child abuse case that raises
fundamental questions about the extent of the law’s reach to protect liberty rights within intimate
family relations. In this case, the petitioner was a four-year-old child who was severely beaten by
his father. The county social service agency received complaints about the abuse, yet took no
action to remove the child from his father’s custody. When the child was abused so brutally that
he suffered permanent brain damage, his mother sued the Department of Social Services on the
grounds that the state violated the substantive component of the Due Process Clause by depriving
the child’s liberty interest. The state argued that since it took no action to harm the child in
question, it was not liable for any abuse within the privacy of the family home.
The Court opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled in favor of Winnebago
County on the grounds that a state social service agency does not have any affirmative obligation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to intervene in child abuse cases
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where the child in question is in parental custody, and the state has not increased the child’s
endangerment. This decision implies that the state’s failure to protect a child from parental abuse
does not constitute a violation of the child’s right to liberty. DeShaney sparked contentious
debate about whether due process should be interpreted to protect individual freedom through
limiting state involvement in the privacy of the family, or whether it is intended to protect
citizens who cannot protect themselves from both other citizens and from the state.
The majority opinion relies on the notion that the text and history of due process do not
provide adequate justification to protect citizens from infringement of liberties by private actors.
In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the Due Process Clause is intended as a negative
liberty rather than as a positive obligation of the state. He writes:
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means.36
Chief Justice Rehnquist relies on an isolated textual interpretation of the Clause to support his
opinion, rather than incorporating more contemporary, context-based arguments, and invoking
an all-encompassing evaluation of history, tradition, morality, and evolving social structures.
“Although on the surface this interpretation seems very powerful, it fundamentally distorts the
meaning of the Due Process Clause by abstracting the language from its historical context. When
the Clause is read in light of the contemporary legal understanding, a different meaning
emerges.”37 Chief Justice Rehnquist ignores the contemporary values of social service
institutions by failing to mention the hypocrisy embedded in the fact that social service agencies

36

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Heymen, Steven J. “The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3, Constitutional Perspectives, Dec., 1991, 561.
37

24

have been put in place precisely for the purpose of establishing an obligation on the state to
protect its citizens. This exemplifies the conservatism within his methodology because he
interprets the text in the context of the era in which it was written, rather than applying a broader
interpretation to the modern circumstances at hand. With his text-based approach, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stays true to his conservatism by employing the narrowest type of interpretation. Such
narrowness is indicative of the conservative theory of specificity. Namely, Chief Justice
Rehnquist refers to the most specific tradition because he subscribes to the theory that this is the
most constitutionally correct way to understand history. As the Clause prohibits the government
from depriving persons of life, liberty, and property, his interpretation looks at due process as a
duty of inaction rather than action. In DeShaney, the state did not actively deprive the child of his
liberty; rather, the state knowingly did not protect the child’s liberty interests from infringement
by a private actor. Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist holds that the text of the Clause does not
extend to include an obligation to act.
The second element of the majority opinion concerns the intent of the Framers. Chief
Justice Rehnquist subscribes to the view of negative liberties on the grounds that the Framers
included the Due Process Clause for the purpose of preventing governmental abuse of power. He
states that due process
was intended to prevent government “from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression,” Davidson v. Cannon, “to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,” and “to prevent governmental power
from being ‘used for purposes of oppression,’” Parratt v. Taylor, to prevent the
“affirmative abuse of power.”38
This can be characterized as originalist reasoning because he derives authority from the intent of
the Framers at the time the Constitution was written. Chief Justice Rehnquist explains that the
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Due Process Clause was originally intended to limit government intervention in citizens’ private
lives for the purpose of preventing abuse of power and oppression. This narrows the Court’s
interpretational freedom of the Clause because it limits the guarantee of due process to the
Framers’ intent, rather than treating its vague language as an affirmation of the general
protection of life, liberty, and property. As such, Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly outlines that the
Constitution intends to protect people from the state, not from each other. This treatment of
tradition runs into trouble due to its high level of specificity. Chief Justice Rehnquist
superficially satisfies the specificity requirement of conservative jurisprudence because he
narrows his interpretation to such an extreme level. Yet, by regarding the societal structure of the
1700’s as the most specific tradition, he actually detracts from his proclamation of specificity in
a roundabout way because he draws upon an antiquated tradition that was intended for an
entirely different purpose. The Framers may have intended to protect individuals from
government intervention in their private lives. Yet this intention has no bearing on their position
regarding the correct level of government involvement in protecting vulnerable individuals from
physical harm inflicted by more powerful individuals in the privacy of the family home.
At the time of ratification, the Framers were not preoccupied with too little government
involvement, but concerned that the government may have too much power. “The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans
from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmental service.”39 Chief
Justice Rehnquist uses this originalist justification to extract the special relationship that may (or
may not) exist between the state and certain individuals, namely those whom the state has
promised to protect, from his interpretation. He writes that the Constitution’s “purpose was to
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protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.
The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the
democratic political processes.”40 The idea of the Framers’ intent is valid in the sense that due
process was born out of the notion of preventing government abuse. Yet such reasoning fails
when placed within the context of the case itself. DeShaney calls into question the actions of a
state agency that was put in place for the specific purpose of protecting people from each other.
Thus, the argument that due process should be interpreted to protect people from government
intrusion falls short in light of the fact that the social service agency’s purpose is to intrude in
cases where citizens need protection.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s high level of specificity in his interpretation of tradition strays
from the overall intent of the Clause, which is to protect life, liberty, and property. He ignores
the contemporary social and political context of the case as a relevant component of the Court’s
analysis of the all-encompassing conception of liberty. He looks to the intent of the Framers at a
time when the state social service institution did not exist in the way it does now. He interprets
the text itself as a limit on state action rather than as a general guarantee. For Chief Justice
Rehnquist, neither the vague text of the Due Process Clause or the intent of the Framers provides
adequate evidence in support of the petitioners’ claim. Rather, his originalist and textualist
methods narrow his scope of analysis in such a way that his outcome functions as a limit on the
guarantees of due process to the most specific extent.
As well as deriving authority from the text and Framers’ intent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
creates a historical narrative to justify his opinion that history does not “support such an
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expansive reading of the constitutional text.”41 He looks at an array of precedent as a basis to
argue that “our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”42
Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Harris v. McRae (1980): “Although the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference, . . . it does
not confer an entitlement to such [governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom.”43 While this precedent certainly appears to validate Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion on a theoretical level, there are fundamental differences in substance
between Harris and DeShaney that make its relevance as a precedent case somewhat murky. In
Harris, the Court ruled that the Medicaid program was not required to fund abortions, even those
that were medically necessary. This case does not hold up as justification in DeShaney because
in Harris, the policymakers did not implement the Medicaid program specifically for funding
medically necessary abortions nor did they create policy stating that Medicaid was required to
fund abortion, whereas in DeShaney the social service agency was put in place with the specific
purpose of preventing child abuse.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also cites Lindsey v. Normet (1972) to argue that since “the Due
Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective
services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could
have been averted had it chosen to provide them.”44 Yet, the facts of Lindsey are so different than
those of DeShaney that the usage of Lindsey as a precedent is not valid. In Lindsey, the petitioner
41
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refused to pay his monthly rent unless necessary repairs were made on his apartment. As a result,
he was threatened with eviction. The complaint was that the Oregon Forcible Entry and
Wrongful Detainer (FED) Statute violated the petitioner’s due process guarantee. The Court
ruled that the eviction procedure did not violate due process because “rental payments are not
suspended while the alleged wrongdoings of the landlord are litigated.”45 Furthermore, the Court
stated that an assurance of adequate housing is a matter for the legislature to handle. In
DeShaney, Chief Justice Rehnquist uses Lindsey as evidence to claim it is not the responsibility
of the state to provide housing or social services, and as long as the state takes no action to
worsen the situation, it is not responsible for protecting the liberty interests that may be denied as
a result of the actions of social service employees. Similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance
on Harris as a precedent, his reliance on Lindsey encounters problems in the notion that it is the
role of the legislature to create policy to address such issues. This is because the claim in
DeShaney asks the Court to make a decision in a context where the legislature has already
created the relevant policy.
Despite the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist troublingly narrows his interpretation of the
Court’s historical treatment of state intervention in liberty rights cases by citing Harris and
Lindsey, he continues his opinion by acknowledging his faux pas in comparing these cases to
DeShaney. To explain why Harris and Lindsey are so fundamentally different to DeShaney,
Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses the “special relationship” that the petitioner claims exists in
DeShaney that does not exist in Harris or Lindsey. He writes “even if the Due Process Clause
imposes no affirmative obligation on the State to provide the general public with adequate
protective services, such a duty may arise out of certain ‘special relationships’ created or
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assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals.”46 The petitioner argues that there is a
special relationship between the state and the child in DeShaney because
the State knew that Joshua faced a special danger of abuse at his father’s hands, and
specifically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to protect him against that
danger. Having actually undertaken to protect Joshua from this danger -- which
petitioners concede the State played no part in creating -- the State acquired an
affirmative “duty,” enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to do so in a reasonably
competent fashion.47
Chief Justice Rehnquist categorically denies the notion of a “special relationship” assumed by
the state to protect particular individuals in DeShaney. He argues that the relationship is not
clear-cut because the state did not take the child into custody.
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledges the existence of precedents that can be construed
to support the claim that the state did have a responsibility to protect the child from abuse. He
writes: “It is true that, in certain limited circumstances, the Constitution imposes upon the State
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals.”48 In support of
this affirmative obligation of the state to protect individuals who fall under the category of
having a “special relationship,” he cites Estelle v. Gamble (1976), which required the state to
provide medical care to incarcerated prisoners. This case was decided on the grounds that since
“the prisoner is unable ‘by reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself,’ it is only
‘just’ that the State be required to care for him.”49 With Estelle as a precedent, it reasonably
follows that the state should be required to protect the child in DeShaney because of the “special
relationship” that exists in which the child is unable to protect himself and is deprived of liberty,
which confers an affirmative obligation on the state. Even though Chief Justice Rehnquist
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presents the rationale behind the petitioners’ claim and validates it with the concept of the
“special relationship,” as established in Estelle, he then rejects it altogether with the assertion
that “these cases afford petitioners no help.”50 Although the state has an obligation to provide
general protective services in prisons and psychiatric institutions, such obligation does not
extend to DeShaney because the child was not in the state’s custody.
Overall, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s historical narrative is odd. While he advocates looking
to the narrowest level of tradition, his specificity actually impedes on his ability to thoroughly
examine the entire scope of tradition and precedent. He first refers to Harris and Lindsey to
support his opinion, yet they are arguably too specific to be relevant in light of the facts of the
case at hand. He then refers to cases, such as Estelle, that have a much more relevant scope to
defining the affirmative obligation that arises out of the relationship that exists between the
abused child and the state. Yet he claims Estelle is not applicable. He ends his discussion of the
historical treatment of state involvement in liberty rights by justifying his rejection of the
“special relationship” at play. He argues the Estelle precedent is irrelevant because “when the
State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
wellbeing.”51 Chief Justice Rehnquist dismisses the notion that a “special relationship” exists in
DeShaney because the types of relationships that confer an affirmative obligation on the state are
those in which the state itself has restricted an individual’s liberty in such a way that the
individual is unable to protect him or herself. He argues “the affirmative duty to protect arises
not from the State's knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent
to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
50
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behalf.”52 Throughout this section of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly makes
concessions that would serve to undermine his opinion if he were to place any value on them.
For instance, he writes: “It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against
a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort law to
provide him with adequate protection against that danger.”53 As such, his adherence to history
and precedents does not achieve its desired outcome because it further complicates the Court’s
historical treatment of similar issues.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s methodology highlights the conservative propensity to
subscribe to the doctrine of procedural due process, rather than substantive due process, as
justification for employing such high levels of specificity. Until the relatively contemporary
doctrine of substantive due process became a popular topic of analysis, the general understanding
and applicability of procedural due process was largely straightforward and uncontroversial.
“The phrase ‘life, liberty or property’ was read as a unit and given an open-ended, functional
interpretation, which meant that the government couldn’t seriously hurt you without due process
of law.”54 With the popularization of substantive due process, a new level of generality in
interpreting the clause became legitimized. Rather than looking at due process from a procedural
standpoint, substantive due process refers to the definition of liberty in terms of its outcomes.
Namely, prior to determining if one is entitled to due process, the persons in question must prove
they have been deprived of their liberty interests. This widens the scope of legitimate
methodology in due process cases because it creates a new responsibility for the Court to look
beyond written procedure through an assessment of the substantive components of the case at
52

ibid.
ibid.
54
Ely, John Hart. (2) Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1980, 19.
53

32

hand. This assessment looks at liberty interests in light of the facts of the case and the
contemporary political climate. Critics of substantive due process find fault in the role of the
Court as a policymaker, rather than as a legal interpreter. They argue that the social construct of
liberty belongs with an assessment of policy and morality by the legislative branch.
Conservatives tend to reject substantive due process on the grounds that the judiciary is
overstepping its role. With this background, the conservative majority opinion in DeShaney can
be looked at as advocating procedural due process, whereas the dissent rejects a procedure-based
outcome in favor of substance.
In DeShaney, the distinction between procedural and substantive due process analysis is
convoluted. Chief Justice Rehnquist embarks on the difficult task of deciding a case where
substantive due process is at stake, while simultaneously subscribing strictly to the theory of
procedural due process. The case invokes the substantive due process doctrine because the claim
is that “there exists a minimum level of protection against private wrongs that the government
must provide, irrespective of the procedures the government affords.”55 If the case were one of
procedural due process, the question at hand would be whether the government could
constitutionally deny all protection against private wrongs. Yet, there was no such claim that the
state withheld all protection from the child. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision overlooks crucial
elements of due process as a result of his refusal to invoke substantive due process reasoning in a
case that primarily relies on a substantive interpretation. Ironically, he begins his opinion by
explicitly acknowledging the importance of substantive due process in DeShaney: “The claim is
one invoking the substantive, rather than the procedural, component of the Due Process Clause;
petitioners do not claim that the State denied Joshua protection without according him
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appropriate procedural safeguards.”56 Chief Justice Rehnquist belittles the legitimacy of the
substantive nature of the claim through briefly stating its relevance, and then emphasizing that
the petitioners themselves do not contest that they rightfully received their constitutional
guarantee of procedural due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist miraculously manages to adhere to
a procedural interpretation despite the fact that the case involves a substantive one. This is
fundamentally misguided because, by looking at the case in terms of its procedural due process
implications, Chief Justice Rehnquist does not address the core issue. Rather, his opinion
contains broad language claiming that due process does not require the state to provide even
“minimal levels of safety and security.”57 The Court completely rejects the relevance of
substantive due process in DeShaney on the grounds that the clause was intended to “to protect
the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.”58
The Court also relied on the language of the Clause—the word “deprive,” it asserted,
referred to government action, not to the government's failure to protect against private
action—and on cases that asserted that the Due Process Clause creates “no affirmative
right to governmental aid.”59
Chief Justice Rehnquist ignores the substantive elements of the case by simply delving into a
procedural due process analysis. He addresses the case as if the question is whether the Due
Process Clause places any affirmative obligation on the state, rather than whether there are
certain triggers that exist to place an affirmative obligation on the state in varying levels and
circumstances. This methodology functions to outwardly validate his high level of specificity
because it only looks at one aspect of the claim, rather than looking at the more general
substantive questions at hand.
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The problem here with the conservative criticism of substantive due process is that while
conservatives argue that the legislative branch should carry out the assessment of policy, the
assessment in DeShaney had already been carried out by the legislature. Specifically, the
legislature created policy that established the social service agency for the exact purpose of
protecting children from parental abuse. If the Court narrows its interpretation to a strictly
procedural level, and subsequently ignores the actions of the legislative branch, the judicial
decision can be looked at as overstepping its role in the sense that it is ruling on policy rather
than legality. On the other hand, when the Court derives authority from the theory of substantive
due process, it is not in fact assuming the role of a policymaker; it is making decisions based
upon the preexisting policies implemented by the legislature. This is the catch-22 of the
conservative procedural analysis in this case.
Overall, the conservative methodology in the majority opinion mainly encounters
fundamental problems in terms of its narrowness. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s pure text and intent
based focus, and adherence to procedural due process, fall short in their lack of attention paid to
contemporary social and political structures. This creates an overly narrow, and subsequently
flawed, methodology. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “idea has a simple allure: the Due Process
Clause only forbids the government from actively injuring people. It does not require the
government to protect people from private wrongs. So long as the government is not acting, it
cannot violate the Due Process Clause.”60 This interpretation is flawed both in its reasoning and
its theoretical approach. On one level, the notion of government inaction in itself is somewhat
nonsensical. The idea that the government is obligated to protect its citizens against deprivation
of liberty caused by private actors is well established. The creation of social service agencies
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provides solid evidence that the government assumes the duty to protect those who cannot
protect themselves. Thus, there are no theoretical difficulties embedded within the proposition
that “the Constitution forbids the government from withdrawing all protection against private
wrongdoing.”61 With such a program established to protect children, the Due Process Clause
should logically ensure that social service officials do not abuse their power. Chief Justice
Rehnquist claims that the Framers’ intent was to protect individuals against governmental abuse
of power; and as such, the scope of due process is limited to actions of governmental abuse
instead of inaction. Yet, his distinction between action and inaction is problematic because
“wrongfully withholding protection—no less than ‘actively’ injuring a person—can constitute an
abuse of power.”62 The Court fails to realize that the decision not to intervene actually blurs the
line between action and inaction because the action of making such a decision arguably causes
the action of injuring the child. On another level, the majority opinion’s exception for
affirmatively protecting the rights of those in prisons and hospitals is not logically sound. The
underlying principle for such exceptions suggests that the state does have affirmative obligations
to protect those individuals placed in state custody. This principle logically should hold
legitimacy in child abuse cases as well then because just as the state has taken the action of
placing an individual in prison, it has also taken the action of establishing a social service agency
with an affirmative obligation to protect.
Through his oppressively high level of specificity in analyzing history and tradition,
Chief Justice Rehnquist actually contributes to a political agenda that “tends to keep power from
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the powerless and preserves political power in the hands of the few.”63 He sets a precedent that
allows government agencies the liberty to make decisions about which individuals to aid and
protect however they see fit, without any judicial oversight to monitor whether they are fulfilling
their obligations to carry out their intended purposes. “The Court's view that state inaction does
not violate due process is both inconsistent with the responsibility that government bears for the
welfare of citizens and outdated given the extensive role that administrative agencies play in our
society.”64 Basically, the political problems that arise from DeShaney demonstrate that Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s conservative legal reasoning directly correlates to a politically conservative
outcome. Although such a correlation appears obvious, it is actually quite useful to recognize. It
shows the coherence of conservative jurisprudence because the conservatives have established a
methodology that is both legal in its approach and politically favorable in its outcome. As such, it
follows that liberal justices must subscribe to their own legal methodology in order to
legitimately arrive at politically liberal outcomes. If both liberals and conservatives utilize the
same methods of legal reasoning (ie. beginning with the text, analyzing precedent with the same
level of specificity, and ending with a ruling on the current case), problems arise when the
resulting political outcomes differ. This provokes the questions: do the liberal dissenters make
the same methodological mistake as the conservatives in their quest to justify their agenda of
rights expansion? If so, does this make the liberal opinions purely political? Or do the liberal
dissenters draw upon distinctly liberal methodology, which allows them to achieve a valid legal
justification for their agenda?
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The first of the two dissenting opinions in DeShaney, written by Justice Brennan, uses an
approach that emphasizes a larger picture of the nature of liberty interests, rather than only
emphasizing the Constitution’s textual and intent based ideas on positive and negative liberties.
This distinction between the liberal and conservative methodologies sheds light on the ways in
which liberal and conservative justices can defend their respective politically liberal and
conservative opinions on predominantly legal grounds. On this note, Justice Brennan commences
his dissent by articulating the fundamental difference between his and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
interpretations of the issue at hand:
It may well be, as the Court decides, that the Due Process Clause, as construed by our
prior cases, creates no general right to basic governmental services. That, however, is not
the question presented here…No one, in short, has asked the Court to proclaim that, as a
general matter, the Constitution safeguards positive as well as negative liberties.65
Justice Brennan criticizes the majority opinion on the grounds that it misreads the main issue of
the case. Rather than concerning how the Constitution regards an affirmative governmental duty
to protect its citizens regardless of context, Justice Brennan argues that the context of the case
does matter here. He writes: “When a State has—‘by word and by deed,’—announced an
intention to protect a certain class of citizens, and has before it facts that would trigger that
protection under the applicable state law, the Constitution imposes upon the State an affirmative
duty of protection.”66 This line of reasoning looks at the facts of the case with respect to the
larger conception of liberty in contemporary society. Basically, the legislature decides to protect
the liberty rights of different classes of citizens in different ways on an institutional level; and in
this case, there is policy dictating that the state must assume an active role in protecting children
from abuse within the family home.
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And from this perspective, holding these Wisconsin officials liable—where the only
difference between this case and one involving a general claim to protective services is
Wisconsin’s establishment and operation of a program to protect children—would seem
to punish an effort that we should seek to promote.67
Justice Brennan criticizes the majority opinion by interjecting contextual arguments surrounding
legislative decisions and contemporary social traditions into his dissent. Such elements overall
serve to disprove Chief Justice Rehnquist’s narrow interpretation of positive and negative rights.
Justice Brennan undermines the majority opinion by stating he “would begin from the
opposite direction.”68 He starts by focusing on the action the state has taken in the case rather
than the action it has not taken. Justice Brennan legitimizes such methodology by drawing upon
Estelle v. Gamble (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo (1982). These two cases begin with
discussions of state action, and follow up by using such action to evaluate the manner in which
the Constitution deals with inaction. In Estelle and Youngberg, the Court rules that when the
state confines individuals to prison or a psychiatric hospital, it assumes the responsibility of
caring for these individuals because their liberties are being deprived in such a way that they
cannot care for themselves. Through these precedents, Justice Brennan methodically dismisses
the idea of a clear line between action and inaction.
Justice Brennan devotes much of his opinion to dissecting Youngberg both with respect
to the opinion itself and to its treatment by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion. He
criticizes the conservative interpretation of Youngberg in DeShaney on the grounds that Chief
Justice Rehnquist strictly adheres to the idea that the Constitution does not establish positive
rights, yet he does not recognize that such an idea does not hold true in all circumstances. Justice
Brennan cites Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dismissal of Youngberg:

67
68

ibid.
ibid.
39

In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf -- through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty -- which is the
'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure
to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.69
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues here that when the state affirmatively acts to restrain an
individual’s freedom through institutionalization, there exists a trigger that allows the Court to
determine that constitutional protection under due process does apply. Yet, he deems this ruling
irrelevant in DeShaney because it concerns the constitutionality of state inaction when a third
party causes the deprivation of liberty, rather than the state. Justice Brennan dedicates a fair
amount of his decision to detailing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of Youngberg with
the intention of discrediting it. He attacks the logic of the majority opinion by claiming that the
core issue in Youngberg is not to challenge the state’s affirmative action in circumstances of
institutionalization; rather it is to establish the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest, which is violated in Youngberg when the state fails to provide services that meet the
requirements of confinement. He argues in favor of the relevance of Youngberg on the grounds
that “the state has somehow displaced private avenues of relief from child abuse, and therefore
an abused child is in a position similar to a prisoner, stripped of alternative means of selfprotection.”70
While Justice Brennan certainly makes a compelling argument in his quest to overturn
the majority opinion, such methodology is problematic on a greater scale. By engaging in his
lengthy argument over the correct interpretation of Youngberg, he does not achieve the more
pressing liberal agenda of establishing a methodology characterized by an adherence to a more
general scope of history and tradition. In fact, he does quite the opposite. His methodology
69
70

ibid.
Beermann, 1085.
40

mirrors that of the conservative majority by placing an ordinate amount of authority on Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the scope of history, tradition, and precedent. The problem
with this conservative methodology is that it ends at the first available stopping point. Chief
Justice Rehnquist is satisfied with a level of specificity that uses the smallest possible scope of
tradition as his entire analysis. Yet, in this level of specificity, he uses tradition as a guise for
furthering his personal value judgment. The problem with Justice Brennan’s response is that he
treats precedent in the same way as Chief Justice Rehnquist does. Both justices argue that the
other deviates from the Court’s obligation to obey precedent, and each inserts his own personal
values into the scope of due process rights. While Chief Justice Rehnquist claims to derive
authority from the most specific traditions, Justice Brennan argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist
does not treat precedent in a constitutionally correct way because he is not looking to the
appropriate source of authority.71 Overall, this creates an interesting dynamic. While Chief
Justice Rehnquist employs an overbroad view of precedent and the most specific view of
tradition, Justice Brennan employs the opposite approach.72 Justice Brennan views precedent
quite narrowly and applies such precedent to a more general view of tradition.
In order to combat this problem of specificity, Justice Brennan should place authority on
the past, yet should use his historical analysis as a basis to legitimize the usage of a level of
generality that accounts for the trajectory of the changing values of the past, and leads up to an
all-encompassing vision of the past, present, and future. He criticizes the methodology of the
majority opinion, but in doing so, crafts his own opinion with a similarly specific scope. Justice
Brennan breaks the surface of a coherent substantive due process analysis by looking at liberty
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interests in similar cases, yet still limits his interpretive approach to the most specific historically
protected liberty interests. Instead, he should place value on the contemporary social and
political climate to redefine the conception of liberty in a substantive sense.
The argument that the first section of Justice Brennan’s dissent does not truly and
completely overcome the methodological problems of the conservative majority opinion
provokes the question of what the alternative would be. Justice Brennan better answers this
question as he continues his analysis. He finishes his attack on the majority opinion’s incorrect
interpretation of Youngberg by explicitly advocating a wider scope of analysis:
To the Court, the only fact that seems to count as an “affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf” is direct physical control…I would not,
however, give Youngberg and Estelle such a stingy scope. I would recognize, as the
Court apparently cannot, that “the State’s knowledge of [an] individual’s predicament
[and] its expressions of intent to help him” can amount to a “limitation of his freedom to
act on his own behalf” or to obtain help from others.73
Justice Brennan discredits the majority opinion on the grounds that such a narrow reading of due
process undermines the broad constitutional guarantee of liberty rights in DeShaney by failing to
include a class of persons who cannot protect themselves. This remedies some of the problems
that arise from Justice Brennan’s initial similarities to the conservative majority opinion. While
he similarly looks to precedent and historical treatment of liberty interests, he ultimately, and
correctly, widens his scope by arguing that these precedent cases must be interpreted in light of
evolving social norms and traditions. He writes: “I would read Youngberg and Estelle to stand
for the much more generous proposition that, if a State cuts off private sources of aid and then
refuses aid itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction.”74 With this,
Justice Brennan refocuses the opinion to embody a more general interpretation by concluding
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that Youngberg is in fact highly relevant when the underlying issues are viewed generally enough
to reflect new circumstances. Overall, Justice Brennan skims the surface of a new liberal
jurisprudence, yet does not take his opinion far enough to actually break through.
In looking at the overall disagreements between the justices in DeShaney, the part of
Justice Brennan’s dissent pertaining to the weaknesses of the Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
has a stronger argument than does the majority opinion itself, and therefore arguably reaches a
more constitutionally correct outcome. Yet, even so, Justice Brennan does not take his argument
far enough. By stopping there, Justice Brennan takes a defensive stance instead of taking
ownership of a methodology distinct from the conservative opinion. Through focusing on
attacking Chief Justice Rehnquist’s narrow scope, Justice Brennan ironically confines this part of
his opinion to the same narrowness. One way to avoid this mistake would be to criticize Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the parts it is missing, instead of only for the parts that are there.
For example, instead of attacking Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of Youngberg on a
relatively micro level, Justice Brennan could attack the majority opinion’s interpretation for its
failure to extract the underlying issues in Youngberg, and then for its failure to apply them to the
political and social context of DeShaney. Such an interpretation would address the broader
substantive due process principles at stake through looking at how Youngberg defines the
constitutional conception of liberty, and then deciding DeShaney by ensuring it implicitly
adheres to this conception of liberty in a more contemporary circumstance. This would better
embody a distinctly liberal methodology because Justice Brennan would advocate a higher level
of generality to justify his opinion instead of justifying his opinion on the grounds that his view
is correct because the plurality’s is wrong.
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Justice Brennan finally arrives at his own unique argument—an argument that makes
little mention of the majority opinion because it is a product of his uniquely liberal
interpretational process. As expected, this section of his dissent provides the most insight into his
personal brand of liberal jurisprudence because it reveals his legal ideology as its own separate
entity instead of as a response to conservative methods. Justice Brennan widens his analysis to
incorporate how the Constitution should treat liberty interests, with respect to the most
appropriate level of generality. He pays much attention to the facts of the case as a means to
claim there ultimately is no concrete difference between action and inaction. He begins with a
general view of the state’s system of protecting children: “Wisconsin has established a child
welfare system specifically designed to help children like Joshua…Wisconsin law invites—
indeed, directs—citizens and other governmental entities to depend on local departments of
social services such as respondent to protect children from abuse.”75 With this setup, Justice
Brennan creates a framework that emphasizes both the specific purpose of the social service
department, and the extent of its authority within the context of the government. His words
create somewhat of a map of the inner workings of the system through pointing out that the
legislature has established a structure in which citizens, governmental service agencies, and law
enforcement officials, are all instructed to contact the department of social services to handle
cases of child abuse.
Through its child welfare program…the State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens
and governmental bodies other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do
anything more than report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or
dismisses these suspicions, no one will step in to fill the gap. Wisconsin's child protection
program thus effectively confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy
DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to remove him.
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Conceivably, then, children like Joshua are made worse off by the existence of this
program when the persons and entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs.76
With such a chain of command, it logically follows that the department of social services has the
specific responsibility of protecting children from abuse when it is reported. By implementing a
system in which the department of social services bears the final authority to intervene in child
abuse cases, the legislature entrusts this specific department to carry out its duty—especially
considering it is the only state department with such a duty.
Justice Brennan then applies the actions following the chain of command to the specific
case:
Each time someone voiced a suspicion that Joshua was being abused, that information
was relayed to the Department for investigation and possible action. When Randy
DeShaney’s second wife told the police that he had “hit the boy causing marks and [was]
a prime case for child abuse,” the police referred her complaint to DSS. When, on three
separate occasions, emergency room personnel noticed suspicious injuries on Joshua’s
body, they went to DSS with this information. When neighbors informed the police that
they had seen or heard Joshua's father or his father’s lover beating or otherwise abusing
Joshua, the police brought these reports to the attention of DSS.77
This emphasis placed on the authority of the department of social services is crucial to Justice
Brennan’s overall argument because it demonstrates both the petitioner’s and community’s
adherence to the procedure put in place to stop child abuse, and most importantly, the failure of
the most important player to follow the procedure. Justice Brennan describes the failure of the
department of social services:
And when respondent Kemmeter, through these reports and through her own
observations in the course of nearly 20 visits to the DeShaney home, compiled growing
evidence that Joshua was being abused, that information stayed within the Department—
chronicled by the social worker in detail that seems almost eerie in light of her failure to
act upon it.78
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The lack of action taken by the state sheds light on the reason behind Justice Brennan’s
discussion of the series of events that took place in DeShaney. He is embarking on a line of
reasoning that leads to legitimizing his view of the relevant constitutional principles concerning
when and how liberty must be protected. He makes his opinion more powerful by arguing in
favor of a higher level of generality to account for the most constitutionally coherent analysis of
tradition in light of the contemporary context of the case. He not only discusses the procedural
failure, but also the lack of humanity that can result when tradition is interpreted so narrowly. He
writes: “As to the extent of the social worker's involvement in, and knowledge of, Joshua's
predicament, her reaction to the news of Joshua's last and most devastating injuries is
illuminating: ‘I just knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead.’”79 This
attention to the specific facts of the case further justifies his opinion because it functions on both
a methodological level and an emotional level. Justice Brennan details the horrific outcome of
the situation as evidence that the plurality’s level of specificity is inconsistent with the
constitutional conception of liberty because it is too narrow to analyze the underlying values
behind the relevant legal traditions, and to adapt those values to best remain consistent in the
context of DeShaney. Instead, employing a higher level of generality would remain true to the
traditional conception of liberty by analyzing precedent based on its fidelity to constitutional
values, not literal, antiquated rules. This is an effective tactic because it stays true to relevant
legal principles while simultaneously connecting such principles to their actual result in society.
Justice Brennan uses the facts of the case to blur the line between what constitutes action
and inaction. He argues that the very nature of the child protection program itself implies a duty
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to act because the agency has the distinct role of intervening in cases where children need a third
party to protect their liberty interests.
While many different people contributed information and advice to this decision, it was
up to the people at DSS to make the ultimate decision (subject to the approval of the local
government’s corporation counsel) whether to disturb the family’s current
arrangements…Unfortunately for Joshua DeShaney, the buck effectively stopped with
the Department.80
By investigating, yet not acting, the service agency is intentionally choosing to neglect its duty,
which subsequently denies adequate protection of liberty to the child.
It simply belies reality, therefore, to contend that the State “stood by and did nothing”
with respect to Joshua. Through its child protection program, the State actively
intervened in Joshua’s life and, by virtue of this intervention, acquired ever more certain
knowledge that Joshua was in grave danger.81
What makes the social service agency so uniquely at fault here is their exclusive control over the
decision whether or not to take action to protect a child from alleged abuse.
After Justice Brennan proves that the child’s liberty interests were unconstitutionally
denied, he ends his opinion with a jab at the originalist interpretation of the case. This is a fitting
end because he has just advocated a more general interpretation of the past by refocusing his
historical narrative of constitutionally protected liberty interests to apply to the contemporary
role of social service agencies. The entire second half of his opinion relies on the purpose of the
agency as an integral component to determine whether or not there exists a traditional
constitutional duty to act. Justice Brennan’s interpretation almost entirely gives authority to the
evolving societal role of governmental agencies as justification to interpret tradition through
preserving a set of principles and values, instead of through literally preserving the most specific
procedurally relevant, yet substantively antiquated, laws. This serves to encompass a more
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consistent tradition of liberty interests. Justice Brennan attacks the logic of the majority opinion’s
interpretation on the grounds that it looks in the exact opposite direction. While Justice Brennan
emphasizes the importance of expanding rights to apply traditional values and principles to
contemporary societal structures, the plurality emphasizes limiting rights to remain most
consistent with the political and legal agenda of the past.
By subscribing to the theory of originalism, Chief Justice Rehnquist legitimizes his
methodological narrowness with the justification that he is giving authority to the intent of the
Framers. Chief Justice Rehnquist interprets due process in accordance with originalist ideals
through the assertion that the clause “was intended to prevent government from abusing [its]
power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.”82 Justice Brennan points out that such an
interpretation is highly problematic when applied to the contemporary relationship between
individuals and the state. The relationship has greatly evolved since the Framers crafted the
Constitution, which creates a line of analysis that explores whether an originalist view protects
the fundamental guarantee of liberty in this modern context. Justice Brennan writes: “My
disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can be every bit as abusive
of power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then
ignores it.”83 Justice Brennan ends his dissent on this note to connect his earlier section attacking
the majority opinion’s use of precedent with his later section incorporating contemporary social
and political ideals into his interpretation. He effectively complicates the action-inaction
dichotomy that the majority opinion relies on so heavily by arguing that it is the inaction, rather
than the action, that represents the real abuse of governmental power. Through an interpretation
that focuses on the Framers’ original intent of minimizing government intervention in citizens’
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private lives, the majority opinion’s adherence to the highest level of specificity causes it to
overlook the contemporary role of government intervention by means of social services.
Justice Brennan concludes by highlighting the injustice that arises from the practical
outcome of the majority opinion’s insurmountable methodological flaw. He makes an emotional
appeal about the sorry state of affairs brought about by this decision:
Today’s opinion construes the Due Process Clause to permit a State to displace private
sources of protection and then, at the critical moment, to shrug its shoulders and turn
away from the harm that it has promised to try to prevent. Because I cannot agree that our
Constitution is indifferent to such indifference, I respectfully dissent.84
This argument especially holds strong ground against the facts of the case. The father beat and
abused the petitioner, Joshua, constantly and severely. The state was notified of the situation, yet
did not take Joshua out of his father’s custody. After these beatings went on for an extended
period of time, Joshua’s father beat him so badly that he suffered permanent brain damage and
became profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother sued the county on the grounds that Joshua’s
substantive due process rights were violated because the state did not protect his liberty interests.
With these facts, it is impossible to separate the current moral and political institutions in place
from the meaning behind the text of the Due Process Clause. The text calls for some level of
generality by providing an abstract guarantee of liberty, regardless of the difference between the
societal structure that existed in the 1700’s and the one existing today. The most constitutionally
correct outcome, according to the implications of the Clause, is the one that remains consistent
with this guaranteed right to liberty. This interpretation takes the constitutional conception of
liberty in light of the interest in protecting individuals against state abuses of power. In contrast
to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s argument that the state does not have an affirmative obligation to
intervene in private family matters, the Court must account for the legislative aspect of the
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situation—the social service agency was created by the people and for the people to prevent the
exact tragedy that occurred. With this consideration, the Court does not act as a policymaker. It
respects existing policy decisions.
Justice Brennan’s dissent represents the legal capabilities of a new liberal methodology,
yet leaves room for much more progress. While he is successful in shifting toward a higher level
of generality, he still largely succumbs to the trap of playing defense against the narrow
conservative position. The conservative method of analyzing the most specific level of tradition
is a concrete guideline, whereas the liberals have not yet established a uniform approach to
determining the most constitutionally correct level of generality. This is further explored in the
second dissent in DeShaney, written by Justice Blackmun. His dissent can be characterized as
embodying a more definitive methodological precedent for the level of generality that liberal
jurisprudence should employ. Rather than attacking the majority opinion by methodically and
chronologically refuting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claims, Justice Blackmun plays upon the idea
that the strength of his dissent relies on a practical application of his liberal theory of generality.
It is also important to point out that perhaps Justice Blackmun does not delve into a categorical
critique of the narrow conservative opinion because Justice Brennan already has done so. By
assuming a defensive position, Justice Blackmun would essentially be making the same
methodological mistakes as the conservatives because he would be paralleling their exact method
he is criticizing, and he would also be restating Justice Brennan’s exact arguments. Instead,
Justice Blackmun dismisses the conservative interpretation with one strike. This allows him to
bypass a discussion of its inconsistencies, and delve straight into his view of how to interpret
DeShaney in the right way. He commences with the statement: “The Court itself retreats into a
sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the
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legal norms that should apply to those facts.”85 This opening is indicative of the tone of the rest
of the opinion because it is brief and direct. Justice Blackmun makes it clear that he has no
intention of plowing through the ‘sterile formalism’ of the majority opinion. He finds it sufficient
to note that this formalism clouds Chief Justice Rehnquist’s ability to thoroughly interpret the
case with the appropriate legal framework. And with that, he moves on to the core of his dissent.
Justice Blackmun refers to the fundamental nature of due process itself. He states,
“formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”86 Due process interpretation cannot be confined to the most specific
tradition because the Clause itself is so fundamentally vague. This provides a legal framework to
justify a more general view of the past. Justice Blackmun’s dissent relies upon the inherent
ambiguities in most appropriately interpreting the Clause. He scoffs at the Court’s “attempts to
draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction”87 on the grounds that such restriction
aims to convert due process interpretation into an exact science. It is ridiculous to get caught up
in the action-inaction terminology because it causes the Court to overlook the obviousness of the
state’s fundamental duty to protect the child from abuse. With this theoretical framework, Justice
Blackmun derives authority from an entirely different school of interpretation than does his
conservative counterparts. He refocuses the case back to its core issues through advocating the
use of a level of generality that best allows the Court to remain loyal to the conception of liberty:
The question presented by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment
precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to
read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a ‘sympathetic’ reading, one which
comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not
be exiled from the province of judging.88
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This type of interpretation exemplifies a shift towards concretely establishing a new liberal
methodology. Justice Blackmun looks at due process as a guide for interpretation instead of as a
limit on the scope of protected liberties. The vagueness of the clause invites the Court to choose
how to read it in light of the issues of the case at hand. And in DeShaney, Justice Blackmun
believes the appropriate interpretation should be broad because the case deals with issues of
justice in a circumstance that could not have been anticipated in the political climates of the past.
This line of reasoning grapples head-on with the fundamental problems of the conservative
methodology. Justice Blackmun openly acknowledges the validity of different levels of
generality and claims that, ultimately, the constitutionally sound decision is the one that applies
principles from the text, intent, and precedent, to the relevant context. The key is that it is the
principles that must conform to legitimate constitutional protections of liberty, not the literal, and
often outdated, most specific legal norms of the past. Justice Blackmun does not read anything
into the text that is not there, nor does he deviate from the intent of the Framers. He simply views
their intent in terms of the deliberate vagueness of the Clause in order to provide interpretive
leeway, not to instruct the Court to be as consistent as possible with the norms of the 1700’s. He
uses the intentional ambiguity of the Clause to justify drawing upon a timely conception of
justice and liberty in the modern context of the case.
The legal framework of Justice Blackmun’s dissent raises pressing questions about how
the Court could possibly determine what is the conception of justice. There is not just one
singular conception, and it is apparent in the differences between the majority opinion and the
two dissents that different conceptions of justice are at play even in this one case. How can
Justice Blackmun possibly interpret the Due Process Clause in terms of “dictates of fundamental
justice”? Chief Justice Rehnquist places moral value on the idea of limited government
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intervention, whereas Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun both place moral value on the safety
and protection of the abused child. The notions of justice and morality should not reflect the
personal judgments of the Court. They should reflect those of society. In DeShaney, the people
of Wisconsin had already made the moral decision simply by the fact that they established the
child welfare system. This demonstrates that the collective morality supports the protection of
abused children. The Court must incorporate this sense of morality into the decision-making
process. This line of reasoning is relevant to the process of institutionalizing a new liberal
methodology because it stays true to the past, and applies the values of the past to the values that
form the contemporary collective morality. Deferring authority to society’s collective sense of
morality holds true in all cases. In Roe, it holds true because abortion is a more generally
accepted practice that it historically was (as shown through both legislative decisions and
medical advances), and as such, the Court does not act as a policymaker; it simply rules in favor
of a policy that society has already largely incorporated into its collective morality. The same
goes for Lawrence because its ruling is based on a notion of morality constructed by both
societal and legislative attitudes toward sodomy practices. The idea of a collective conception of
justice and morality is also relevant in Michael H. because the Court incorporates an analysis of
the current social and political view of the family structure, and rules in accordance with these
moral values.
In order to decide the case in light of the inherent broadness of a principled due process
decision, it is necessary to integrate the morality-based social and political norms of modern
society. This includes the structure of governmental institutions, which inherently reflect the
moral trends of society in general.89 The notion that the intent of the Framers was to incorporate
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the due process doctrine for the purpose of protecting the people against the power of state
government does not provide adequate support for the majority opinion in DeShaney. It implies
that the state has no obligation to protect the more vulnerable individuals from endangerment in
the privacy of the family home. This establishes groundwork for the plurality’s narrowness. Yet
taking into account the role of contemporary social service institutions brings in the moral
argument that since their purpose is to protect those who do not have the resources or abilities to
protect themselves against infringements of liberty interests, it follows that the state has the
obligation to intervene since the social service agency in question was created with exactly that
function. This ideology is not just that of Justice Blackmun’s; it is representative of society at
large. There is evidence to support such ideology within the legislative policy decisions that
established the social service agencies. While it is likely the case that Justice Blackmun
personally subscribes to his proposed political outcome, and Chief Justice Rehnquist subscribes
to his, the moral argument here works on a legal level that supports Justice Blackmun’s values
because they are the values that reflect those of the legislature and society at large. Justice
Blackmun provides adequate evidence to explain the conception of liberty and justice in
contemporary society. This is the foundation of Justice Blackmun’s view of the level of
generality upon which to analyze the case. He interprets tradition with the most specificity
possible that will preserve society’s conception of liberty.
Justice Blackmun ends his opinion with exactly this sentiment. He combines an
emotional appeal based on the collective morality urging the Court to make decisions with
humanity and compassion, with a legal framework emphasizing the importance of the conception
of justice. He writes:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and
intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents, who placed him in a dangerous
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predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing
except, as the Court revealingly observes, “dutifully recorded these incidents in [their]
files.”90
Justice Blackmun explicitly interjects a sense of morality into his legal opinion. Yet, this is
arguably an appropriate tool. There is an interesting balance between having a formal command
of language that allows the Court to interpret the legal principles outlined in the Constitution and
having an emotional appeal towards sympathy and justice in a particularly horrific situation. This
balance can only function legitimately if the emotional appeal is grounded in society’s
conception of liberty, not in the personal view of the justice. Emotionally driven rhetoric has a
special place in judicial opinions. While striving to create a purely legal methodology, the Court
is naturally comprised of human beings with different conceptions of humanity and compassion.
This baseline of morality is an omnipresent component underlying all judicial opinions. To
ignore this fact is to deny its existence. To claim to rule on purely legal grounds is a farce.
“Adjudication is an act of interpretation, whereby a judge decides a novel case by fitting his
decision to the existing body of legal materials, while invoking principles to give the best
possible meaning to those materials.”91 The inevitability of injecting even the most miniscule
hint of the justices’ personal values within the process of giving substantial meaning to legal
doctrine must be acknowledged. Yet this inevitability is not a detriment to the goal of remaining
purely legal, as long as any emotional language is representative of society’s collective standards
of morality.
In Justice Blackmun’s conclusion, he seamlessly achieves an effective balance between
law and humanity. He follows up his proclamation of “Poor Joshua!” with an explanation of why
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he so adamantly advocates in favor of Joshua on a legal level. This is an effective structure
because he first appeals to the Court on an emotional level, and then provides legal justification
for such emotions.
It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles— so full of late
of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and justice for all,” that this
child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly
retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve—but now are denied by this
Court -- the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light of the
constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is meant to provide.92
Justice Blackmun criticizes the Court for supposedly basing its decision on constitutional
principles of liberty and justice, which he says is immensely flawed because the decision, in
effect, confirms that Joshua will neither receive the right to liberty nor to justice. How can Chief
Justice Rehnquist claim to adhere to the due process guarantee of liberty when his decision does
not hold the state responsible for failing to intervene, and subsequently, allowing a healthy child
to procure permanent brain damage? Justice Blackmun proves that the Constitution must be
interpreted with a level of generality that encompasses modern circumstances, as they relate to
the Constitution’s protected concepts. The conservative interpretation perhaps functions in
accordance with a theory designed to protect liberty over two centuries ago. Yet when applying
such an antiquated interpretation to a modern circumstance, the opposite outcome occurs in
terms of trying to preserve liberty principles; the Court actually deprives the child of his liberties.
In conclusion, DeShaney covers considerable ground in the establishment of a more
coherent liberal jurisprudence. Since the majority opinion encounters the fundamental problems
with employing too high a level of specificity, the liberal dissenting opinions have an abundance
of material to work with. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun successfully adhere to the
basic foundations of liberal methodology. They still view the Constitution as a rulebook
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containing a set of rules and principles that must be followed. Yet they understand that the text of
such a vague Clause is a guideline to interpret fundamental constitutional principles in a timely
and appropriate manner in the context of the specific case.
If the criticism of conservative jurisprudence is that it relies on the most specific level of
tradition, then conservative jurisprudence is coherent as it is. It may not appeal to the more
liberal view of how the Court should interpret the Clause, but its conservatism does rest on
legitimate legal grounds. Liberal jurisprudence is defined by a greater level of generality because
liberals derive authority from the principles underlying the relevant traditions, and then apply
those principles to the changing social and political climate in such a way that best upholds the
conception of liberty. Liberal jurisprudence does not embody the same level of coherence as
does its conservative counterpart because the liberal methodology deals with integrating less
straightforward notions of morality and contemporary societal norms. But DeShaney at the very
least demonstrates the liberals’ potential. DeShaney hints at the avenues upon which liberal
jurisprudence can be more consistent, and can establish more concrete guidelines to determine
the most valid level of generality. Yet, it is not a landmark of liberal jurisprudence mainly
because both Justice Brennan’s and Justice Blackmun’s dissents do not establish strong enough
methodological precedents to redirect the Court down a path toward a more liberal judicial era.

ii. Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989)
Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) questions the expansiveness of due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of the state’s involvement in the family structure. In this
case, Gerald D. and Carole D. were married and bore a child. Yet, Carole D. had an extramarital
affair with Michael H., who had a paternity test revealing he was the biological father. When
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Michael attempted to claim visitation rights, Gerald argued that his claim was invalid because
under California law, when a child is presumed to be a child of marriage, a third party can only
challenge this belief within the first two years of the child’s birth. Michael claimed that this law
violated his due process rights, both substantively, by denying him the constitutionally protected
liberty to have a parent-child relationship with his biological child, and procedurally, by
excluding him from being able to seek visitation rights in family court because he is not the
child’s father by law. The Supreme Court upheld the California law and granted sole paternity to
Gerald. Because the case questions the degree to which liberty interests are protected by due
process, the contention surrounding the specificity of the majority opinion did not end after the
case was decided.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, examines common-law tradition to determine
which parent, Gerald or Michael, has the more historically protected liberty interest. He claims
Michael does not sufficiently prove that his liberty interest is a fundamental right because it is
not as “deeply imbedded within society's traditions”93 as is Gerald’s liberty interest. Justice
Scalia begins his opinion on this note: “the California statute that is the subject of this litigation
is, in substance, more than a century old.”94 This immediately sets the stage for a line of
reasoning based on the constitutional authority held by the notion of tradition.
Justice Scalia employs a slippery slope argument to justify the claim that a ruling in favor
of granting Michael the right would encourage the development of a family situation that is
inconsistent with the historical constitutional protection of traditional family structures. If
Michael were to be declared the biological father of the child, the immediate change in the
family would be an allowance of visitation rights. Justice Scalia argues there exists a slippery
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slope here because other rights would necessarily follow, “most importantly, the right to be
considered as the parent who should have custody.”95 If Michael were to attain such parental
status, he would also assume
the right to the child’s services and earnings; the right to direct the child’s activities; the
right to make decisions regarding the control, education, and health of the child; and the
right, as well as the duty, to prepare the child for additional obligations, which includes
the teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.96
This slippery slope details the extent to which Justice Scalia believes the traditional family
structure would be broken in such a circumstance. However, his reasoning runs into trouble in
the sense that he “tried to write 1950s white middle class theories into the Constitution.”97 The
Constitution does not extend in such a way that allows the Court to read definitive guidelines on
any specific type of protected family institution into its language. Justice Scalia fails to
incorporate the idea that “there are, of course, other traditions of family life in this country.
There are traditions of extended families, of spousal separations, of common law marriage and
unmarried cohabitation—but apparently they don’t count, since we didn’t see them on ‘I Love
Lucy.’”98 Justice Scalia’s methodology is flawed because it places constitutional legitimacy on
basing the level of protection that individuals should be accorded upon his personal value
judgment of the family tradition. His slippery slope establishes a very narrow scope of analysis
because it does not stop to consider that the rights that could follow from granting Michael
parental status may in fact be more in accordance with the principles behind familial traditions,
such as stability and love, than denying the biological father-child relationship would be. Justice
Scalia takes issue with the possibility that Michael will assume more rights if he is given the
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right to claim parental status, yet the majority opinion forgets that, on a procedural level, such
rights would be determined in an entirely separate judicial proceeding, and it is yet to be known
whether or not they would be granted. He also does not engage in a constitutional argument
about why Michael receiving more rights would be a bad thing, except that they would disrupt
the “traditional family” Justice Scalia favors—one whose traditions hardly derive directly from
the time of the founding.
Justice Scalia’s conception of tradition encounters fundamental problems on a substantive
level as well. Michael H. necessitates that the Court search for an objective constitutional ideal
regarding the level of protection that should be afforded to the traditional family institution. Such
an endeavor must begin with the core question: how is tradition defined and with what level of
specificity should it be evaluated? Not only does Justice Scalia ignore this entire search for the
most constitutionally justifiable interpretation of tradition, he also skips the step of defending
what scope of familial tradition he is even looking for. Why, and on what constitutional grounds,
does he limit his scope to the liberty interest of the marital unit instead of the liberty interest of
the biological father-child relationship? With this methodological error, he dives into his opinion
with a treatment of the family unit resembling the 1950s nuclear family. This is problematic
because
a tradition is often, in an uncanny way, a betrayal of itself. For Scalia’s vision of the
unitary family, as exemplified by television situation comedies of the 1950s, portrays a
theory of the family that was hypocritical even in its own time since even what white
middle class families in the 1950s said one should do and not do sexually was not in fact
what they always did, as we all found out later on.99
Regardless of whether he chooses this type of family unit or another type from another era, the
core of the mistake is that he claims there is a compelling interest to remain true to the most
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specific traditions of the familial unit. He views the most specific tradition in terms of an actual
family structure, rather than the underlying principles of stability and love, among others, that
the familial unit is designed to facilitate. He does not elaborate on how his conception of this
nuclear family, and its emphasis on protecting the marital unit, is the most valid tradition upon
which to base his analysis.
To establish and enshrine a tradition is thus at the same time to establish a
countertradition—a seamy underside consisting of what society also does and perhaps
cannot help but do, but will not admit to doing. The overt, respectable tradition depends
upon the forgetting of its submerged, less respectable opposite, even as it thrives and
depends on its existence in unexpected ways.100
Justice Scalia does not account for the aspect of the familial tradition that emphasizes protecting
individuals’ autonomy to define their own families. He bases his conception on a combination of
outdated media ideals, religious values, and other underlying prejudices, rather than on the
principles central to the familial tradition that have remained most consistent throughout
legislative and social evolution. Namely, the enduring values that society preserves, as
individuals navigate the norms of the family structure, constitute the most accurate view of
tradition. For instance, the legislative policies dictating divorce procedure or same-sex adoption,
among the many other examples of the perhaps “unconventional” circumstances that define the
modern family, provide insight into the scope of familial relationships that are preserved in
contemporary society. Not only does Justice Scalia ignore such essential elements of the
definition of tradition, he actually draws upon a historical narrative of a family structure that has
since been largely exposed as unrealistic as evidence of the strength of the institution of
marriage.
For example, in the television and movies of the 1950s, one sees Rock Hudson and other
homosexual or bisexual males playing the parts of monogamous heterosexual males, and
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implicitly endorsing a heterosexual lifestyle. These roles served to support and define the
very tradition of sexual practices of which Justice Scalia speaks. They furthered and
reinforced a tradition of values that the persons playing these roles owed no fealty to—a
tradition that required of each of them a particular form of self-betrayal.101
Such a substantive analysis of Justice Scalia’s conception of the family undermines the
legitimacy of the authority he places on the tradition of the family unit as primarily being a
product of marriage. The process of deriving constitutional legitimacy from an interpretation of
tradition, and then concretely applying this authority to the substance of the case, is certainly a
necessary part of the Court’s methodology. Yet, Justice Scalia does not carry out such a process
legitimately because he skips the critical step of defending his rationale behind deferring to such
specific tradition. As such, his loyalty to the traditional nuclear family is an extremely limiting
force in his analysis.
Justice Scalia discusses the tension between procedural and substantive applications of
the due process doctrine to argue in favor of employing a methodology that necessitates a
substantive analysis of familial tradition. This is an interesting move because he is a vocal
proponent of denying the legitimacy of substantive due process in individual rights cases on the
grounds that such decisions should be left to the legislature. Yet, in Michael H., a procedural
analysis has no legal ground to stand on that would support his ruling. He writes that Michael’s
claim is procedural in nature because the state did not grant him his procedural due process right
to be provided a judicial avenue to prove his paternity. He argues that the statute calls for the
substantive rule of law because, as the Court of Appeals ruled:
The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a
determination by the Legislature, as a matter of overriding social policy, that given a
certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband is to be held responsible
for the child, and that the integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.102
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With this language, Justice Scalia insists that the statute itself relies on the subjective concept of
maintaining integrity in the traditional family unit. This allows the Court the freedom to evaluate
the set of criteria that defines “integrity.” Such judicial freedom justifies the line of reasoning
leading to the conclusion that “inquiries into the child’s paternity…would be destructive of
family integrity and privacy.”103 This reasoning blurs the distinction between procedural and
substantive analyses because Justice Scalia prematurely embarks down a substantive analytical
route in regard to what constitutes “integrity” in the familial tradition before he even rules on
whether Michael has the procedural right to claim parental status.
Justice Scalia looks to precedent to justify his claim that Michael H. does indeed
necessitate a substantive due process interpretation. He cites Stanley v. Illinois (1972), Vlandis v.
Kline (1973), and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur (1974) as precedents of a similar
nature that do not rely on procedural due process. These cases strike down claims challenging
“irrebuttable presumptions” under the law. They deal with laws affording protection only to
certain groups of individuals who fall under certain classifications. Stanley looks at whether an
unmarried biological father can file for custody of his children upon their mother’s death. In this
case, the Court does not rely on a procedural due process analysis to protect the process of the
father’s right to a judicial hearing. Instead, the Court looks to history and tradition to understand
whether such a right is “traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
family.”104 The Court in Stanley rules that the biological father’s claim is indeed protected by
familial tradition. This methodology provides a precedent upon which to carry out a substantive
due process analysis in Michael H. in order to determine whether Michael’s claim is consistent
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with the tradition of the unitary family. Justice Scalia argues that the Court rules in favor of the
biological father’s claim in Stanley because, although the traditional family unit values the
marital unit above most other interests, the claim has no bearing on disrupting anyone else’s
marriage. Justice Scalia’s argument that disrupting marriage is unconstitutional runs into
problems because he does not provide any legal grounds for such claim. In Stanley, the Court’s
analysis of tradition can also be expanded to include households with unmarried parents because
the tradition of a single father and his children is valued more in society than those being
children in the foster care system. Justice Scalia accepts the Court’s decision in Stanley but
criticizes it on the grounds that it if the Court continues to expand the definition of the traditional
family, it will get to the point where it “will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected
relationships—and will thus cease to have any constitutional significance—if it is stretched so
far as to include the relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and their
child,”105 as is the circumstance in Michael H.
In Michael H., the married couple can be viewed as a class of citizens that is protected
under the “irrebuttable presumption” that any child bore within this marital unit is the biological
child of both parents. Justice Scalia writes that the
“irrebuttable presumption” cases must ultimately be analyzed as calling into question not
the adequacy of procedures, but…the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and
the policy that the classification serves.106
Essentially, the notion of “irrebuttable presumptions” repositions ostensibly procedural claims
into the substantive sphere on the grounds that these procedural claims are unconstitutional
because they interfere with more compelling state interests of protecting indisputably stronger
traditions, such as the tradition of marriage. As the Stanley precedent invokes the substantive due
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process doctrine, Justice Scalia rejects Michael’s procedural claim on such grounds. But does
“protecting the tradition of marriage” necessarily mean “not disrupting a person’s marriage,”
that, by the way, has already been disrupted in that the wife bore a child with another man? Even
if it does mean that, is protecting this tradition a compelling enough state interest to justify
denying a man the right to be a father to his biological child?
This sets the stage for the rest of his opinion because Justice Scalia limits his analysis to a
response to the substantive component of Michael’s claim—that because he has a biological
parental relationship with the child, Michael claims that the protection of Gerald’s and Carole’s
marriage is an insufficient state interest to justify criminalizing Michael’s relationship with his
child. This aspect of Michael’s argument is substantive in nature because it raises the issue of
whether he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a relationship with his biological
child, or whether Gerald and Carole have a more pressing liberty interest in raising the child in a
traditional family home with two married parents.
Justice Scalia does not embark on his substantive analysis until he has theoretically
justified his methodology. He writes that the Court must use great caution in relation to
substantive due process. Although there exists precedent allowing the Court to create new
constitutional rights, this does not mean that the Court should act upon such precedent again.
Justice Scalia believes the Court “is the most vulnerable, and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
even the design of the Constitution.”107 This rationale narrows the scope of interpretation because
it categorically rejects any possibility of rights expansion because it would be unfaithful to the
text. Justice Scalia defines “new constitutional rights” as rights that are not specifically outlined
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in the Constitution, and subsequently, are a product of the Court’s creation. Yet, his black-andwhite view of the Court’s history of protecting (or creating) rights does not account for the whole
picture. He does not look at the Due Process Clause in terms of its vague language. He fails to
consider that perhaps the Court is not creating new rights; but is looking to the conceptions of
liberty and privacy within the Constitution, and interpreting these guarantees with respect to the
overarching principles preserved through common law, history, tradition, and contemporary
political norms. These criticisms of Justice Scalia’s narrowness are a result of the unduly broad
conservatism within his sweeping rejection of all implied fundamental rights that are not in
accordance with his personal moral convictions. This is evident in the fact that he ironically
rejects the legitimacy of implied fundamental rights in liberty and privacy individual rights cases,
but not in property rights cases.
Justice Scalia advocates the narrowest treatment of substantive rights claims because “in
an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the
interest denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to
objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society.”108 To defend this
view, he cites Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) as evidence that the Due Process Clause only
affords protections that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental,”109 and Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) to prove that precedent dictates a
“continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society.”110 Justice Scalia’s analysis of the scope of substantive due
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process is so limited in nature because it places an overwhelming amount of authority on the
most specific history and tradition.
Justice Scalia’s opinion invites the question: why would it be so detrimental to loosen the
restrictions imposed by this strict conservative view of tradition? Why is Justice Scalia so
adamantly opposed to viewing tradition in terms of more general principles? He writes that the
“purpose is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional
values— not to enable this Court to invent new ones.”111 He treats tradition as a test for whether a
right has been unwaveringly historically protected. Justice Scalia downplays the possibility that
traditions change, and that sometimes these changes can be for the better because they better
embody the fundamental principles of liberty in a changing society. He does not incorporate any
interpretive mechanisms that would place value on preserving principles instead of concrete legal
traditions. This criticism of Justice Scalia does not advocate a system in which the Court creates
rights to further the evolution of societal tradition. Rather, the criticism is that Justice Scalia does
not accept the notion that the Court should incorporate tradition based upon changes that have
already occurred. With this, the Court does not act as a policymaker; it simply keeps up with
contemporary society instead of confining its rulings to an antiquated vision.
By invoking a substantive interpretation of due process that claims the Court can only act
in ways most specifically protected by tradition, Justice Scalia narrows his interpretation to the
utmost extent:
The legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship between persons in
the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society, or whether, on any other basis, it has been accorded
special protection. We think it impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to the contrary,
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our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they
acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of claim Michael asserts.112
Justice Scalia continues this line of reasoning with the argument that there are no traditionally
protected liberties for adulterous fathers. His distinction here is that while there may exist
protected rights for unmarried fathers, traditional protection does not extend to circumstances
where the mother is married because, in this case, the father is adulterous. Although the
Constitution protects parental liberties, Justice Scalia claims that tradition and nature do not
protect paternal rights of two fathers, one by marriage and one by adultery. This stringent
adherence to tradition necessarily limits the constitutionality of due process claims because he
defines the family in such strict historically conventional terms. Furthermore, he treats the
familial tradition in terms of its values regarding the role of adulterous fathers. Yet why not look
to the tradition of protecting biological father-child relationships? The answer is that this
interpretation would undermine Justice Scalia’s conservative agenda to limit the establishment of
new rights.
Justice Scalia chronicles the legal history of the family structure in his discussion of
ancient common law traditions. He writes: “the presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental
principle of the common law. Traditionally, that presumption could be rebutted only by proof
that a husband was incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant
period.”113 This historical narrative is a favorable attestation to Justice Scalia’s claim that the
legal rights of the marital unit have traditionally been treated as the most compelling state
interest. It is notable that Justice Scalia relies on evidence from the English legal system of the
1500s to defend his view of the family structure of the United States five centuries later. He
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explains that such laws were based upon the societal aversion to classifying children as
illegitimate. He also concedes that more recent laws in the United States and England have
loosened such strict constraints, yet are still strongly biased against determining a child of a
married woman to be illegitimate. Justice Scalia does not find any historical evidence
specifically addressing the rights of a biological father to reclaim parental rights over a child
whose mother is married to another man. He takes this lack of evidence to mean that Michael has
the affirmative burden to prove the existence of this right in a context that has historically
favored the sanctity of marriage. This burden rests upon precarious constitutional grounds
because it calls for the Court to interpret rights cases from the vantage point of needing to prove
a right exists, rather than assuming the burden of needing to prove a right does not exist as a
basis to deny it.
This positions Michael in a hopeless battle. If Justice Scalia places heavy emphasis on the
most specific tradition, and Michael’s claim has not been unrelentingly historically protected, he
ultimately has no grounds to stand on. This methodology encounters major theoretical problems
because it implies that the Court cannot legitimately rule in favor of protecting any rights or
liberties that have not been historically protected beyond the shadow of a doubt. If this is the
case, how can the Court take into account any societal evolution whatsoever? For example, what
about women’s rights? And what’s more, how can the Court protect individual rights in cases
where some form of oppression has come about with new technologies that simply did not exist
throughout history?
Justice Scalia elaborates on his justification with a discussion of the levels of generality
that the Court should use for interpreting tradition. His theory of specificity is the core of his
analysis. “The level of generality at which the Supreme Court defines liberty interests is
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important because it, along with the Court’s definition of tradition, wholly determines whether
the due process clause protects an asserted liberty interest.”114 The basis of his argument is that
implied fundamental rights—namely rights that are not specifically referred to in the
Constitution, but are protected within the scope of broader enumerated rights—cannot be
determined by the recognition of a general tradition because this would leave “judges free to
decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs,”115 and would undermine the entire
notion of a rule of law.116 Instead, he limits the scope of substantive due process by stating “that
the Court should use only the most specific level of tradition it can identify in order to determine
whether a particular right or liberty is to be protected.”117 This demonstrates Justice Scalia’s
narrow interpretation of the illegitimacy of implied fundamental rights. “Because any general
tradition might arguably protect a multitude of asserted liberty interests, such a method would
allow for the proliferation of rights. To limit the proliferation, Justice Scalia utilizes a notion of
levels of generality.”118 He claims that when the Court goes about determining the most
constitutionally correct level of generality at which to define a liberty interest, it should
refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for example, there were no societal
tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously
conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions
regarding natural fathers in general. But there is such a more specific tradition, and it
unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent.119
The notion of looking to tradition in a manner that emphasizes specificity makes sense in the
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context of conservative jurisprudence because it stays true to the jurisprudential agenda of
limiting rights as much as possible to remain most consistent with the scope of rights that existed
when the Framers drafted the Constitution. A low level of generality is simply unable, and
unwilling, to account for the manifestation of enduring societal values in a more contemporary
context.
Justice Scalia defends his methodology with the claim that “general traditions provide
such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate, rather than discern, the society's
views.”120 The attack on a more general view of tradition is valid for those who subscribe to the
view that a proliferation of rights would be a constitutionally unsound outcome. Since generality
widens the scope of protected rights not specifically referred to in the Constitution, it follows that
a theory of specificity would narrow this scope in the opposite direction. As Justice Scalia
employs such a specific methodology, he concludes that society has traditionally denied
paternity rights to unwed fathers in circumstances where the child was conceived through
adultery. He arrives at this conclusion because he finds that it refers to the most specific
tradition.
Under Justice Scalia’s approach, this supposed societal tradition defines the class of
constitutionally protected parent-child relationships narrowly and excludes those
relationships in which the parent was an unwed father of a child adulterously conceived.
When the scope of substantive due process protection is defined at this level of generality,
Michael’s relationship with Victoria is unprotected.121
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion remains faithful to his self-proclaimed legal conservatism,
there is still much room for criticism on the grounds that his level of generality is inconsistent
with basic principles of substantive due process. His methodology encounters problems in terms
of the more liberal idea that the Constitution is intentionally vague in order to retain the ability to
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remain relevant over centuries as a living document. If the language is read as an intentionally
general and abstract guarantee of life, liberty, and property, Justice Scalia’s stubborn devotion to
specificity becomes nonsensical. Such specificity excludes the possibility of looking to more
general principles of liberty that society has traditionally valued as a guide to determine the most
constitutionally correct scope of rights protection in modern circumstances. If the Court looks to
a more general view of tradition based upon the historical protection of biological father-child
relationships, the evidence would cause the case to be decided very differently.
Justice Scalia draws upon precedent to justify his strict approach to interpreting tradition.
He references Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) to argue the Court historically denies protection in
claims where the right in question has been criminalized by any state legislature at any time in
history. In Bowers, the Court rules against expanding sexual autonomy and privacy rights to
include sodomy practices. As one aspect of its justification, the Court looks to the historical
criminalization of sodomy in the United States: “At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States had criminal sodomy laws, that all 50 of the States had such
laws prior to 1961, and that 24 States and the District of Columbia continued to have them.”122
This historical criminalization of sodomy practices (although these laws were steadily being
abolished state-by-state) creates a historical narrative that is valid enough evidence for the Court
to determine that sodomy is not to be included in the scope of rights associated with sexual
autonomy. With this precedent, Justice Scalia writes: “we concluded from that record, regarding
that very specific aspect of sexual conduct, that to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
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liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”123 Ironically, Bowers is later overturned because this justification
is determined to be constitutionally invalid in its exceedingly rigid specificity.
This justification regarding the validity of drawing upon the most specific tradition is
faulty at best and catastrophic at worst. The claim that Bowers provides a precedent for the
theory of specificity sets up an interpretive method of looking to family and social values from
the time of ratification on which to base contemporary decisions. With this logic, due process in
itself becomes null because it only serves to protect historical liberties in their narrowest, most
conservative sense, disregarding the notion of protecting principles to account for social
evolution.
Justice Scalia does address some criticisms of his argument that are articulated in Justice
Brennan’s interpretation of the conception of liberty in his dissent in Michael H. Justice Brennan
argues that Justice Scalia’s opinion suppresses the liberty rights that individuals are allowed
within “the freedom not to conform.”124 Justice Scalia argues against this view because it looks at
the situation from a singular vantage point. He does not agree with the idea that “one disposition
can expand a ‘liberty’ of sorts without contracting an equivalent ‘liberty’ on the other side.”125
Justice Scalia criticizes Justice Brennan not only for having a bias towards Michael, but also for
advocating this bias at the expense of Gerald’s liberties. Justice Scalia believes that “to provide
protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father, and vice
versa.”126 This argument is fundamentally backwards because Justice Scalia approaches the case
in terms of the liberties of other individuals that may be denied if the petitioner’s claim is
granted. The constitutionally correct approach is to begin with the petitioner’s claim by
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analyzing the liberties that he is being denied. This is not considered a “bias” in favor of
Michael. It is simply the most appropriate procedure. Michael brings the case to the Court
because he believes that his liberty interests are being deprived. That is the core issue; it is not
about the impact on Gerald’s liberties.
Justice Scalia argues that the judiciary is not the right vehicle to settle this lose-lose
situation; the legislature should have the authority to make policy decisions dictating the nature
of parental rights. He discusses the roles of the legislature and the judiciary: “Our disposition
does not choose between these two ‘freedoms,’ but leaves that to the people of California. Justice
Brennan’s approach chooses one of them as the constitutional imperative, on no apparent basis
except that the unconventional is to be preferred.”127 While Justice Scalia argues that Justice
Brennan only sees one side of the controversy, he makes the same mistake by only seeing the
other side of it. He justifies his side with the claim that this issue should be left to the legislature,
but he fails to prove that the legislature has adequately addressed it. The statute in question does
indeed play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the case; but if it is to be used as
justification, the legislature’s rationale behind implementing this law must be thoroughly
analyzed and explicated. Justice Scalia quotes the text of the statute: “the issue [child] of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a
child of the marriage.”128 This language can certainly be construed to prove Justice Scalia’s
interpretation, yet it is not conclusive enough to end his argument there. For instance, it can be
argued that the statute alone is not sufficient to determine the case because the child is no longer
presumed to be a child of marriage in light of new medical technology allowing paternity to be
tested through DNA. Thus, Justice Scalia’s dismissal of Justice Brennan’s opinion ironically
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does exactly what he is criticizing. Justice Scalia attacks Justice Brennan for favoring one side,
yet by failing to convincingly prove that the legislature acted in accordance with constitutional
ideals, Justice Scalia favors the other. Justice Scalia’s view of the relationship between the Court
and the legislature is illogical because if all decisions pertaining to the scope of individual rights
are left to the legislature, there is no check on power. The legislature becomes free to only
protect majority interests at the expense of oppressing the liberty interests of minority classes.
This is precisely what the Court is supposed to protect against.
Overall, Justice Scalia’s opinion uses an approach that exacerbates the existing problems
of how generally the Court should interpret tradition. He employs a methodology that fits into
the larger vision of overly narrow conservative jurisprudence. Yet, he lacks a clear working
definition of tradition. He is uncertain in his effort to thoroughly reconstruct the past. He
demonstrates a clear bias by applying his own constructed notions of beliefs and customs to the
case.129 “And as a result, his theory becomes both unworkable and unsound.”130
Justice Scalia’s opinion evokes contentious responses both in the concurrences written by
Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens, and in the dissents written by Justice Brennan and Justice
White. While Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens concur with the majority opinion, they are
careful to broaden their interpretations to combat the potential dangers embedded in the limits
Justice Scalia establishes. Justice O’Connor takes issue with the inconsistencies of Justice
Scalia’s historical analysis. She argues that his high level of specificity causes him to be
inconsistent with precedent. She writes: “On occasion the Court has characterized relevant
traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be ‘the most specific
level’ available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode
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of historical analysis.”131 With such a strict adherence to specificity, the Court is unable to adapt
to unanticipated circumstances. Justice O’Connor widens the scope of historical analysis in such
a way that it legitimizes different levels of generality, and thus, allows the Court to view history
in terms of more general underlying principles.
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion fundamentally agrees with the outcome of the case,
yet takes issue with the methods used to arrive at this outcome. He disapproves of Justice
Scalia’s sweeping rejection of the idea that “a natural father might ever have a constitutionally
protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting
with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth.”132 Such a sweeping rejection
creates too broad a precedent. Justice Scalia invalidates the possibility that “enduring ‘family’
relationships may develop in unconventional settings.”133 Justice Stevens finds such a holding
too restrictive. His argument relieves some of the narrowness of the majority opinion because it
allows for the future possibility of a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship in
another case of this nature, or in another case involving an unconventional family relationship in
general. For this reason, Justice Stevens’ opinion corrects one aspect of the flaws of Justice
Scalia’s methodology. While Justice Stevens does discuss the root of his argument, he does not
delve into the concept of the unconventional family relationship with respect to the most
legitimate scope of historical narrative. If Justice Stevens were to chronicle historically the
traditions of the family, he would possibly find that so-called unconventional family structures
are becoming more and more common on both a social level and a policy-based level. As such,
Justice Stevens rightfully criticizes the narrowness of Justice Scalia’s opinion, but does not go
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into enough detail to place his claim (that enduring family relationships can develop in
unconventional settings) into a historical framework.
Justice Brennan’s dissent takes the complete opposite stance of the majority opinion.
Justice Brennan views tradition as a means to interpret societal values and morals throughout
history, and apply these enduring principles to modern circumstances. He argues that the Court
has historically interpreted due process in terms of whether the limitation on the liberty in
question “impermissibly infringed upon one of the more generalized interests—such as freedom
from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, and childrearing—that ‘form the core of our
definition of ‘liberty.’”134 This directly undermines the theory of specificity Justice Scalia has set
forth. Justice Scalia interprets the issue in its most specific form to be whether society
traditionally protects the rights of adulterous fathers. Justice Brennan rejects such specificity
through interpreting the core issue to be “whether the specific parent-child relationship under
consideration is close enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an
aspect of ‘liberty’ as well.”135 Justice Brennan’s conception of tradition is fundamentally more
liberal in nature because it looks to an all-encompassing vision based on the general principles
underlying the liberties that have been traditionally protected. Through this analytical
framework, he concludes that precedent supports Michael’s liberty interest in his relationship
with his daughter. Justice Brennan looks at the tradition of biological parent-child relations,
combined with the tradition of substantial parent-child relations in the family setting, in order to
discover the level of generality that provides the best evidence in favor of Michael’s liberty
interest.
Justice Brennan begins his dissent by attacking the majority opinion’s definition and
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application of tradition. He eloquently highlights the fundamental misconceptions embedded in
Justice Scalia’s evaluation of tradition:
Apparently oblivious to the fact that this concept can be as malleable and as elusive as
“liberty” itself, the plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border around the
Constitution. The pretense is seductive; it would be comforting to believe that a search
for “tradition” involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through
dusty volumes on American history.136
These criticisms of Justice Scalia’s methodology create the framework of Justice Brennan’s
analysis. By looking at the theoretical problems that arise from the Court’s adherence to the most
specific tradition, Justice Brennan sets up a lens in which the case should be analyzed. He
reasons that if the Court cannot even agree on which traditions shed most light on the liberty
interests at stake in Michael H., the majority opinion thus fails to establish and implement the
necessary objective standards upon which to evaluate tradition. To the majority opinion, he
comments, “It is ironic that an approach so utterly dependent on tradition is so indifferent to our
precedents.”137 This sums up the inconsistencies in Justice Scalia’s methodology because it
explains that the majority opinion relies so heavily on the authority of tradition in a literal sense,
but does not adequately adhere to preserving the principles behind these traditions in a
substantive sense.
Justice Brennan further highlights the extent of Justice Scalia’s methodological blunders
through a discussion of the practical effects of his ruling on precedents. Justice Brennan states
that if the Court interprets tradition with such a high level of specificity, a multitude of past
decisions will be overturned. He elaborates with a list of cases that fall under this category:
Surely the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples, Eisenstadt v. Baird, (1972), or
even by married couples, Griswold v. Connecticut, (1965); the freedom from corporal
punishment in schools, Ingraham v. Wright, (1977); the freedom from an arbitrary
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transfer from a prison to a psychiatric institution, Vitek v. Jones, (1980); and even the
right to raise one's natural but illegitimate children, Stanley v. Illinois, (1972), were not
“interest[s] traditionally protected by our society,” at the time of their consideration by
this Court.138
These cases exemplify circumstances in which the Court rules in favor of protecting the liberty
interests at stake, in a context where such liberty interests were once prohibited. Justice Brennan
deduces that “if we had asked, therefore, in Eisenstadt, Griswold, Ingraham, Vitek, or Stanley
itself whether the specific interest under consideration had been traditionally protected, the
answer would have been a resounding ‘no.’”139 Seeing as such a high level of specificity was not
applied in these cases, Justice Scalia’s interpretive method in Michael H. is not supported by
precedent.
Justice Brennan does not stop the criticism there. He states that not only is Justice
Scalia’s interpretive method novel, it is misguided. The misguided nature of the opinion stems
from the fact that Justice Scalia ignores the guidelines for interpreting tradition that are implied
by the Constitution’s deliberately broad language. Justice Brennan writes:
In the plurality’s constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the fact that the
original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world in
which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired a particular
child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and
stigmatizing role it once did.140
This critique is based upon the notion that the vague language of the Constitution necessitates a
broader view of relevant principles. Justice Brennan points out that tradition does not account for
current technology allowing blood tests to determine paternity, and furthermore, illegitimacy
does not carry the same stigma that it used to. This aspect of Justice Brennan’s interpretation
relies on an analysis of contemporary societal structures to demonstrate that the most specific
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tradition can actually contradict the underlying liberty principles at stake when applied to a
modern circumstance. Justice Brennan claims the Court should identify codified rules relating to
liberty interests in terms of their principles. Such identification provides key insight into the
underlying societal values being preserved.
Justice Brennan describes the difference between Justice Scalia’s approach and his own,
respectively, as a choice between asking whether the liberty interest is protected by the most
specific law or whether the liberty interest is traditionally protected by the principles underlying
the moral and political trajectory of a more general set of laws. The former option implies that
the Court must find evidence within the literal laws of the past, and apply it today as it was
exactly applied throughout history. This methodology “ignores the kind of society in which our
Constitution exists.”141 On the other hand, the latter option accounts for a more realistic and
complex view of society. Justice Brennan does so by looking for evidence in the principles
preserved throughout society’s changing laws and policies. Justice Brennan’s method
acknowledges, “we are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
one in which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellant practice
because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies.”142 If society can agree that
institutions of “family” and “parenthood” are highly valued, it is irrational and destructive to
attempt to agree on the substantive qualities of those values. Such attempts, as made by Justice
Scalia, diminish the freedom not to conform because they establish a system in which liberty
interests require specific permission from history. The opposite approaches by the liberal and
conservative justices are also indicative of the challenges of establishing a coherent liberal
jurisprudence. Since conservatives draw upon a much narrower scope of analysis, their
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methodology is much less complicated. Conservatives give authority to concrete legal traditions,
while liberals give authority to the principles behind these legal traditions. It is only natural that
the liberals’ large body of evidence is more abstract and intricate, and thus, it is more difficult to
maintain coherence and consistency.
Justice Brennan argues that the majority does not interpret the Constitution in a manner
consistent with the nature of the document itself. While Justice Brennan regards the Constitution
as a living charter, the majority opinion views it as “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.”143 This view is fundamentally
backward because Justice Scalia fails to recognize that times change and that a traditional rule is
prone to evolve from its original foundation in order to remain loyal to its underlying traditional
principles.
The differences between Justice Brennan’s and Justice Scalia’s approaches stem from the
fact that they are grounded in entirely different theories of constitutional interpretation. Justice
Brennan does not agree with Justice Scalia’s theory of specificity because he “cannot accept an
interpretive method that does such violence to the charter.”144 Since both justices have opposing
views on the nature of the Constitution itself, their methodologies are undoubtedly rooted in
differing assumptions as well. Justice Scalia interprets his role as a justice to be that of ensuring
the rules of the past continue to prevail in modern times. Whereas, Justice Brennan sees his role
to be that of interpreting values of the past, and then reinterpreting them in modern
circumstances to ensure they remain consistent with the general guarantees of the original
document. Such a distinction is indicative of the divide between liberal and conservative
jurisprudence in family rights cases. Both types of jurisprudence begin with the same goal of
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recognizing the most relevant constitutional principle that must be drawn upon to decide the
case. This is done through looking at the text itself and interpreting the exact language. The next
step from both standpoints is to find precedent that sheds light on the way the Court has
historically treated similar liberty interests. This process provides the necessary evidence to
analyze the case in terms of history and tradition. Up to this point, the liberal and conservative
methodologies continue to follow the same trajectory. The justices necessarily carry out such
methodology because the entire basis of constitutional law primarily relies on the Constitution
itself, and on the Court’s past treatment of the document. It is at this juncture that the liberal and
conservative methodologies diverge. The conservative methodology stops here because
conservatives believe this is the point where the Court fulfills its requirement of seeing that the
values of the past continue to be upheld. The liberal methodology requires another step because
the Court has not yet reinterpreted the values of the past to most consistently apply to the new
constitutional questions that arise in contemporary society. This next step embodies the defining
methodology in the quest for a new and coherent liberal jurisprudence. As such a process does
not yet embrace consistent standards in the same way that the conservative process does, it is up
to the liberal justices to establish guidelines that best apply constitutional ideals of the past to
more contemporary contexts. This is easier said than done. By giving authority to principles,
instead of rules, the liberal methodology is inherently much less cleaner and tidier than the
conservative methodology. This is because the liberal members of the Court cannot just open a
history textbook to locate the most specific traditional legal rules. The liberal justices must look
outward to a combination of various norms of the past and the present, and ultimately, piece
them to create a conception of the tradition at hand. Thus, the establishment of a coherent liberal
jurisprudence is undeniably characterized by a much more chaotic process.
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Justice Brennan embarks on a mission to apply historically protected liberty interests to
the application of the law in Michael H.’s particular circumstance. He explores whether the
parent-child relationship is sufficiently established through precedent. Is the relationship close
enough to the interests the Court has previously protected within the constitutional guarantee of
liberty? Unlike Justice Scalia, who only looks at whether Michael H. is consistent with evidence
of legal norms relating to the historically protected family unit, Justice Brennan’s methodology
incorporates the next step of analyzing the overall constitutional conception of liberty in the
context of parent-child relationships. He then applies this conception of liberty to the modern
family unit. Justice Brennan explores four precedents that rule on whether unwed fathers have
protected liberty interests in their relationships with their children:
Though different in factual and legal circumstances, these cases have produced a unifying
theme: although an unwed father’s biological link to his child does not, in and of itself,
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link,
combined with a substantial parent-child relationship, will do so.145
This adherence to precedent is important because he looks at the principles behind the cases
instead of deriving authority from their actual facts. Such methodology avoids the conservative
mistake of narrowing the ruling to only giving authority to concrete historical rules and
procedures. Rather, Justice Brennan derives authority from the underlying values in the
precedents. He regards the unifying values as the true indicators of history and tradition because
they demonstrate the principles that society deems worthy of protecting. This gives him leeway
to defend his dissent on the grounds that he is adhering to these principles translated into a novel
circumstance.
Justice Brennan criticizes the majority’s dismissal of the most relevant precedents
because this dismissal reflects a value judgment on the part of Justice Scalia. The plurality denies
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the relevance of these cases on the grounds that they all protect the “unitary family”—namely,
the family consisting of married parents and their children. In placing such value on his
conception of the “unitary family,” Justice Scalia disregards the view that the historical
protection of the father-child relationship in the unitary family can be reinterpreted to embody
the same set of values surrounding familial relations in the context of the modern conception of
the family structure. The contention between the plurality and the dissent is whether the Court
has a duty to uphold historical legal definitions of the structure of the family unit, or has a duty to
uphold the underlying values that dictate the extent of protected liberty interests in family
relations. Justice Brennan disagrees with the level of importance that the plurality places on the
definition of the family:
The plurality’s exclusive, rather than inclusive, definition of the “unitary family” is out of
step with other decisions as well. This pinched conception of “the family,” crucial as it is
in rejecting Michael’s and Victoria’s claims of a liberty interest, is jarring in light of our
many cases preventing the States from denying important interests or statuses to those
whose situations do not fit the government's narrow view of the family.146
If the Court only affords the guarantee of liberty to those who fit the conservative definition of
the “unitary family,” every family structure that does not fit into their mold will be forever
doomed to a systemic denial of these same liberties. With such a precedent, the conservative
Court sees no room for any family structures that are out of sync with its ideas on what the
family unit should consist of. This negates the Court’s role to impartially protect liberty interests
from instances of oppression by the majority rule because the conservative justices enforce a
legal vision of the family that excludes certain minority classes. Justice Brennan believes such a
denial of liberty interests creates the real inconsistency in terms of the general guarantees of due
process because it ignores the underlying themes and values associated with the status of the
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family in society.
Justice Brennan also casts doubt on the legitimacy of Justice Scalia’s methodology on a
procedural level. Justice Brennan reasons that there is a good explanation as to why the Court
has never looked at the relationship unwed fathers seek to disturb while ruling on whether the
unwed father has a liberty interest in the biological father-child relationship. The conservative
methodology prohibits one individual’s liberty interests because it may possibly infringe on
another’s. This is inconsistent with the Constitution because it shifts the focus from determining
whether a liberty interest exists to determining how it can be terminated.
According to our established framework under the Due Process Clause, however, we first
ask whether the person claiming constitutional protection has an interest that the
Constitution recognizes; if we find that she does, we next consider the State’s interest in
limiting the extent of the procedures that will attend the deprivation of that interest.147
Justice Scalia’s fundamental misinterpretation of the Due Process Clause resides in the fact that
he ignores the Clause’s allowance for a high enough level of interpretational freedom to
substantively determine if a liberty interest falls within the scope of protection. Yet the Clause
does not provide the same interpretational freedom for the Court to go on a fishing expedition for
the disruptions such a liberty interest may cause. In searching for the disruptions that may occur
if the biological father is to be granted the right to have a relationship with his child, the Court
ignores the process of first evaluating the biological father’s affirmative claim itself. Justice
Brennan writes: “Michael’s challenge in this Court does not depend on his ability ultimately to
obtain visitation rights; it would be strange indeed if, before one could be granted a hearing, one
were required to prove that one would prevail on the merits.”148 Justice Brennan criticizes Justice
Scalia for jumping directly into a discussion of the repercussions of the biological father’s
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substantive parental role if he is given the right to a relationship with his child. Instead, Justice
Scalia should start with a procedural analysis of the initial claim.
Justice Scalia’s methodology is grossly inappropriate when analyzed against the
biological father’s claim itself. The statute in question determines that the husband of the
biological mother is legally considered to be the child’s father despite DNA evidence showing
that another man has a 98 percent probability of being the biological father. In Michael H., the
biological father asks the Court for a hearing to grant him legal parental status. Procedurally, if
he cannot legally establish his paternity, he cannot petition for any further substantive rights.
Justice Scalia requires that Michael prove that his potential father-child relationship is in the best
interest of the family unit as a whole. This is premature because he overlooks the main question
of whether Michael even has the procedural right to a hearing to determine his parental status.
“The point of procedural due process is to give the litigant a fair chance at prevailing, not to
ensure a particular substantive outcome.”149 Justice Scalia wastes time conjecturing about the
possible scenarios that can arise if the biological father plays a role in the child’s life. Such
conjectures are irrelevant because Michael cannot even file for custody if he is not recognized as
the child’s father by law. “The State has declared a certain fact relevant, indeed controlling, yet
has denied a particular class of litigants a hearing to establish that fact.”150 Justice Scalia
approaches procedural due process from the wrong vantage point because he analyzes the
possible negative outcomes associated with granting the liberty interest, before he looks at the
constitutionality of the liberty interest itself. Furthermore, his substantive analysis is arbitrary.
Why does he choose to value the traditional interests of the marital family unit instead of value
the interests of the child, or the interests of the biological father for that matter? Michael does not
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seek to change the relationship between the mother and her husband; he only seeks to have a
relationship with his daughter. If Justice Scalia insists on analyzing the interests of parties other
than the actual petitioner, it is completely arbitrary for him to choose the marital interest over
any of the other interests at stake.
Ultimately, Justice Brennan interprets the question before the Court to be “whether
California has an interest so powerful that it justifies granting Michael no hearing before
terminating his parental rights.” Such phrasing emphasizes that the state interest must be
exceedingly compelling if it is actually sufficient enough to deprive the biological father of his
right to procedural due process. Justice Brennan suggests that the possibility that the state
interest is more powerful than the guarantees of due process is unlikely at best. He employs
precedent to support the view that the biological father should be permitted to retain his
procedural due process right to a hearing to decide whether he is to be recognized as the father.
This procedure must be granted before the Court can legitimately terminate his right to a
substantive relationship with the child based upon a justification composed of speculations as to
what will occur after the hearing. Justice Brennan cites Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. (1950) to support his view:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause, but there can be no doubt that, at a minimum, they require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.151
This precedent functions as evidence that the state cannot limit procedure simply because it does
not support the substantive outcome. When there arises a claim that an individual’s liberty
interests are being denied by the state, the minimum due process guarantee is that of a procedural
hearing specifically addressing the claim. Justice Brennan writes that “it would be strange indeed
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if a State could curtail procedures with the explanation that it was hostile to the underlying,
constitutionally protected interest.”152 In Michael H., this so-called “strange” procedure is
precisely the problem. The Court wrongly looks to the best-interest principle to argue in favor of
protecting the stable family unit consisting of the married parents, and subsequently, the
relationship between the child and presumed father.
The liberty interests associated with protecting the traditional family unit are determined
by who gets custody, not determined by who is the father. Justice Brennan writes: “Family
finances and family dynamics are relevant, not to paternity, but to the best interests of the
child— and the child’s best interests are not, as I have stressed, in issue at the hearing that
Michael seeks.”153 In the claim of the biological father, custody and general lifestyle decisions
are not the issue. Michael only seeks to be granted a legal status that recognizes him as the
child’s father. “In order to change the current situation among these people, Michael first must
convince a court that he is Victoria’s father, and even if he is able to do this, he will be denied
visitation rights if that would be in Victoria’s best interests.”154 The fact that Justice Scalia
blatantly ignores the procedural aspect of the case is fundamentally inconsistent with the most
basic constitutional principles. Justice Brennan writes, “It is elementary that a determination that
a State must afford procedures before it terminates a given right is not a prediction about the end
result of those procedures.”155 By employing a methodology entirely dependent on an end result
that will possibly come about if the Court rules in favor of granting the procedural right, the
basics of constitutional law are forgotten by the Court, or at least by the majority.
Justice White also writes a dissent in Michael H., in which the premise of his argument is
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that since the biological father demonstrates a sufficient interest in having a relationship with the
child, constitutional protection of this liberty interest should follow suit. His approach is similar
to that of Justice Brennan in the sense that he relies largely on tradition, but does not look to the
most specific tradition that Justice Scalia advocates.156 Justice White focuses on the traditions
associated with the legal status of unwed fathers, rather than on the status of adulterous fathers.
The core of his analysis of tradition is that “the basic principal enunciated in the Court’s unwed
father cases is that an unwed father who has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his
paternity by way of personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities has a protected liberty
interest in a relationship with his child.”157 He provides evidence through drawing on precedent
involving unwed fathers to support his claim that the existence of a substantial father-child
relation, combined with the father’s willingness to take on the responsibilities of parenthood, is
traditionally treated by the Court as a sufficient interest to grant parental legal status. Justice
White also makes arguments about the relevance of new medical technology—specifically the
advances of DNA testing that make the statute in question even more outdated. He goes one step
further and debunks the plurality’s argument about the stigmatization that existed in ancient
common law on the grounds that the social and political associations with such stigma are no
longer relevant in the modern context. Overall, Justice White’s dissent concisely touches upon
the problems with Justice Scalia’s interpretation. In conjunction with Justice Brennan’s dissent, it
reinforces the standard approach for liberal justices to treat tradition with a more consistent level
of generality, and subsequently embodies a more coherent liberal jurisprudential vision.
Outwardly, Justice Brennan’s dissent can be characterized as a good liberal opinion in the
sense that it effectively criticizes the inconsistencies of the conservative majority opinion. Justice
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Brennan makes one compelling argument after another about why Justice Scalia’s opinion is not
constitutionally sound. When Justice Brennan turns his dissent from attacking the majority
opinion to stating his own opinion, the validity of his interpretation of tradition falls short. By
looking at the value system behind the relevant historical liberty interests, Justice Brennan
certainly employs a methodology much improved from that of the majority opinion because he
eases up from Justice Scalia’s high level of specificity. Justice Brennan, as expected, claims it is
overly narrow to view tradition in its most specific form because such specificity results in an
inability to account for any modern circumstances that may alter the preservation of the
underlying values. He alternatively subscribes to a more general view of tradition that asks how
the underlying value system can best translate into a new, more modern context. This is certainly
a more liberal methodology because it places importance on the trajectory of a tradition from its
history up until its manifestation in contemporary society.
Yet, the dissent takes on a conservative slant in its propensity to conform and obey past
tradition, rather than defining liberty as an individualistic concept.158 To an extent, Justice
Brennan falls into the same trap as Justice Scalia does through attempting to validate his decision
based upon laws rather than principles. He questions the liberty interests of unwed fathers to
have relationships with their biological children in terms of historical legal protection, rather than
the principles that invariably underlie the evolution of the legal norms. While Justice Scalia
looks to the tradition of the unitary family through the lens of the requirement of the marital unit,
Justice Brennan looks to the involvement Michael already has with his biological child. This
provides the framework for him to argue that legal tradition does indeed recognize a
constitutionally protected relationship.
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What contribution does Justice Brennan make to the liberal jurisprudential agenda by
interpreting tradition with more of an emphasis on the traditional legal rights of unwed fathers,
instead of on the state interest in preserving the unitary family? One reason Justice Brennan’s
interpretation is more liberal is that he gains historical insight on the level of rights affirmatively
afforded to individuals in similar circumstances, rather than seeking out the disruption of third
parties’ liberty interests before even analyzing the petitioner’s claim. The former methodology is
inherently more liberal in nature because it begins with an exploration of the general liberty
interest being denied. The latter is distinctly more conservative because it functions from the
bottom up—it begins with an analysis of the inconsistencies of tradition that may occur if a series
of events take place after the initial right is granted, rather than beginning with the exploration of
whether the right should be granted in the first place. In this way, Justice Brennan arguably
arrives at the constitutionally correct outcome. Yet there is another way to answer this question
of which interpretation of tradition is more liberal. In this next approach, neither methodology is
more liberal. Justice Brennan makes the same methodological mistake as Justice Scalia in
viewing the case as a categorization of traditionally acceptable family structures. Although both
justices differ in their perceived narrowness of tradition, they still confine the outcome of the
case to what the law traditionally deems to be acceptable.
Both Justices Brennan and Scalia prove to be traditionalists of the first order. Justice
Scalia seeks to enforce his view of “tradition,” establishing the hegemony of his vision of
culture, thus betraying other values and other traditions in the process. But Justice
Brennan is equally a betrayer. For he seeks to use a general concept of tradition to
subvert tradition, thus betraying it. If Scalia’s use of tradition is a betrayal, Brennan’s use
of tradition against itself is a betrayal of a betrayal. And in so doing Brennan attempts to
elevate a countertradition—which rejects Justice Scalia’s views of socially appropriate
behavior—to constitutional importance.159
With this reasoning, Justice Brennan’s methodology is deceivingly conservative. “Both justices
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seek to protect and conserve the traditions of the past against contemporaneous or future
change…they protect not the individual’s right to be different, idiosyncratic, iconoclastic, or
rebellious, but rather the individual’s right to conform to tradition and obey its dictates.”160
Justice Brennan looks to legal traditions of the biological father-child relationship in order to
define the liberty interests at stake. Justice Brennan still values a historical legal conception of
familial institutions and individual relations above all else, just as Justice Scalia does. This is
only truly overcome if he looks to the principles guiding the historical legal protection of the
family unit, and bases his analysis on the best way to remain consistent to such principles in a
contemporary setting.
In criticizing Justice Brennan’s adherence to historical conceptions of liberty for having
underlying roots in conservatism, the next question is: if methodology that seeks to preserve the
most specific history and tradition is jurisprudentially conservative in nature, what is the
alternative for liberal jurisprudence? How can liberal jurisprudence be consistent with
established constitutional principles if it does not provide interpretations based on specific legal
traditions of the past? What other legitimate basis is there upon which liberal justices can make
decisions? The entire field of constitutional law is based upon an adherence to a document of the
past, and upon the precedents that have been established in accordance with the rules and
principles of this document. The interpretational tools at hand are necessarily based on the past.
As such, it may outwardly appear counterintuitive to criticize Justice Brennan for looking to
remain consistent with legal traditions as a basis to decide the case. Yet the heart of the criticism
of Justice Brennan’s methodology is not that he looks to the past to ground his interpretation. It
is that he does not look to the past in light of the larger conception of liberty. “The Justices’
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collective need to constrain interpretation by the ethical demands of the adjudicative virtues has
cramped our understanding of liberty, as well as of the Constitution’s other general phrases.”161
By strictly placing value on past tradition and precedent, the Court fails to consider the actual
principles underlying past traditions. Thus, it does not acknowledge whether those principles will
continue to hold strong in the conception of liberty interests in contemporary society.

B. Abortion Rights
i. Roe v. Wade (1973)
Roe v. Wade (1973) is a quintessential case in establishing a more coherent liberal
jurisprudence because the controversial decision is “the clearest example of noninterpretivist
‘reasoning’ on the part of the Court in four decades.”162 With a basic understanding of the
different schools of constitutional interpretation, another category comes about in which these
theories can be further broken down: interpretivism and noninterpretivism. Interpretivism refers
to a reliance on both the implicit and explicit content of the written text, whereas
noninterpretivism validates looking beyond the written content and relying on norms that cannot
be discovered through the text alone.163 The idea behind interpretivism is appealing on a
theoretical level because it functions within the realm of the known. The two significant
attractions of an interpretivist approach are that “it better fits our usual conceptions of what law
is and the way it works”164 and it better “reconcile[s] itself with the underlying democratic theory
of our government”165 than does the alternative. The prospect of noninterpretivism is an easy
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target for criticism because it deals with taking the unwritten, and thus unknown, into account.
On a practical level, the theory of noninterpretivism plays a big role in the normative evaluation
of liberal jurisprudence because it allows for the decision-making process to be intertwined with
moral values, as well as with changes in American social and political norms. The novel
adherence to noninterpretivist reasoning in Roe represents the beginning of a phenomenon in
which the liberal justices push the boundaries of how generally they can possibly interpret
tradition.
Not only does Roe break ground in defining a new methodology of liberal jurisprudence,
it also incorporates larger issues concerning the role of the Court in politics. Roe necessarily
forces the Court to mediate between opposing politicized views within a national controversy,
and attempts to end the controversy by deferring to a solution rooted in the Constitution.166 The
legal reasoning in Roe is guided by the notion that the Court should look beyond the actual text;
it should look to current social and political norms as an integral part of the decision-making
process. This high level of noninterpretivism makes Roe a contentious case because the decision
brought about largely unprecedented issues of the political nature of substantive due process,
building upon those disputes that originally articulated in Griswold, which had previously been
discredited by the Lochner era.167 Roe is an instrumental case in testing the appropriate levels of
restraint versus activism.
In Roe, the Court determines that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is constitutionally
protected on the grounds of the existence and applicability of a fundamental right to privacy.
Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion claims that this right is embedded within the Fourteenth
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Amendment’s conception of personal liberty, and its implied limitations on state involvement in
citizens’ private lives. Justice Blackmun states that the right to privacy presupposed in the text of
the Due Process Clause is broad enough to encompass the abortion decision, yet is subject to
some limitations. “Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’…
and…legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake.”168 In essence, the Court determines that a woman does have the constitutional right to
terminate her pregnancy, but there is a point where compelling state interests become dominant
in terms of protecting health, medical standards, and prenatal life. Justice Blackmun justifies his
opinion by drawing upon a multitude of social, political, and medical institutions throughout
history and in contemporary life. He analyzes the nature of abortion regulation, and concludes
that its history does not justify criminalization. This methodology is a critical aspect of liberal
jurisprudence because it represents a prime example of looking beyond the text to base an
opinion on a combination of historical and contemporary evaluations of the American value
system. Justice Blackmun grounds his definition of the right to privacy in the language of the
Clause through its guarantee of liberty. With this textual groundwork in place, he shifts his focus
to medical, political, and moral institutional norms to determine whether the right to privacy
extends to include abortion. This begs the question of whether such a noninterpretivist analysis is
a constitutionally sound methodology. And if so, is it a part of the solution for establishing a
more coherent liberal jurisprudence?
Justice Blackmun looks broadly to history and tradition, and then moves on to a
discussion of how to best preserve these traditions in the context of contemporary state interests.
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He places his interpretation of tradition into a modern context to explore whether the enduring
principles behind the relevant traditions can indeed justify criminalization. Justice Blackmun’s
analysis begins all the way back with ancient attitudes about abortion. He finds that neither
Greek nor Roman law prohibited abortion on the grounds of protecting the unborn. The only
ancient context in which abortion was prosecuted was in circumstances where it violated a
father’s right to his child. Justice Blackmun incrementally moves forward in his historical
narrative to the Hippocratic Oath. He argues that although the Oath deems abortion unethical, it
does not represent the greater norms of its time because it “originated in a group representing
only a small segment of Greek opinion, and…was not accepted by all ancient physicians.”169
After this dismissal of the Oath’s authority in representing the ethical history of abortion, Justice
Blackmun discusses the tradition in common law, English statutory law, and American law. In
terms of common law, Justice Blackmun states it is doubtful that abortion “was ever firmly
established as a common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.”170 In
English statutory law, he notes that abortion is legal under the condition that the mother’s life is
at risk or the unborn child will be born handicapped. In American law, although abortion was
criminalized over time on a state-by-state basis, “a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right
to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.”171
Justice Blackmun’s next historical section is comprised of an analysis of the position of
the American Medical Association (AMA). He writes that the AMA, and the medical profession
in general, historically shared the country’s anti-abortion sentiment in the late nineteenth century.
This position evolved in the opposite direction in later years. In 1967, the general position was
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still that abortion was a criminal act, yet exceptions were made when medical evidence
documented health risks to the mother or unborn child. A few years later, the AMA was
categorized as being split in its opinion on abortion. It was a very polarizing issue for the medical
profession as a whole. The overall movement in favor of abortion rights was “felt to be
influenced ‘by the rapid changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make
abortion more freely available;’ and a feeling ‘that this trend will continue.’”172 Justice Blackmun
concludes his historical narrative with a sentiment in favor of the constitutional protection of
abortion rights. He draws upon a wide range of tradition that encompasses arguments both in
favor and against his final decision. Yet, he ultimately states that the cumulative history of
abortion practices demonstrates a trend in favor of legalization. For Justice Blackmun, this trend
is sufficient to justify protecting the right.
With his extensive historical analysis in place, Justice Blackmun refers back to the text of
the Constitution to firmly ground his methodology. He claims that while the Constitution does
not explicitly discuss the right to privacy, the Court has always recognized this right when it is
deemed fundamental to protecting ordered liberty. He dismisses the disagreements over whether
life begins at conception or at birth: “When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.”173 The Court’s role in defining the right to privacy is strictly in accordance with
protecting ordered liberty as best it can; it is not to make judgment calls on contentious medical,
religious, and social issues. With this assertion, Justice Blackmun tiptoes on the blurry line
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between acting as the ultimate political authority on a controversial social issue and rooting his
opinion in the Constitution’s text.
Overall, Justice Blackmun interprets history and tradition with a high level of generality
in order to create an all-encompassing narrative of the underlying liberty principles in question.
In terms of the structure of his opinion, it is notable that “only well past the two-thirds mark in
the opinion did Blackmun finally address the constitutional contentions advanced by ‘Roe’ and
other abortion case plaintiffs.”174 Before this, his methodology is comprised of: issues of
jurisdiction; a lengthy historical section; and an evaluation of the legislative purposes of
antiabortion laws. This notably veers away from the conservative roots of the Court’s
methodology due to its emphasis on the moral trends governing society’s political and social
evolution. Justice Blackmun invokes an objective sense of morality into his opinion by focusing
on societal attitudes towards abortion on a social, political, and legislative level. He relies on the
set of moral values that society places on abortion in order to validate his opinion that the
collective morality supports abortion as a protected privacy right under the Constitution’s broad
conception of liberty. This methodology has been subject to relentless criticism on the grounds
that Justice Blackmun does “not address the crucial challenge of substantive due process
jurisprudence—how to derive new fundamental rights and specify their content. Blackmun relied
on precedent to show the existence of the right of privacy.”175 The methodological problem is
that he simply states that the right is broad enough to encompass the abortion decision. Justice
Blackmun correctly looks to a general view of tradition to defend his opinion, yet does not create
a sufficient framework to defend the legality of this process, or so say the conservatives.

174

Garrow, David J. Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v.
Wade. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994, 590.
175
Griffin, 171.
98

Justice Rehnquist’s dissent attacks the methodology of the liberal majority opinion on the
grounds that it deviates too far from a legal decision. He writes that it “partakes more of judicial
legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”176 In straying so far from the intent of the Framers, Justice Rehnquist argues that
Justice Blackmun derives a right that “was apparently completely unknown to the drafters.”177
Justice Rehnquist invokes an originalist approach to justify his attack on Justice Blackmun’s
opinion. This in itself sheds light on the different values underlying liberal and conservative
jurisprudence. Conservative justices employ originalist methods to further their agenda of
limiting rights. The theory of originalism provides legal grounds for conservatives to reject the
argument that liberty interests can be expanded through a substantive understanding of the text.
The strictest form of originalism exclusively interprets even the most abstract language on a
procedural level. Liberal jurisprudence must accordingly defend the legitimacy of looking
beyond the text and incorporating contemporary norms and values into Court decisions, whereas
conservative jurisprudence strictly adheres to the theory of specificity in order to justify
imposing severe limitations on the scope of rights. In practice, Justice Rehnquist’s criticism that
Justice Blackmun’s opinion derives a nonexistent right falls flat when the majority opinion is
defended as being in accordance with the definition of liberty interests throughout history.
A fundamental component of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is the high level of specificity
he uses to interpret history and tradition. Unlike the majority opinion, which employs a higher
level of generality to hold that there is no sufficient historical evidence compelling enough to
justify criminalizing abortion, the conservative dissent interprets tradition in a much narrower
sense. Justice Rehnquist writes:
176
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The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those
States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it
seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934). Even today, when society’s views on abortion are changing, the very
existence of the debate is evidence that the “right” to an abortion is not so universally
accepted as the appellant would have us believe.178
In giving authority to the most specific history of abortion restriction, Justice Rehnquist imposes
fundamentally narrower limits than Justice Blackmun does. Justice Rehnquist utilizes his
historical narrative to make the overall point that if the right to abortion is not universally
accepted, then the validity of abortion being a protected liberty interest is unsatisfactory. By
asking the question of when abortion has been restricted, Justice Rehnquist approaches his
argument with an interpretation of history that supports limiting rights because it starts with an
evaluation of when such rights have been historically limited.
While Justice Blackmun certainly acknowledges that abortion is not a universally
accepted practice throughout history, he approaches his analysis with a level of generality that
begins with a search for traditions that support the constitutionality of abortion rights. He looks
to overall social trends, medical opinions, and parts of history in which abortion has been
acceptable. Justice Rehnquist does not buy this approach. Perhaps Justice Blackmun’s historical
review is overbroad, yet if so, Justice Rehnquist’s is undoubtedly overly narrow. He claims that
the very existence of a debate is enough to claim that abortion rights are not so rooted in
American traditions as to be constitutionally protected. If this is indeed the case, the larger
implication of Justice Rehnquist’s assertion is that the Court cannot protect any privacy interests
that have even been slightly subject to political debate. This makes Justice Rehnquist’s
methodology inherently flawed in its narrowness. Essentially, the liberal methodology begins
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with the question of when tradition has protected the right, whereas the conservative opinion
begins with the question of when tradition has prohibited it.
The fundamental contention between Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice Blackmun’s
opinions can be traced back to the nature of liberty interests themselves. Liberty interests are
protected in the Constitution using a variety of justifications regarding history, tradition,
morality, and compelling state interests. Justice Blackmun acknowledges all of these elements,
and subsequently looks to the “big picture” to arrive at a decision that accounts for the
culmination of all interests at stake. Justice Rehnquist is quick to disregard this process by
claiming on one level that there is no evidence of this right in the text or intent, and on another
level, that history fails to prove abortion is universally accepted. This methodology is similar to
that of Justice Blackmun on the most basic level—they both look to a textual interpretation
alongside a historical analysis. Yet, on a deeper level, this basic structure leads the two justices
to drastically different places. By finding no direct textual or historical evidence as a result of his
adherence to the theory of specificity, Justice Rehnquist closes his case. Whereas Justice
Blackmun finds the conception of liberty interests, and supports such a conception through a
detailed review of history, tradition, and compelling state interests. This methodology treats the
case with a higher level of generality to justify the constitutionality of the right in terms of its
consistency with the underlying principles behind the traditions of the liberty interest at stake.
The second dissent in Roe, written by the conservative Justice White, is unsurprisingly
very critical of Justice Blackmun’s methodology as well. Justice White first points to the
problems with the majority opinion’s implication that the Constitution values the decision of the
mother more than the life of the fetus. He is highly skeptical of a ruling in which the Court gives
full discretion to the woman, and subsequently fails to protect the life of the fetus. Justice
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White’s interpretation is flawed because he views the majority decision through the lens of his
personal beliefs about abortion. He does not view Justice Blackmun’s decision with respect to
the line of legal analysis he uses to reach his ultimate outcome. Justice White criticizes the
decision purely based upon his political reaction to the outcome. By stating that “during the
period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the
convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the
fetus,”179 Justice White embarks on a methodologically shaky road. He chastises the woman for
selfishly killing her fetus in an impulsive, careless manner. This judgment in itself undermines
his argument because it is not representative of the constitutional question at hand; it represents a
conservative stereotype of the “immorality” of the abortion decision. Furthermore, Justice
White’s dissent is an insulting characterization of women who choose the abortion option.
Nowhere in the realm of valid constitutional decision-making is there a place for harsh character
attacks on any class of individuals.
After his criticism of women who choose abortion, Justice White turns to an
interpretation of the text to support his claims. Lacking a concrete overview of history or textual
analysis, he asserts:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s
judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for
pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that
right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes.180
With this argument—that the Court essentially derives a new right out of thin air—Justice White
claims that Roe demonstrates an “extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review.”181 His
argument can potentially be supported in some schools of textualist and originalist theory on a
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theoretical level. Yet his strict interpretation is problematic for liberals because it puts substantial
limitations on many already established rights. In valuing the text as a literal procedural outline
for determining rights, Justice White implicitly advocates a system that disregards the multitude
of liberty interests that are not explicitly mentioned. He undermines his methodology by further
critiquing the decision in terms of his own political leanings, rather than looking to precedent or
trends in social values. Basically, Justice White criticizes the majority opinion due to its
evaluation of what the Constitution should value, and then he goes on to very clearly impose his
own political values. He writes, “I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice
by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by investing
mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it.”182 This is where
the fundamental flaw resides. Defining abortion practices as allowing mothers and doctors to
exterminate human life exemplifies the blatant value judgment in Justice White’s dissent. While
he criticizes the majority opinion for including political and social values, he then goes on to do
the exact same thing. This is problematic on two levels: it undermines his supposed strict
adherence to the text, and it makes the same methodological “error” as the majority opinion. If
Justice White is really basing his opinion purely on the text, as he claims, he should theoretically
have no need to back up his opinion with an appeal to his subjective version of morality. His
supposed textualist stance only goes so far as to state the right is nowhere to be found in the text.
He does not look at the section of text that the majority uses to derive the right. He does not
consider that the Constitution’s intentionally vague language is sufficient proof that the right
does exist in the text. He does not explicitly refer to any part of the text that would indicate the
flaw in determining the existence of such a right. Rather, his opinion makes the exact same

182

ibid.
103

mistake for which he attacks the majority opinion. In arguing that Justice Blackmun’s decision is
rooted in a liberal political leaning, Justice White hypocritically denounces the decision based
upon his conservative political leaning.
In looking at the majority opinion and dissenting opinions in Roe, the question inevitably
returns to the problems of liberal jurisprudence. How does liberal jurisprudence differentiate
itself from conservative jurisprudence? Roe highlights the fundamental differences between
liberals and conservatives in a new way. While DeShaney and Michael H. both support the
hypothesis that the difference between liberal and conservative jurisprudence is based on the
different levels of generality, Roe takes this theory one step further by establishing a precedent of
the extent to which liberal justices can employ such a high level of generality. While it is crucial
to note that in terms of the final outcome, the majority and dissenting opinions in Roe are in
accordance with the justices’ respective political ideologies (the liberal justices ultimately
support the right to abortion, whereas the conservative justices do not), the methods of
interpretation are greatly different. In terms of the dissenting opinions, the problem of too much
narrowness in the conservative approach certainly exists. Both Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White display characteristically conservative methods of interpretation through deferring
authority to the Framers and the text as a means to justify their specificity. Yet, the argument that
liberal jurisprudence makes the same fundamental mistakes does not seem to apply to Roe.
Justice Blackmun grounds his analysis in the text using a different concept of the
Constitution’s authority. A major scholarly criticism of Justice Blackmun’s opinion concerns his
fidelity to the text. In order to see how his methodology is not purely a political statement, and
rather contains legitimate constitutional interpretation, it is important to look at how the
arguments surrounding his lack of fidelity manifest themselves. Constitutional law scholar John
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Hart Ely argues that while the Roe decision is not bad in terms of its outcome, “it is bad because
it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be.”183 While Justice Rehnquist and Justice White make
insurmountable methodological mistakes themselves, are they correct in claiming Justice
Blackmun strays too far from the text? Through his focus on the historical and contemporary
social attitudes towards abortion legislation, does Justice Blackmun ultimately disregard his
“obligation to trace its premises to the charter from which it derives its authority?”184 Does he
employ too high a level of generality? Justice Blackmun defends his methodology as being
derived from the text through precedents relating to substantive due process and the
constitutional conception of liberty itself.
A defense of Justice Blackmun’s opinion is the key to evaluating the larger implications
of Roe and to understanding its contribution to furthering a more cohesive liberal jurisprudence.
In order to argue that Roe is legitimate, two underlying ideas must be regarded as legitimate:
“First, that the Constitution, in protecting liberty against deprivation ‘without due process of
law,’ acts in a substantive manner to protect sexual and bodily privacy; second, that this privacy
is ‘broad enough’ (in Justice Blackmun’s phrase) ‘to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.’”185 In order to prove these two concepts are true, it is first
necessary to look at how the text and precedent regard the meaning of liberty. The notion of
liberty is discussed in the text on a federal level in the Fifth Amendment and on a state level in
the Fourteenth Amendment, both of which prohibit the deprivation of “life, liberty, and property

183

Ely, John Hart. (1) “The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,” The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 82, No. 5, 1973, 947.
184
Ely (1), 949.
185
Hirsch, H.N. A Theory of Liberty: The Constitution and Minorities. New York: Routledge,
Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1992, 30.
105

without due process of law.”186 While this is a familiar phrase, what does it actually mean? How
far can it extend? The understanding of liberty in the Constitution is vague and abstract; however
it is not indeterminate.187 A review of history and precedent provides various insights on liberty
interests that cannot be ignored in this context:
There are at least four such propositions: (1) “Liberty” was protected when citizens were
protected from arbitrary government action. (2) Liberty was to be the rule, its restriction
the exception. (3) The liberty of an individual could be restricted only for agreed, limited
purposes: to protect another individual, or the public, from harm. (4) The purpose of
government, and of the Constitution, was to protect man’s natural rights, including
unenumerated rights. The most important of these rights were personal security and
property, broadly understood.188
These propositions all point to the conclusion that liberty interests are intended to encompass as
many parts of individual life as possible. Liberty should only be restricted when absolutely
necessary to protect others from harm. The role of the Court is to protect individual liberties at
all times unless there are such compelling interests at stake that it absolutely cannot. Liberty
extends as far as it possibly can; that is, until it encroaches on other liberty interests. As such,
Justice Blackmun’s methodology is most consistent with the constitutional conception of liberty
because it seeks to protect as wide a scope of liberty interests as possible. On the other hand,
Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice White’s methodologies lack this fidelity to the text because they
seek out traditions that limit the scope of liberty interests as much as possible.
Justice Blackmun’s assumption in Roe is that liberty extends to giving the judiciary
power to make a substantive evaluation. In doing so, he remains in accordance with the historical
scope of liberty interests because he regards liberty as a substantive process measuring all

186

U.S. Const., Amend. 14, Sec. 1.
Hirsch, 50.
188
Hirsch, 51.
187

106

interests at stake. Finding no compelling enough reasons to ban abortion, at least at the beginning
of a pregnancy, he determines that it should be protected.
Two precedent cases are particularly demonstrative of the legitimacy of Justice
Blackmun’s claim that privacy rights are indeed broad enough to include abortion: Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965) and Poe v. Ullman (1961). Griswold provides background for the use of a
substantive due process analysis; it affirms that the line of substantive due process reasoning is
appropriately carried out in Roe. Furthermore, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe sets a precedent for
the process of determining protected liberty interests by the Court.
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) is a landmark case in which the Court overturned a
Connecticut law criminalizing the use of contraceptives because it violated the right to marital
privacy. The majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, derives this right to privacy from the
penumbras of other constitutionally protected rights. Justice Harlan writes a concurring opinion
deriving the right to privacy from due process in the Fourteenth Amendment. In conjunction,
these two opinions set up a type of conceptual groundwork for Roe because they establish the
right to bodily privacy that they deem implicit in all other constitutional protections. Justice
Douglas bases his decision on the notion that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.”189 In essence, when reading the Bill of Rights as a set of protections, it follows that
there exists an implicit set of guarantees that give greater meaning to those that are codified.
Within every constitutional right to privacy, the Court derives “zones of privacy”190 emanating
from the given right. Justice Douglas provides examples of these zones of privacy in order to
back up his interpretation:
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The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States (1886) as
protection against all governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life.” We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) to the Fourth Amendment
as creating a “right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people.”191
This demonstrates how the Court can legitimately associate a specific codified right with the
entire zone of privacy protected within it. Boyd shows that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
protect individuals against all government invasions in the home, including a specific protection
against publicizing a man’s personal papers against his will. While the Bill of Rights does not
discuss the protection of private papers, it falls within the entire zone of privacy.
Justice Douglas then applies this method of interpretation to Griswold. He claims that this
idea of the zone of privacy is applicable because the right to privacy incorporates the right to use
contraceptives. “It concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum
destructive impact upon that relationship.”192 This reasoning demonstrates Justice Douglas’ view
on how best to remain consistent with precedent. The concept of zones of privacy provides
evidence in Griswold in terms of the extent to which the Court can legitimately protect a right
based on larger general principles of liberty. Justice Douglas cites NAACP v. Alabama (1958) as
a concrete example of the principle of constitutionally protected zones of privacy. In terms of
NAACP, the law in Griswold is unconstitutional because “governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”193 This
explication of Griswold is in accordance with Justice Douglas’ theoretical framework because it
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looks to the penumbras of the right to privacy as evidence of constitutionality. The right to
privacy extends far enough to allow the use of contraceptives because the Connecticut statute
bans the activity itself rather than banning its manufacture or sale. Such an overbroad ban is
inconsistent with constitutional principles because it prohibits a private behavior that is not
structurally or institutionally prohibited in society’s tradition. There exists precedent that grants
individual rights to privacy in making personal life decisions, and there exists a social and
political structure that allows the manufacture and sale of contraceptives as an acceptable tool to
use in one’s private sexual and familial decisions. As such, there is no compelling interest that
would prohibit the use of contraceptives in accordance with the Constitution’s general guarantee
of liberty.
Roe also remains consistent with precedent when analyzed in the context of the scope of
protected liberty interests in Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman (1961). In Poe, the Court
ruled that a Connecticut statute banning the use of contraceptives was constitutional because it
has never actually been enforced. For this reason, the Court determined that the law was not ripe
to be challenged, as there had not been any repercussions for anyone who had disobeyed it.
Justice Harlan dissents on the grounds that the Connecticut statute violates the right to privacy
through invading intimate decisions in an individual’s personal sphere. He relies upon the text of
the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, and interprets the Clause to include any
law that encroaches on liberty interests. Rather than subscribing to the procedural view that the
Clause is intended to protect the specific liberty interests enumerated in the Bill of Rights, Justice
Harlan broadens the constitutional concept of liberty to include
a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes, what a

109

reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.194
This line of reasoning gives the Court power to evaluate the right to privacy using rational and
reasonable judgment calls based upon contemporary circumstances.
Justice Harlan begins by challenging the procedural interpretation of due process:
It is not the particular enumeration of rights in the first eight Amendments which spells
out the reach of Fourteenth Amendment due process, but rather, as was suggested in
another context long before the adoption of that Amendment, those concepts which are
considered to embrace those rights which are . . . fundamental… Again and again this
Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment is no more than a shorthand
reference to what is explicitly set out elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.195
He sets up this critique of procedural due process to emphasize its narrow scope; he plays upon
the absurdity of due process being included in the text solely to reiterate that the Bill of Rights
must be protected. Justice Harlan advocates a substantive approach by comparing the
implications of the two forms of due process decision-making. He writes: “That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive,
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve
as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.”196 His argument is strengthened by
looking at tradition more generally as a changing structure in which the Court must adapt to
remain consistent with principles, rather than as a formula to remain most consistent with
specific antiquated laws. Furthermore, while Justice Harlan’s dissent establishes a mode of
substantive due process that defers authority to underlying principles, it is also important in
regard to its text-based interpretation. He looks to the vague language of the Clause and argues:
The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
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Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion…and so on.197
The concept of liberty is intertwined with the judicial freedom to interpret the law as to most
closely reflect its principles in light of the evolution of tradition and values. The language of the
Due Process Clause calls upon the Court to be a decider of the scope of protected rights in
accordance with whether there is any compelling interest for such rights to be limited.
Once Justice Harlan lays out his interpretation of substantive due process and supports it
with textual analysis, he looks at the facts of the case through the methodological lens he has just
previously justified:
The very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society
is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has
traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to
attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary
would be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal.198
Justice Harlan does not only theoretically advocate substantive due process, he practically
applies it to the implication of the Connecticut statute. The nature of the statute is that of a moral
judgment of acceptable behavior. When legislation veers away from the sole purpose of creating
legal order to protect individuals from harm, the Court must view such legislation for its intended
purpose—to improve the moral character of the citizenry. With this, it follows that constitutional
interpretation must integrate these moral values into decisions about the scope of protected rights
in order to fully address the issues of constitutionality within the statute. “It is in this area of
sexual morality, which contains many proscriptions of consensual behavior having little or no
direct impact on others, that the State of Connecticut has expressed its moral judgment that all
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use of contraceptives is improper.”199 In the Connecticut statute, the state is trying to regulate the
institution of marriage to create a moral system to dictate what sexual practices are acceptable.
This also takes the form of a series of implied value judgments about the appropriate context in
which children should be born and raised, as well as other judgment calls about “laws forbidding
adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition,
confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.”200 With such a
statute, it would be methodologically ineffective to look at its constitutionality on purely
procedural grounds, considering moral judgments concerning sexual behavior are nowhere to be
found within the written text. With strict adherence to procedure, the Court has no basis to make
any coherent ruling because no exact guidance from the text exists. This type of decision
necessarily overlooks the inclusiveness of the language of due process that actually encourages
incorporation of substance-based evaluations. Rather, through establishing a methodology that
widens the scope of liberty interests, Justice Harlan sets a precedent emphasizing the larger
picture of maintaining the conception of liberty.
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe provides a powerful precedent upon which to defend
Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe. Justice Harlan sets the standard for the methodological
elements that comprise a coherent substantive due process opinion.
In alluding to the traditions from which America broke, Justice Harlan thus recognized,
in a way that Justice Scalia appears not to, that the existence of a tradition may be a
reason for rejecting it as controlling…This is especially true, one might think, when they
are impositions of values by a majority on a political, cultural, ethnic, religious, or
ideological minority.201
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Justice Blackmun draws upon this precedent in Roe through widening the scope of liberty
interests to include an evaluation of privacy rights that looks at general tradition as a living
entity. This allows Justice Blackmun to include moral and political evaluations of the evolving
societal traditions regarding abortion practices. The core meaning of Poe functions as a
precedent on a deep level in its establishment of the overall way in which the liberal members of
the Court should regard the meaning of liberty. Not only does it expand the scope of legitimate
liberty interests, it also explains the rationale behind doing so. Justice Harlan’s dissent delves
into the fundamental assumptions behind liberal jurisprudence because it grounds the legality of
the liberal jurisprudential agenda in the notion that the constitutional guarantee of liberty is
linguistically designed to protect individual liberties at all costs unless there is an interest against
doing so that is exceedingly compelling. This is the foundation of Justice Blackmun’s
methodology in Roe.
The differences in liberal and conservative methodologies in Roe are derived from
differences in the most basic assumptions underlying the respective liberal and conservative
constitutional ideals. As such, the contention surrounding Roe extends far from the Court
opinions to the large assortment of discourse among both justices and scholars in the field of
constitutional law. For instance, Justice Scalia sustains the relevance of Roe by basing later
decisions upon his disagreement with its legitimacy. He interprets the components of the Roe
decision as fundamentally backwards. In his dissent in Lawrence, he writes,
Roe v. Wade recognized that the right to abort an unborn child was a “fundamental right”
protected by the Due Process Clause. The Roe Court, however, made no attempt to
establish that this right was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”; instead,
it based its conclusion that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty …
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy” on its own normative judgment that anti-abortion laws were undesirable.202
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This view on the right to privacy in Roe is indicative of Scalia’s view of the legitimate source of
privacy rights. He claims that the implied fundamental right to privacy can only be called upon
for justification if it is so deeply rooted in history and tradition that it can hold up against a textbased reading of the Constitution. The Roe decision does not satisfy these conditions for Justice
Scalia because it draws upon a moral judgment on the part of the Court. This denial of what he
refers to as “normative judgment” as justification is precisely why the decision holds legitimacy
for liberal constitutional law scholars. Rather than denying the right to privacy on the grounds
that it is a social construction that should be left to Congress, liberal legal ideology that the Court
sustains its legitimacy from its reading of the abstract clauses that encourage the incorporation of
democratic moral principles.
Justice Scalia also advocates for the overturning of Roe in his concurring opinion in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989). He claims that Roe is not derived from textbased reasoning and legal tradition; rather its faulty justification lies within the Court’s creation
of a fundamental right that does not account for the Constitution’s language or history.203 Scalia
extrapolates on this view in his concurrence in Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990):
One will search in vain the document we are supposed to be construing for text that
provides the basis for the argument over these distinctions; and will find in our society’s
tradition regarding abortion no hint that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant,
much less any indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to be
resolved.204
Justice Scalia explains that if the right to abortion cannot be found in the text, it is therefore not
legitimate. This narrowness is indicative of the larger theoretical problems that conservatives
point out in Roe. Conservative methodology rejects the emphasis on general privacy and liberty
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interests embedded within historical and social trends because this is purely a political
declaration furthering liberal policy goals.
Aside from the issues regarding Roe’s lack of grounding in the text, Justice Scalia claims
that by using the right to privacy as legitimate justification, the Court deviates from its supposed
judicial role and becomes too much of a political actor. Justice Scalia outlines this idea in
Webster: “Alone sufficient to justify a broad holding is the fact that our retaining control,
through Roe, of what I believe to be, and many of our citizens recognize to be, a political issue,
continuously distorts the public perception of the role of the Court.”205 Justice Scalia argues that
if abortion is included within the scope of the right to privacy, it will cause great harm to the
institution of the Court. Through injecting itself into all types of human behavior, particularly
improper political participation, the judicial image of the Court will be irreparably tarnished.206
For this reason, Justice Scalia invokes the intent of the Framers to advocate for Roe to be
overturned; namely, legislature should be entrusted to make policy that reflects contemporary
social values. “It is not the job of the judiciary to read a right to privacy into the Constitution.
Instead, Congress and the states must create and protect such a right, if they choose to do so.”207
With Justice Scalia’s critique, the question emerges of how political he is being himself. Is his
critique of liberal methodology inherently rooted in the fact that Justice Scalia does not support
the political outcome on a personal level?
On one level, the disagreement between liberals and conservatives on the legitimacy of
Roe can be traced back to their different theories of the constraints of interpreting abstract text.
Yet, on a more fundamental level, the differing opinions reside within their respective opposing
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views on the role of the Court in general. Liberal jurisprudence derives legitimacy in Roe partly
from the assumption that the countermajoritarian difficulty is inherently evaded when the Court
invokes principles to keep up with changing democratic values. On these grounds, conservatives
reject Roe because it delegates political power to the Court that should be reserved for Congress.
With political power in the hands of the Court, the countermajoritarian difficulty is exacerbated
because it strays from the text-based reading, which according to Justice Scalia, is the framework
of judicial legitimacy.
When looking at the scope of implied fundamental rights in a more general sense, Roe is
decided correctly, while the justification for its overruling falls flat under Justice Scalia’s
interpretation. “Roe recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions
affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of
the person.”208 This type of reasoning in Roe emphasizes the discipline of the liberal conception
of liberty as the root behind the interpretation of abstract principles.
Liberals defend Roe with the basic groundwork that the Court can derive authority from
the concept that the text intentionally contains abstract moral principles that encourage the Court
to interpret the correct application of individual rights. From a procedural standpoint, liberals
defend Roe through a discussion, and subsequent denial, of the distinction between enumerated
and unenumerated rights. This refers to the notion that the guarantee to due process exists both in
terms of enumerated rights claims and unenumerated rights claims because the language of the
Constitution extends to protect rights that are not specifically referred to in the document. By
placing the abortion decision within the scope of the fundamental right to privacy, Justice
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Blackmun asserts his authority to interpret tradition in a manner general enough to justify
expanding rights. The question at hand is whether the Court has the authority to enforce rights
that are unenumerated in the Constitution, especially given that there are rights that are
enumerated. Liberal constitutional law scholar Ronald Dworkin lays out three constitutional
arguments to defend Roe by disproving the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated
rights. The first argues that the Equal Protection Clause gives women protection against genderbased discrimination (with the constraint of compelling state interests). The second argues that
the First Amendment grants the individual right to burn the American flag. The third argues that
the Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy under which women have the constitutional
right to an abortion. The first two arguments represent enumerated rights, while the third
argument refers to an unenumerated right, meaning the right to an abortion. This right “is
thought to bear a more tenuous or distant relationship to the language of the Constitution. It is
said to be at best implied by, rather than stated in, that language.”209 Yet, Dworkin argues that
this distinction is faulty. All three arguments contain the same interpretive elements that
undermine the supposed semantic constraints of unenumerated rights. The Bill of Rights does not
specifically state that “freedom of speech” means that people are free to burn flags or that “equal
protection” means that excluding women from certain jobs is unconstitutional.
Each conclusion (if sound) follows, not from some historical hope or belief or intention of
a “framer,” but because the political principle that supports that conclusion best accounts
for the general structure and history of constitutional law. Someone who thinks that this
manner of constitutional argument is inappropriate-who thinks, for example, that framers’
expectations should play a more decisive role than this view of constitutional argument
allows-will have that reservation about all three arguments, not distinctly about the third. If
he thinks that the third argument is wrong, because he abhors, for example, the idea of
substantive due process, then he will reject it, but because it is wrong, not because the right
it claims would be an unenumerated one.210
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This discussion of the problems that arise in attempting to undermine Roe on a rights-based
platform reinforces the notion that Roe contains sound procedural groundwork.
Dworkin asks the question: “How should judges decide which rights do and which do not
have ‘roots’ in the abstract language?”211 While Justice Scalia suggests that abstract language
cannot derive a right that the framers did not specifically enumerate,212 Dworkin points out that if
we reject the right to privacy in one instance, such as Roe, we must then reject “a great number
of other, unquestioned constitutional rights that lawyers frequently describe in language not to be
found their either.”213 Rather, Dworkin sets forth a common law approach to argue that the
principles in earlier privacy decisions should be applied to later decisions in order to enforce “the
concept of ordered liberty,” which is the vision of the United States as a society committed to
upholding individual liberty and dignity. Yet this concept in itself still provokes questions about
the disciplined nature of ordered liberty. Through subscribing to the view that privacy rights are
legitimate when they further the cause of liberty, one must ask how and when can the Court
make judgment calls regarding a principle as abstract as “liberty”? Dworkin answers this
question through a “personal judgment” justification. He states that governmental constraints on
people’s freedom are not legitimate in regard to ideals about what kinds of lives are good or bad.
For instance, decisions citing the immorality of abortion or sodomy are personally judgmental,
and thus, unacceptable. On the other hand, impersonally judgmental decisions that appeal to the
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value of an object or state of affairs, rather than one’s personal life decisions, are subject to
governmental limitation.214
In terms of the liberal substantive arguments in favor of Roe, there exists an appeal to a
personal judgment justification. This methodology classifies Roe as being under the scope of
one’s personal responsibility to uphold his or her ethical values. Dworkin writes:
The abortion decision is at least as much of a private decision…as any other the Court
has protected. In many ways it is more private, because the decision involves a woman’s
control not just of her connection to others, but of the use of her own body, and the
Constitution recognizes in a variety of ways the special intimacy of a person’s connection
to her own physical integrity.215
This analysis of Roe exemplifies the legitimacy of a personal judgment line of reasoning because
it sees abortion rights as inextricably intertwined with personal moral development. The
principled approach to deciding the case relies on the fact that the Constitution protects lifestyle
choices that are pertinent to this moral development. Therefore, a justification on these grounds
is disciplined because it is in accordance with precedent in terms of the guarantee of liberty in
making autonomous individual life choices as long as such choices do not infringe on more
compelling interests.
Overall, Roe is one of the rare cases that can be characterized as a precedent for a new,
coherent liberal methodology. The liberal-conservative dichotomy is not simply defined by the
distinction between generality and specificity in each system’s unique methodology. Roe
provides a path for to remedy the inconsistencies of liberal jurisprudence because it demonstrates
the utmost level of generality that can legitimately be used. As such, Justice Blackmun creates a
guideline for the liberal members of the Court to consistently draw upon when determining what
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level of generality in interpreting tradition will provide the best evidence for expanding rights.
Justice Blackmun writes a uniquely liberal opinion through regarding the constitutional
conception of liberty as a living, breathing force in American life. This most importantly devises
a definition of liberty as a culmination of the text, tradition, objective morality, and ultimately
the preservation of all these enduring principles in light of contemporary norms and ideals. To
ensure this preservation, the liberal members of the Court have a new tool upon which to know
the limits to the levels of generality at their disposal.
Roe provides a quintessential example of the way liberal jurisprudence can indeed derive
an outcome consistent with the liberal agenda through drawing upon a valid legal methodology
that is distinct to liberal jurisprudence. The main problem in liberal jurisprudence is
inconsistency—in terms of abiding by standards that define a distinctly liberal methodology. In
conservative decision-making, the standard is to interpret tradition with the highest level of
specificity. This guideline provides a concrete method for conservatives to establish coherency in
their interpretations. Yet, liberal jurisprudence is disorganized. There is a consensus that tradition
must be interpreted with some level of generality higher than the most specific level. Yet, at what
level should liberal justices interpret tradition in order to further their motive to expand rights as
often as is legally justifiable? Liberal jurisprudence dictates that the most appropriate level of
generality is the most specific level that allows the Court to rule in favor of the right in question.
This guideline is logical because it values more generality only when absolutely necessary to
preserving the underlying principles behind the relevant traditions. Roe contributes to the
establishment of a coherent liberal jurisprudence because it sets a precedent for the highest level
of generality that may be used when absolutely necessary.
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C. Gay Rights
i. Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) struck down the ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) by
determining there is an implied fundamental right to privacy with regard to sodomy laws that is
in fact constitutionally protected under due process. Lawrence upholds the right of consenting
adults to engage in sexual activity based on the level of personal privacy at stake. The statute in
question is determined to further no compelling state interest that would justify a denial of
privacy. While Bowers holds a narrow view of privacy, Lawrence widens the scope of protected
consensual adult conduct to include sodomy.
The case denies the legitimacy of looking to the narrow conservative view of deeply
rooted tradition to determine which specific sexual activities should be protected. In the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy disallows government intrusion of privacy rights if based on the notion
that the right in question, such as sodomy, has not been traditionally protected by society at the
most specific level. This directly overturns Bowers because it refers to the unconstitutionality of
the judiciary to be the moral arbiter of whether individual sexual choices must only be for
procreative purposes. Such judicial willingness to undermine the conservative theory of
specificity creates a new precedent affording protection to a much wider scope of sexual activity
between consenting adults. The Court determines that due process relies on justice, and justice
includes a right to same-sex intercourse. With this logic, the abstract text of the Constitution
provides a framework for the decision, but principles regarding the nature of justice are the
ultimate deciders of the case.216 This methodology is distinctly liberal in nature.
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion begins with a brief discussion of the Constitution’s treatment
of liberty principles. This sets the tone for the rest of the opinion because it regards liberty as an
all-encompassing part of American life that
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.217
Justice Kennedy treats liberty as an ideal that cannot be defined solely by a laundry list of the
most specifically protected activities; rather, the concept of liberty transcends this spatial
dimension, and permeates all guiding principles of the public’s moral disposition. With this
wider definition of liberty, Justice Kennedy interprets the Constitution as a guide of principles
upon which to evaluate the scope of protected liberties in a changing social climate. Such an
interpretation exemplifies liberal methodology because it opens the door for the judiciary to
determine the extent of protected personal liberties based upon a cumulative evaluation of the
general traditions that shed light on society’s enduring liberty principles. This differs from the
methodology of the conservative dissenters because they dispute the legitimacy of deriving any
authority whatsoever from sources other than the most specific interpretation of tradition in order
to remain as literally authentic to the text itself and the intent of the Framers.
Justice Kennedy refers to Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
as precedents for legitimizing his view on the need for a broader scope of liberty under the Due
Process Clause. Although Griswold only protects sexual autonomy as part of the right to privacy
within the marital relationship, its logic extends the right to autonomy in sexual conduct beyond
the marital relationship to all consensual adult relations. Eisenstadt invalidates the prohibition of
distributing contraceptives to unmarried people. From there, the Court broadens the
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interpretation of liberty with regard to privacy rights in Roe, among other important precedents.
Justice Kennedy bases his conception of liberty within the framework of the broadening scope.
While he uses these cases as precedents, there is a marked difference between the language in
Lawrence and that of other cases; Justice Kennedy “consistently uses the word ‘liberty’ rather
than ‘privacy,’ to describe the constitutional interest at stake.”218 This use of language is a
positive step towards a more cohesive liberal methodology, because it looks at due process as an
all-encompassing conception of liberty rather than as a specific discussion of whether the right to
sodomy can be found in the Constitution’s language.
The starting point of the justification in the liberal majority opinion in Lawrence lies
within the historical treatment of sodomy practices. The role of history in the Court’s decisionmaking has been a point of contention between liberals and conservatives because it reflects the
Court’s larger view of how the text should be correctly interpreted. In liberal jurisprudence, a
historical analysis provides insight into the abiding principles in existence throughout centuries
of societal evolution. History is not always a literal basis for limiting individual rights. Rather, it
is a means to gain a deeper understanding of the power structure of majority rule, social and
political backlash, and evolving understandings of various behaviors.
In conservative jurisprudence, the most specific tradition is the key to justifying a
decision based on the Framers’ intent and its subsequent steadfast legacy. In essence, the
historical criminalization of a certain practice signifies it should also now be criminalized
because this is more in line with the original understanding of the Constitution. In Lawrence, this
difference in interpretational methods is highlighted in Justice Kennedy’s treatment of historical
legal and social attitudes towards homosexuality. He argues that the earliest sodomy laws were
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not specifically directed towards homosexuals. They were geared towards the criminalization of
non-procreative sexual activity in general. Furthermore, a large portion of sodomy prosecution
was carried out in nonconsensual cases involving minors or victims of assault. Considering the
underlying principles behind traditions of prohibiting sodomy were not for the purpose of
criminalizing homosexual activity, the most specific tradition of the illegality of sodomy does
not function as the most consistent historical narrative. Consequently, Justice Kennedy deems it
inappropriate to equate historical criminalization with the current legal status of sodomy because
the practice itself was placed within a different legal category. Laws specifically prohibiting
same-sex relations were not put in place until the 1970’s, and even then, were only present in
nine states. Thus, the historical narrative creates a much more complex picture than to warrant a
simple across-the-board ban on sodomy.
In Bowers, the Court uses the systemic condemnation of homosexual practices
throughout history to justify criminalization. This history is regarded as legitimate justification
because “for many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions
accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives.”219 Private acts of homosexual intimacy are viewed as criminal in the sense
that they provoke moral decay and disrupt the moral and ethical course of society as a whole.
While the historical discussion of society’s attitudes towards homosexual conduct plays a large
role in Bowers, Justice Kennedy sees the main issue in Lawrence as “whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law.”220 This relates back to his definition of liberty interests as being an overarching
force pervading everyday life rather than as a concrete evaluation of whether a specific right is
219
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protected. He subscribes to the notion that “our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.”221 In this sense, Justice Kennedy takes a much more general view
of liberty than the Court takes in Bowers.
Alongside Justice Kennedy’s historical analysis is his deference to a social construction
process. This refers to the idea that “at the core of Supreme Court decision making is the
construction, or the justices’ picture of the social, political, and economic world outside the
Court as it applies polity and rights principles.” 222 The Lawrence decision relies on this notion of
social construction through defining rights in terms of their social context.223 To determine the
constitutionality of protecting a right with respect to social construction, the Constitution can still
be legitimately viewed as a text guiding the ultimate decision. The distinction is that the text
represents a set of principles that must be applied to the circumstances of the outside world. The
Lawrence decision is primarily a social constructionist decision in regard to its reliance on an
“emerging awareness” that the Framers could not have anticipated. Justice Kennedy explicitly
legitimizes the use of moral judgments based upon contemporary social circumstances: “In all
events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.
These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”224 He backs
up this statement by referring to County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998): “[H]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
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inquiry.”225 The recognition of an “emerging awareness” as a means to undermine specific
interpretations of tradition is important in understanding the distinction between liberal and
conservative methods. In liberal jurisprudence, it is legitimate to draw upon “the transformative
nature of law as new social facts allow justices to build upon past social constructions.”226 Unlike
the narrow conservative conception of tradition, Justice Kennedy advocates an approach that
incorporates tradition only to the extent that it supports the larger principles of liberty in an
evolving social climate.
The authority given to changing social values is further demonstrated in post-Bowers
precedents that question the legitimacy of Bowers’ outcome. Justice Kennedy cites Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (1992) as a precedent for looking at the transcendental
nature of liberty and privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.227
In Casey, the Court interpreted substantive protection of liberty interests in the Due Process
Clause as the protection of the autonomy to make personal life decisions without governmental
interference. “It shifted the construction of abortion rights from a passive notion of privacy to a
more forceful concept of personhood, placing women in closer proximity to the social and
economic world in which they live.”228 This line of reasoning in Casey applies to the discussion
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of sodomy rights because it primarily focuses on the constitutional right to liberty in one’s
personal life choices in a contemporary social and political context.
Justice Scalia’s dissent raises issues with Justice Kennedy’s core methodology. This
stems from the two justices’ fundamentally different positions on what constitutes legitimate
interpretation. Justice Scalia argues that the Constitution provides no textual support for viewing
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right under due process. In fact, when the Bill of Rights
was ratified, sodomy was a criminal offense, and has continued to be outlawed throughout
United States history. Thus, the right to engage in sodomy does not warrant constitutional
protection because it is not grounded in tradition or history. Justice Scalia disputes the Court’s
claim that rather than looking to specific tradition, it should pay attention to “emerging
awareness” to demonstrate that liberty principles give “substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”229 This view is not
legitimate for Justice Scalia because an “emerging awareness” is not a sufficient basis to
establish a new fundamental right. His blatant rejection of the social construction process
operates on the grounds that rights cannot be changed substantively over time.230 This
interpretation runs into theoretical problems in light of the counter argument to Justice Scalia’s
opinion—that the incorporation of an “emerging awareness” does not constitute the creation of a
new right; rather this “emerging awareness” is a tool for the Court to consistently protect liberty
interests by translating their underlying principles into a contemporary context.
In looking at Justice Scalia’s dissent as a rebuttal to the plurality opinion, there are
noticeable discrepancies in language. While Justice Scalia focuses on proving sodomy is not a
fundamental right, Justice Kennedy does not refer to fundamental rights at all. Both justices use
229
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different language altogether to justify their respective interpretations. How can Justice
Kennedy’s argument about liberty be compared to Justice Scalia’s argument about the tradition
of privacy rights? Neither the conservative side nor the liberal side specifically address one
another’s methodology as a result of their fundamentally different approaches to due process
interpretation.
Justice Scalia’s dissent begins with a discussion of the procedural implications of
overturning Bowers. He argues that the law cannot be determined based on ideas of morality
without embarking on “a slippery slope that would lead courts to legalize a parade of sexualconduct horribles.”231 If due process were to overturn laws based on moral choices, the Court
would then have to overturn a multitude of decisions. Justice Scalia argues:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of
Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is
called into question by today’s decision.232
Ironically, this line of reasoning runs into major problems on the same procedural level upon
which Justice Scalia appears so loyal to. If overturning Bowers means that all laws represent
moral choices, Justice Scalia ignores the fact that he himself is making a value judgment on
society’s moral compass that may or may not exist. Justice Scalia allows his political preference
to pervade his so-called “procedural” opinion. This is shown by the very fact that he views
consensual homosexual conduct between two adults as a moral decision equal to bestiality,
prostitution, or incest. Furthermore, the use of a slippery slope argument by nature is an
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emotional appeal. While it can be a legitimate method of reasoning, its power does not
necessarily reside in its rationality.
A slippery slope argument highlights the dire effects of proximately potential future
decisions that are likely to result from the present case. And the slippage of the slippery
slope argument comes from amplifying “likelihood” to the point of necessity. That is,
someone appealing to the danger of the slippery slope seeks to convince her audience that
if the present case is decided in a particular way, stare decisis will lock future courts into
certain (implicitly unpalatable) decisions.233
Justice Scalia’s assertion here does not combine rationality with emotional appeal. It serves to
combine a framework of an illogical argument with its outward emotional appeal. In contrast to
this conservative formation of a slippery slope argument, Justice Kennedy views the slippery
slope as being derived from a different place all together. He claims Bowers is at the forefront of
the slippery slope because sodomy laws affect the status of homosexuals in the United States in
general. While these sodomy laws appear to only prohibit a single act within the scope of sexual
conduct, “in fact the effect of that act's criminalization is the blurring of the line between act and
actor, between conduct and status.”234 For this reason, Justice Kennedy looks to the liberty
interests of homosexuals in a more general sense to argue that the slippery slope resides in the
implications of criminalizing sodomy. While Justice Scalia includes homosexuality as a
traditional moral offense and warns that its legal protection will lead to the overturning of laws
criminalizing all sex-based offenses, Justice Kennedy takes the opposite view by deciding the
case on due process grounds instead of equal protection.235 This indicates that the issue is not the
status of homosexuals versus heterosexuals; it is that of protecting the right of sexual privacy for
all citizens. As such, Justice Scalia’s slippery slope holds no bearing. Lawrence does not create a
new right; it simply expands the right to sexual privacy to include all adults regardless of sexual
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orientation.
Justice Kennedy addresses the same issues as Justice Scalia, but takes a rather different
view of due process. He points out that the case does not involve minors, non-consenting
persons, public conduct, or prostitution. Nor does it seek any formal recognition from the
government for any type of homosexual relationship.
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.236
Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of due process regards liberty as a general right to make moral
choices that do not infringe upon anyone else’s liberty. Due process ensures protection of this
autonomy in individuals’ private lives without government intervention. As Justice Scalia
attempts to dispute this view of due process, he does not directly address Justice Kennedy’s
argument because he is employing an entirely different interpretational scheme accompanied by
an entirely different set of assumptions. For Justice Scalia, the Texas statute in question
“undoubtedly imposes constraints on liberty.”237 The main difference between the two justices is
that Justice Scalia sees no problem in the constitutionality of such a constraint. He argues that
although the law in question limits liberty, “so do laws prohibiting prostitution, recreational use
of heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60 hours per week in a bakery. But there is no
right to ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause, though today’s opinion repeatedly makes that
claim.”238 This is where one fundamental difference arises. How can Justice Scalia argue that due
process does not guarantee a right to liberty? Especially considering he claims to subscribe to a
236
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constitutional theory that emphasizes complete fidelity to the text, it outwardly appears blatantly
inconceivable that Justice Scalia would dispute the guarantee of liberty in regard to a clause that
reads: “No state shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property.”239 Yet, Justice Scalia
emphasizes the last part of the text of the Clause: “No state shall…deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. (emphasis added).”240 He interprets the Due
Process Clause to “expressly allow States to deprive their citizens of ‘liberty,’ so long as ‘due
process of law’ is provided.”241
Justice Scalia addresses the majority opinion’s substantive due process analysis, yet
confines it to a very narrow scope. He claims that this doctrine is applicable only when states
infringe on fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement serves a compelling state
interest. Furthermore, such fundamental rights can only be protected if they are “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”242 This criterion exists because a right is only labeled
‘fundamental’ if it is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.”243 This
interpretation of substantive due process limits the Court to protecting rights based upon their
historical protection and long-standing tradition. This contradicts the liberal conception of
substantive due process in terms of its disregard for the doctrine’s very purpose of upholding
ordered liberty in an evolving social climate. Furthermore, in setting out to prove sodomy is not a
fundamental right, Justice Scalia fails to elaborate on the fact that Justice Kennedy does not once
use such terminology. With markedly different standards of decision-making, Justice Scalia
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attacks the majority opinion for a lack of evidence with respect to his methodology. He does not
consider that Justice Kennedy holds the statute to different standards all together.
Justice Scalia highlights the undeniable role of the justices’ respective political and social
predispositions being embedded within the legal process. The tradition of prosecuting sex-based
offenses demonstrates that the Texas statute is well within its constitutional right to exist. The
problem arises within Justice Scalia’s preexisting belief that sodomy is indeed a criminal act.
Justice Scalia sets out to prove that sodomy is not rooted in history and tradition. Yet, he
undermines his conservative theory of interpretation as he embarks on this quest to refute the
majority decision with his own version of what constitutes tradition. He states that the presence
of an “emerging awareness” has no bearing on the establishment of a fundamental right. He
further argues that not only does the majority opinion rely on illegitimate criteria, it also
incorrectly determines the existence of this “emerging awareness” because:
States continue to prosecute all sorts of crimes by adults ‘in matters pertaining to sex’:
prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscenity, and child pornography. Sodomy laws, too,
have been enforced ‘in the past half century,’ in which there have been 134 reported
cases involving prosecutions for consensual, adult, homosexual sodomy.”244
This comparison between sodomy and sex crimes, such as incest or child pornography, is
obviously problematic because Justice Scalia unfairly compares a consensual sexual practice to
nonconsensual sexual acts involving minors. In the latter acts, the conception of liberty interests
is glaringly different because these sexual practices take away the liberty of the unwilling
participant. By grouping sodomy with these nonconsensual acts, Justice Scalia invokes his
personal values to undermine Justice Kennedy’s opinion on what constitutes protected liberties.
Justice Scalia actually veers away from his supposed originalist theory and succumbs to
the subjective moral reasoning process that he outwardly criticizes so fiercely. He implicitly
244
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incorporates a personal value judgment; namely, that crimes such as incest and child
pornography (which can include underage and non-consenting participants) should be placed
within the same moral category as homosexual sex between consenting adults. While he
criticizes the majority opinion for taking “sides in the culture war, departing from its role of
assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed,”245 he
commits the exact same offense. He attempts to justify his stance in favor of prohibiting sodomy
through a rant against homosexual rights. He writes:
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as
partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their
families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.246
For Justice Scalia to draw legitimacy from his personal view under the guise of an analysis of the
perceived role of homosexuals in society today, he strays even farther from his pledge to remain
faithful to an originalist interpretation. Not only does he undermine his condemnation for the
Court’s use of “emerging awareness,” he blatantly deviates from the text and the intent of the
Framers by basing his opinion largely on modern circumstances.
This dissent both conforms to the existing theories behind conservative methodology, and
to Justice Scalia’s theory of specificity. In terms of the fundamental right to privacy concerning
control over one’s own body, Justice Scalia strongly opposes substantive rights claims in
general. His main contention is that such unenumerated rights deviate from the actual text and
intent of the Constitution to an unacceptable extent. He says that this deviation from the text “has
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enabled judges to do more freewheeling lawmaking than any other.”247 As such, how does Justice
Scalia read the fundamental right to privacy into the Constitution? He elaborates on his view of
the proper application of due process:
Well, it may or may not be a good thing to guarantee additional liberties, but the Due
Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation. By its inescapable terms,
it guarantees only process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken; even
life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions require—notably, a
validly enacted law and a fair trial.248
This procedural reading of due process fundamentally opposes liberal methodology because it is
completely means-based rather than outcome-oriented. Justice Scalia only cares that individuals
are granted liberty, as per due process, in terms of their navigation through the legal process. He
does not pay attention to the liberty principles that liberal jurisprudence generally argues will
grant an expansion the right to privacy that is validated through the constitutional ideals of
protecting liberties to the utmost extent, except when there is a compelling enough interest not to
do so.
The other dissenting opinion in Lawrence, written by Justice Thomas, agrees with Justice
Scalia’s dissent and adds a brief personal analysis. Justice Thomas first proclaims his
disagreement with the Texas statute on a political level due to its waste of law enforcement
resources.249 Despite this contention, he argues that the Court does not have authority to decide
such cases because there is no specific evidence within the text of the Constitution to repeal the
statute. There is no explicit general right to privacy to guide the Court in making decisions
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regarding the “liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”250
With this statement, Justice Thomas ends his dissent. This opinion exemplifies the shortcomings
of conservative methodology at its core. Justice Thomas boils the decision down to the
fundamental question: do the Constitution and the Framers explicitly provide for the protection
of such a right? Finding no evidence in the text or intent, Justice Thomas is content to rule that
the right does not exist. With no concern for implicit guidelines embedded in the text that allow
the Court to adapt to modern circumstances, this opinion leaves no room for judicial authority to
substantially interpret the Constitution.
The Lawrence decision exemplifies the liberal-conservative dichotomy through engaging
in an argument over the legitimacy of looking outside the most specific tradition into an allencompassing interpretation of larger concepts and principles embedded in the text. Lawrence
makes important headway in the quest for a method of a more coherent liberal jurisprudence.
“As such, the Court’s decision in Lawrence did not simply overturn Bowers, but rather
eviscerated it.”251 Lawrence relies on broad notions of liberty that allow for the protection of as
many rights as possible in the context of contemporary American life. This is the foundation of
the most reasoned and organized liberal methodology.
The contentions between liberal and conservative justices run into new problems in
Lawrence. When due process is interpreted in such fundamentally different ways, the dialogue
comes to a standstill. The justices argue on completely different planes, and with completely
different sets of assumptions. Each sets forth a unique methodology to bring him or her to a
conclusion based upon the respective approach. In such a circumstance, the justices are not
directly addressing one another. While Justice Kennedy bases his discussion on more general
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liberty principles, Justice Scalia is preoccupied with defining the narrowest scope of legitimate
fundamental privacy rights. This disconnect indicates progress in the sense that the political
differences between the liberals and conservatives are argued as legal differences. It also creates
a new set of problems because it hinders direct discussion as a result of the different terminology
being used.
Overall, Lawrence overcomes major problems in liberal jurisprudence because “it set in
motion the continuation of a social construction process involving the meaning of liberty that
began decades ago and provided the jurisprudential bases for expanding homosexual rights in the
near future and decades to come.”252

IV. Methodological Patterns in Liberal Methodology: In conjunction, do these cases
suggest an answer as to what level of generality should be standardized in liberal
jurisprudence?
Through analyzing the methodologies of the liberal and conservative opinions in
DeShaney, Michael H., Roe, and Lawrence, the interpretational problems embedded in such
substantive due process cases return back to the fundamental question—what is tradition? How
can the Court coherently determine its limitations and latitudes? These questions are so pressing
specifically in terms of the Due Process Clause because its language provides the Court an
exceptionally high level of leeway in which they can interpret the most constitutionally correct
conception of rights. The Due Process Clause protects liberty interests in a way that
“paradoxically, is both limited and limitless.”253 The Clause is so vague in nature specifically for
this reason—liberty interests can only be protected throughout time and societal evolution with
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language that extends far enough to encompass new circumstances. The substantive guarantee of
due process remains both limited and limitless in the same way it was centuries ago. By
returning to McCulloch, the legitimacy of a more general reading of the Constitution’s abstract
language can be seen:
To have prescribed the means by which Government should, in all future time, execute its
powers would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument and give it the
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by immutable
rules for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can
be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be
used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.254
While conservatives commonly argue for a strictly literal reading of the text, the method of
constitutional interpretation that advocates an understanding of the abstract language as a
guideline to adapt the text’s enduring principles to contemporary circumstances is entrenched in
precedent beginning shortly after the document was written.
Liberal jurisprudence has come a long way in establishing a uniquely liberal
methodology for determining the most coherent level of generality upon which to further the
liberal agenda of expanding rights. This agenda is based upon the liberal conception of the
intended level of constitutional protection of individual rights. It is not a political or moral goal
of expanding rights. It is based on the Framers’ intent and the language of the Constitution as
being a conception of personal rights and liberties that calls for expansion.
Natural rights define a private domain within which persons may do as they please,
provided their conduct does not encroach upon the rightful domain of others. As long as
their actions remain within this rightful domain, other persons—including persons calling
themselves government officials—should not interfere without a compelling
justification.255
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With this interpretation of the constitutional conception of natural rights and liberties, it becomes
apparent that these rights can never be exhaustively listed or enumerated in the Constitution.
The trouble is that the liberal jurisprudential approach has not yet reached a point where
it has consistent standards. Liberal and conservative justices alike craft opinions with discussions
of the language and original meaning of the text, and then go on to set forth substantial
arguments about tradition with deference to varied levels of generality. Yet, liberal opinions have
not been uniquely liberal while working within this framework. Conservative jurisprudence
advocates employing the highest level of specificity that will support limiting rights in such a
way that the scope of protecting rights remains as close to its historical roots as possible. So,
what are the bounds of interpretation for liberals? If a liberal opinion is to give authority to an
all-encompassing view of liberty interests in an evolving social climate, it is exceedingly more
difficult to standardize the best level of generality at which to do so. Liberal justices take
ownership of a distinct liberal methodology that looks at due process as an intentionally vague
clause written to expand liberty interests in an evolving social and political climate. This
provides judicial freedom to interpret the Constitution in a way that supports rights expansion.
These four cases in conjunction highlight the major problems in the Court’s overall
approach to interpreting tradition, as well as the somewhat successful attempts by liberal justices
to combat these problems. The problem is that “our most specific historical traditions may often
be opposed to our more general commitments to liberty or equality. Curiously, then, different
parts of the American tradition may conflict with each other. And indeed, this is one of the
untidy facts of historical experience.”256 By giving authority to the most specific tradition,
conservative justices ignore the fact that such specificity can undermine larger principles of
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liberty. By viewing tradition so narrowly, tradition can be interpreted so out of context that it
serves the opposite of its intended purpose. “Traditions do not exist as integrated wholes. They
are a motley collection of principles and counterprinciples, standing for one thing when viewed
narrowly and standing for another when viewed more generally. Tradition never speaks with one
voice, although, to be sure, persons of particular predilections may hear only one.”257
The aforementioned cases all involve conflicting theories of due process interpretation to
illuminate the trajectory of the new liberal jurisprudence. It becomes apparent that liberal justices
have been loosely subscribing to similar methodologies over the past century, and a more
coherent and consistent methodological structure has finally become more institutionalized in
landmark cases such as Roe. Yet, the establishment of a uniquely liberal methodological
structure does not follow quite as easily. Liberal justices continue to work with shaky ground
rules in interpreting the most appropriate level of generality that will forward their
jurisprudential agenda. This “shakiness” refers to the inconsistency in determining the
appropriate level of generality to employ, rather than the legitimacy of these varying levels. The
real shift in liberal jurisprudence resides in selecting the most liberal interpretation of substantive
due process and consistently justifying it with a uniform liberal methodology. The progression
towards consistency has certainly undergone impressive strides, and hopefully will continue to
do so until a coherent methodology becomes concretely standardized. Yet, there are many
questions left unanswered:
If there is a tradition of protecting marital privacy, but not a more specific tradition
protecting marital purchase of contraceptives, how do we know whether the latter
situation is nevertheless subsumed under the former for purposes of constitutionally
protected liberty? Might one not conclude instead that the real historical tradition was
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protection of marital privacy in the home, so that the purchase of contraceptives in the
open marketplace could be regulated or even proscribed consistent with the tradition?258
The main contention is in the issue of how the Court can legitimately determine which traditions
are worth protecting. While liberal jurisprudence supports the protection of those traditions that
serve to expand rights in a contemporary context, there is no methodological tactic to do so that
extracts the justices’ personal value judgments out of the equation. The concept of tradition is a
convoluted and subjective interpretational undertaking. For instance, “if sexual harassment
directed toward women in the workplace and respect for marital privacy are both traditions, but
only one is worth protecting, how do we tell the difference?”259 The answer to this may seem
obvious in terms of contemporary social and political norms, yet on a legal level, the picture is
much more complex. The Court must adhere to precedent as a basis to interpret tradition, but
when antiquated precedent supports sexual harassment, what is the Court to do? “What
normative status should be assigned to a set of values given the fact that many people have held
these values at one point or another in our nation's history?”260 The liberal jurisprudential agenda
must standardize a methodology to interpret tradition in a way that encompasses the most
constitutionally consistent level of generality. This view of tradition should provide enough
leeway to expand liberty interests and break free from historically oppressive traditions, while
still remaining consistent to some semblance of fidelity to history and tradition.
The liberal methodology is even more effective when placed in the context of the view
that the conservative approach is oversimplified and unrepresentative of the underlying liberty
principles at stake. Conservatives
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assume that constitutionally protected liberties match or do not match existing traditions
in an unproblematic way. For each asserted right there either is or is not a specific
tradition associated with its protection. Yet there are many different ways of describing a
liberty, and many different ways of characterizing a tradition.261
The core contention is that of how conservative justices select the most specific tradition. The
concept of tradition cannot be compartmentalized in this way because it gives the Court too
much interpretive freedom to isolate one chosen tradition as the baseline upon which to decide a
case. This is the irony of the conservative methodology—in its proclaimed narrowness, it gives
the Court more interpretive freedom than would a more general approach. Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Michael H. provides a good example of the hidden lack of narrowness underlying the
conservative methodology: “there is a tradition of protecting marital privacy but not a tradition of
protecting the marital privacy of a narrower class--for example, middle class persons, and
certainly not a tradition of protecting the privacy of a broader class of persons that would include
unmarried couples.”262 Justice Scalia expands his scope of analysis to allow for the Court to pick
and choose its desired interpretation of the boundaries enclosing the most specific tradition. For
instance, “Griswold v. Connecticut is…a potential embarrassment for Justice Scalia”263 because
he claims that there exists a tradition of protecting the right to privacy within the marital unit, but
there does not exist a tradition of the right to privacy within the marital unit in protecting this
unit to purchase contraceptives. What gives Justice Scalia the judicial authority to place his own
boundaries on what constitutes the most specific marital tradition? This discontinuity embedded
in the theory of specificity derives from the problem that such a theory allows the Court to
decide which traditions are deserving of constitutional protection.
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In order to uncover the best solution to furthering a coherent liberal jurisprudence in face
of such an undisciplined history of traditionalism, the discussion inevitably leads back to the
evidence itself—the cases. In DeShaney, the liberal dissent hints at a coherent liberal
methodology, yet does not go far enough. The liberal justices still adhere to narrow conservative
methodological tactics too much to broaden cohesively the scope of liberty interests under due
process enough to justify the politically liberal outcome. Michael H. remedies this fundamental
problem of liberal methodology to the extent that the liberal dissenters actually engage in an
argument about the nature of liberty in the Due Process Clause. While the liberal dissenters make
substantial claims against the conservative conception of liberty, they still subscribe to
fundamental conservative assumptions by placing too much emphasis on analyzing specific
liberty interests of the past as a means to understand their application in a present day context.
The coherency of liberal jurisprudence undoubtedly takes big strides forward in Roe. The
majority opinion subscribes to a uniquely liberal methodology in a landmark way in terms of
Justice Blackmun’s level of generality. This unsurprisingly causes a lot of conservative backlash,
yet sets the stage for a more standardized and coherent liberal methodology in terms of giving
authority to a more general conception of liberty. Roe tests the waters in discovering how far the
Court can go in its level of generality. One of the legal reasons there is such backlash is because
Justice Blackmun organizes and defends a methodology that is more general than the Court is
accustomed to seeing. This was somewhat of a shock to the system in its time. In this way, Roe is
a hugely important contribution to liberal jurisprudence in the way it uses past privacy and
liberty rights precedents to cumulatively define a coherent liberal conception of the scope of
liberty interests. Yet, Roe is not the last step in the process of establishing a distinctly liberal
methodology. In fact, Roe is the first step. As one of the first cases of its kind in its high level of

142

generality, Justice Blackmun’s methodology must be drawn upon as a precedent for the Court to
determine the extent of the freedoms and limitations of substantive due process reasoning in later
individual rights cases.
In Lawrence, the liberal majority opinion follows Roe and its string of precedents to
further institutionalize the liberal treatment of liberty interests under due process. Lawrence
surpasses most of its precedent cases in solving the problems of liberal methodology. In a sense,
it goes a step further than Roe because it does not succumb to the obligation to explain or defend
itself within a conservative framework. While continuing to draw upon the liberal conception of
liberty, Lawrence is also liberal in structure because it sets forth its justification without back
tracking or defending itself within the typical conservative structure. This is an important step
forward because it demonstrates that liberal methodology does not in fact have to address
institutionally conservative methods of justification in order to prove itself. Conservative justices
certainly do not feel any obligation to abide by liberal assumptions of substantive due process
interpretation in their quest to invalidate liberal opinions. In fact, there are many instances where
conservatives reject liberal opinions by rejecting the doctrine of substantive due process all
together. Yet, where are the cases where liberals reject conservative opinions by rejecting their
theory of specificity all together? In Lawrence, the positive step in liberal jurisprudence creates
an interesting problem—the uniquely liberal methodology is so outside the conservative scope of
interpretation and understanding that while the liberal interpretation is coherent, the discourse
between the liberals and conservatives becomes somewhat incoherent because they do not
address each others’ arguments directly. When liberals and conservatives subscribe to
methodologies unique to their respective theoretical assumptions, they are arguing with one
another on completely different planes of understanding.
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While the path for a new liberal jurisprudence appears to make progress from DeShaney
and Michael H. to Roe and Lawrence, this image is not quite accurate when placed within the
entire historical narrative. Roe was decided over a decade before DeShaney and Michael H. Why
is the case that provides the most coherent example of liberals overcoming the problems of
interpreting tradition the first case to be decided among this group? Why did Roe not set an
example for all liberal interpretations of tradition thereafter? The answer resides in the fact that
the path towards a more coherent liberal jurisprudence is not a straight trajectory. There was so
much conservative backlash after Roe that the result was the emergence of a conservative era in
the Court’s history. While Roe provides a powerful example of the capabilities of the Court to
overcome the narrowness of the conservative view of tradition, it does not set a series of rights
expansions in motion, as evidenced in DeShaney and Michael H. It took three decades until the
principles underlying Justice Blackmun’s methodology in Roe are once again drawn upon in
Lawrence to rule in favor of another expansion of liberty interests so fundamental that it should
have been protected long before. In this sense, Roe is both revolutionary and detrimental. It
provides the necessary groundwork in the long run, but elicits the opposite response in the short
run.

VI. The Future of Liberal Jurisprudence—A speculation on the likelihood of the Court
expanding the scope of protected liberty interests to include same-sex marriage
With all this contention regarding the most legitimate substantive due process
interpretation, the important question for liberal justices and citizens alike becomes: what is the
future of liberal jurisprudence in terms of expanding the Court’s scope of protected liberty and
privacy rights? Within the current political and social climate, the most recent issue of rights
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expansion that calls on the Court to interpret the substantive due process doctrine is that of samesex marriage. The path towards a more coherent liberal jurisprudence will reach a crossroads
when dealing with this issue because it will test the ability of the liberal members of the Court to
choose the best method of carrying out the rights-expanding liberal agenda by ruling in favor of
protecting same-sex marriage.
Before exploring how generally the liberal justices should interpret tradition to best
defend their opinions, it is important to understand the relationship between the Court and the
policymakers that will necessarily come under scrutiny when dealing with such a socially
fractious issue. The liberal brand of constitutional theory rests upon the assumption that politics
and morality cannot be extracted from the law because they are guiding forces behind the legal
understanding of the conception of liberty. As the judiciary is the source of ultimate legal
authority, it is inevitable that contentious social issues such as same-sex marriage will come
before the Court when the political and moral context shifts in the direction of viewing the denial
of such a right as discriminatory. Contrary to conservative criticism, this does not turn the Court
into a policymaker. It does not permit the Court to inject politics and morality into its legal
opinions. Rather, the Court analyzes
the recognition and protection of a bounded freedom to make choices and act upon them.
This bounded freedom is called Liberty (as opposed to an unbounded freedom called
“license”). The recognition of “liberty rights” of this kind provides the inescapable means
by which these and other social problems are solved.264
Since the Constitution protects the freedom to make personal choices, such freedom will
inevitably relate back to the collective morality and its political manifestations. The due process
guarantee of liberty provides the Court with the authority to rule on social and political issues if
they arise as a result of conflicting interpretations of constitutionally protected liberties.
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“According to this account, natural rights are the set of concepts that define the moral space
within which persons must be free to make their own choices and live their own lives if they are
to pursue happiness while living in society with others.”265 If the Constitution allows individuals
to have autonomy over their personal life decisions, it follows that their protected rights may not
regulate their freedom to make these personal decisions, but do regulate the collective moral
space in which those decisions do not encroach on anyone else’s liberties.
With this groundwork for the liberal approach to due process interpretation, it is only
natural that such divisive social and political issues, such as abortion, sodomy, or same-sex
marriage, will come before the Court. While liberals generally do not find it problematic to rule
upon such cases, this view is not agreed upon across the board. The debate largely stems from
Roe because “it raised grave doubts about the Court’s use of the Constitution to solve divisive
social controversies.”266 Although there exists the argument that cases such as Roe confuse the
roles of the legislature and the judiciary, the truth of the matter is quite the opposite. Same-sex
marriage does fall under the scope of protected liberty interests because, among other reasons, it
is a personal life decision that does not diminish anyone else’s liberty interests. When the
policymakers criminalize a practice that should be constitutionally protected, it is within the
Court’s rightful scope of power to take on such a case in order to determine whether the law is
constitutional or not. “Rather than imposing moral duties on persons to live their lives in certain
ways, natural rights protect persons from the State and from each other.”267 With the notion of
the Court’s subjective morality extracted from the equation, the judicial regulation of personal
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rights is necessary because individuals live together in society in such a way that the actions of
one person may adversely affect the welfare of another.268
The issue of same-sex marriage is next on the liberal agenda for the Court’s expansion of
privacy rights in the last half century. Beginning with the establishment of the modern right to
privacy in Griswold’s protection of the right to contraceptive use for married persons, and
followed by Eisenstadt’s expansion of the right to privacy outside the institution of marriage, the
Court established a ‘zone of privacy’ for individuals to make decisions concerning personal
choices in their private lives. By tracing the Court’s treatment of privacy and liberty rights in
regard to the Due Process Clause, it becomes apparent that the protection of unenumerated
rights, time and time again, has been an integral part of constitutional law. The Court has
consistently expanded individual personal rights as the need for the specific protection of more
unenumerated rights becomes more and more glaringly apparent in contemporary society.
The expansion of liberty interests in Roe was the beginning of the contentious and
publicized disputes over the correct scope of liberty and privacy. “To put it bluntly, the law
became a mess.”269 This mess refers to the height of the disagreements among the courts and
scholars of constitutional law over the role and power of the judiciary. From Roe emerged an
attempt by the Court to become more disciplined through giving authority to traditionalism.270
Unfortunately for liberals, this trend was attractive to the conservative agenda of limiting rights.
The idea of traditionalism refers to the theory that liberty and privacy rights are not
constitutionally protected unless the Court can prove that they have been upheld by longstanding
tradition. With this in place, the aftermath of Roe began an era where conservative traditionalist
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opinions consistently prevailed over liberal rights-expanding opinions. This trend is exemplified
in Michael H., DeShaney, and Bowers, among other individual rights cases. It was not until
Lawrence that the conservative, narrow view of tradition was called into question.
Lawrence has been the last stop in the quest for rights expansion. Lawrence effectively
undermined the conservative methodology of specific and narrow traditionalism. From Roe,
which instigated the emergence of the Court’s conservative era, to Michael H. and DeShaney,
which exemplified the Court’s steadfast conservatism, Lawrence was the case in which the
liberals finally succeeded in fighting back. Lawrence is certainly an important case concerning
the legal status of homosexual practices, yet its procedural implications are markedly different
than those of other precedential sexual rights cases. “In the last decades, sodomy prosecutions
have been rare and unpredictable, simply because the public would not stand for many of
them.”271 The procedural issues in Lawrence are distinct because the case is in regard to a law
that was hardly ever enforced. Even in the states that had criminalized sodomy, it was still a
generally accepted practice. The Court basically ruled in favor of what the policymakers and the
general citizenry had long since regarded as non-prosecutable behavior.
Lawrence, and many of the Court’s privacy decisions, should be understood as an
American variation on the old English idea of desuetude. According to that idea, laws
lapse, and can no longer be enforced, when their enforcement has already become
exceedingly rare because the principle behind them has become hopelessly out of step
with people’s convictions.272
Since the statute struck down in Lawrence was based on an antiquated set of societal values that
no longer held much weight, it logically followed that the law was seldom enforced. From a legal
standpoint, it is unconstitutional for the state to continue to follow an old statute that is neither
supported by the collective societal judgment and morality, nor is taken seriously as a law. In
271
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fact, the law “is therefore a tool for harassment, and not an ordinary law at all—in fact a
violation of the rule of law itself.”273
This procedural aspect of why the liberal justices were able to prevail in Lawrence
provides a key piece of the puzzle in conjecturing about the future of same-sex marriage.
Although liberal jurisprudence favors expanding the scope of personal rights to include the right
to same-sex marriage, the history of the Court from Roe to Lawrence provides a less
straightforward picture. Roe and Lawrence are the two quintessential cases for liberals that
demonstrate the potential of a more coherent liberal jurisprudence. These cases were decided in
such a way for reasons more complex than simply the political makeup of the Court, or the
strength of the liberal justices’ opinions. There are marked political similarities between these
cases that aided in their outcomes. The Roe decision coincided with a time when “the nation was
rapidly moving in the direction of easing up restrictions on abortion. The society’s moral trendline was clear.”274 And, it was the same with Lawrence in regard to the nation’s moral trend-line
towards not prosecuting sodomy cases. This pattern even holds true in cases like Griswold and
Brown v. Board of Education (1954). If the Court had ruled in favor of same-sex marriage
already, and even assuming the decision was based upon a constitutionally correct conception of
liberty, it would have actually been a setback for the liberal jurisprudential agenda. By legalizing
same-sex marriage at a time when there was strong social, political, and moral opposition, the
Court would have done more harm than good from a legal standpoint. “Such a ruling would
undoubtedly have produced a large-scale social backlash, and very likely a constitutional
amendment that might have made same-sex marriage impossible and set back the cause of gay
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rights for decades.”275 While this may be true, the legal and political harm from the decision
must be balanced with the need for justice for those not allowed to marry. Yet it is impossible to
attain a harmonious balance. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Court’s
decision did not reflect the general sense of collective morality, and thus, provoked decades of
serious backlash. In fact, Brown partly caused the Democratic Party to lose control of the South,
which is a political repercussion that still exists today. Thus, the future of same-sex marriage not
only lies in the hands of the Court, but also in the hands of the policymakers and society at large.
With a discussion about the political and social context necessary to successfully arguing
a case in favor of same-sex marriage, it is also necessary to make the distinction between the
Court intentionally waiting to take on such a case and the mere observation that the case is not
winnable unless the context is favorable. By no means should the Court intentionally hold off on
making the decision for political reasons. If the Court were to wait for public opinion to shift
before acting on same-sex marriage, this would turn the Court into a political institution. In
essence, “waiting” is the equivalent of saying that rights should be put to a vote and subjected to
majority rule. This goes against the entire theory behind constitutional law. The very purpose of
the Constitution is to protect minority groups from being oppressed by majority rule. It is up the
Court to rule discriminatory legislation unconstitutional and overrule majority voters in cases
where certain classes of individuals are being deprived of their rights. The distinction is that the
Court’s role in rights cases is to intervene when individuals are not being afforded their
constitutional protections, yet it is the social and political context that reflects the objective
collective morality governing the modern conception of liberty. As such, in a social and political
context where denying the protection of same-sex marriage is ingrained as a moral and legal
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aspect of society, the Court has less solid grounds to stand on because the case would reflect the
political motivations of the Court. Yet, when society’s moral code reflects a willingness to
protect such a right, it turns into a situation where majority rule is oppressing minority groups.
This is when the Court has a judicial obligation to step in and enforce the Constitution’s
authority to protect such oppression.
With this piece of the puzzle in place, the discussion returns to the need for a coherent
liberal methodology to interpret tradition in such a way that justifies same-sex marriage on
legitimate legal grounds. The Court should begin “with the fact that denying gays the right to
marry damages them and their children. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to
marry is a fundamental right and critical to the pursuit of happiness.”276 Then, it is important to
establish that same-sex marriage does not harm heterosexuals in anyway. “It's ironic that the
most vocal proponents of family values and marriage oppose extending it to everyone.”277 After
this, it is necessary to investigate how the fundamental argument opposing same-sex marriage is
in regard to religion, “but the First Amendment also precludes pushing views on others. To have
the state step in and say we're going to legislate for one religious group over another is exactly
what is prohibited in the anti-establishment [of a state religion] clause.”278 These arguments work
together to refute the constitutional basis behind the arguments against same-sex marriage, as
well as undermine the relevance of the theory of specificity in such a case. This is because the
conservative argument about the most specific tradition primarily relies on the fact that the
marital tradition does not extend to include same-sex marriage. Once this claim is undermined,
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the constitutional basis of the argument in favor of same-sex marriage is exponentially more
difficult to dispute.
The arguments for same-sex marriage necessarily must be grounded in precedent as well.
In one sense, Lawrence provides a good framework because it establishes a precedent allowing
the right to sexual privacy regardless of sexual orientation. “If new interpretations of history
played a role in making the Lawrence decision possible, Lawrence in turn matters because of
how it will change even further the history of same-sex relations.”279 Lawrence protects sexual
practices for same-sex couples, yet may not provide a specific enough precedent for the Court to
expand rights even more to include same-sex marriage. Rather, the arguments in favor of samesex marriage have more ground to stand on when analyzed in terms of precedents more directly
tied to the institution of marriage. In another sense, Lawrence positions the legal status of samesex relations as another forward step in the trend of expanding personal liberties.280 This
indicates the possibility that the next step for the Court could be to expand the conception of
liberty further to include marriage for same-sex couples.
When the time comes that the political context is ripe for such a case, how can liberals
defend same-sex marriage on legal grounds? If liberal due process jurisprudence prevails, the
conception of liberty will necessarily include the right to marry for homosexuals. This is derived
from the liberal position that private and consensual life decisions, such as sexual autonomy,
bodily autonomy, family decisions, and marital freedom, should be protected across the board
unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. As such, the argument could be made that
marriage is a liberty interest that is a private decision protected from government intrusion. This
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argument stems from a series of rights-expanding precedents that have prevailed throughout
history as society has embraced a more accepting vision of equality in terms of race, gender, and
sexual orientation.
The Court has been indirectly addressing the issue of how to interpret the constitutional
right to marry for over a century. Along with the liberal position on the conception of liberty,
there is also an abundance of evidence upon which the Court can create a narrative of the
tradition of marriage. This is an imperative step in the methodological process. So far, the reach
of the Court to intervene in contentious social issues has been tested in Roe and Lawrence,
among other cases, which has helped to establish a more coherent methodology for the Court to
interpret the meaning of the guarantee of liberty with a wider scope. The next step in the quest to
include same-sex couples within the protected right to marry is to look to precedent in such a
way that explains the tradition of marriage without succumbing to conservative ideals of rigid
specificity. The precedent concerning the right to marry began in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923),
where the Court struck down a law that banned the teaching of languages other than English in
schools. In Meyer, the Court gave a broad reading to due process by stating that liberty included:
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home…and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.281
After specifically acknowledging the right to marry as being constitutionally protected in Meyer,
the Court mentioned marriage again in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942): “Marriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”282 These opinions
demonstrate that the Court regards the institution of marriage as being strongly worth protecting.
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With this framework, the three main precedents that the Court must address in deciding a samesex marriage case are Loving v. Virginia (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), and Turner v. Safley
(1987).283 In Loving, the Court ended all race-based restrictions on marriage. This only came
about when racial equality was such an ingrained societal tradition that the existence of such
race-based marital restrictions was largely viewed as ludicrous anyway. The unanimous decision
ruled that the Virginia statute violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Warren extrapolated on this argument to prove that
the right to marriage cannot discriminate based on skin color because such restriction infringes
on the constitutional right to due process and equal protection.
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.284
The claim that the Constitution protects the right to marry for all citizens regardless of race is
defended on the grounds that the guarantees of due process and equal protection are broad
enough to encompass this freedom. Furthermore, the principles behind these clauses are that
individual freedoms should be expanded in all circumstances unless they encroach on another
individual’s freedom or on a compelling state interest. Justice Warren wrote, “The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.”285 With Justice Warren’s
opinion, Loving sets a solid precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage.
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If the arguments in Loving are viewed as also applying to same-sex marriage, it follows
that the “arguments against same-sex marriage suffer from the same sectarian reasoning offered
in and rejected by the Court in Loving and therefore as equally violative of equality and due
process.”286 If the Court ruled that the protection of marriage could not be limited by race, such
precedent can be drawn upon to prove that this protection cannot be limited by sex either.
If the only arguments against same-sex marriage are sectarian - then opposing the
legalization of same-sex marriage is invidious in a fashion no different from supporting
anti-miscegenation laws: each is a fundamental assault on equality, and neither has any
rhyme or reason beyond sectarian commitments which would foist one’s own diseased,
personal morality on the whole of the polity.287
Loving is a convincing precedent for same-sex marriage because it creates a narrative of the
marital tradition that is general in nature, but still specific enough to be relevant.
After Loving, the Court should look to Zablocki as another example of its previous
treatment of the tradition of marriage. In Zablocki, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting
persons receiving child support to remarry unless they obtained a court order stating that the
children would not become dependents of the state. Justice Marshall wrote, “the right to marry is
of fundamental importance for all individuals.”288 He further claimed:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family
relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.289
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This is an important precedent for same-sex marriage because it treats marriage as a tradition so
fundamental to society that it has the same protection as longstanding traditions, such as
childrearing or procreation.
The precedent set by Zablocki was even further extended in Turner because the Court
applied the interpretation of the marital tradition in Zablocki to the question of whether prison
inmates could marry. The Court ruled that the law prohibiting inmates from marrying was
unconstitutional unless there existed compelling reasons to suggest otherwise. The basis of
Turner referred back to Loving and Zablocki as support for the view that marriage is a
fundamental right derived from the guarantee of liberty in the Due Process Clause. Justice
O’Connor wrote, “inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public
commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital
relationship.”290 She extracted the principles behind the tradition of marriage, and extended their
significance to encompass the protection of marriage in unconventional circumstances. Justice
O’Connor cited other aspects of the significance of the marital union as evidence that it is a
tradition so fundamental that it cannot be limited to only some classes of people. She argued that
“many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their
spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as
an expression of personal dedication.”291 As well as the spiritual meaning behind marriage,
Justice O’Connor also looked at the legal implications of the marital union that go beyond the
marriage document itself. She noted that, “marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of
government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety,
inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of
290
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wedlock).”292 By interpreting marriage as a tradition far more complex than a symbol of the
traditional conventions of the family unit, Justice O’Connor set an important precedent for the
Court to draw upon in the future as justification for same-sex marriage.
These precedents tell a story about the Court’s treatment of marriage. First, there is
indeed a fundamental right to marry. The Court has consistently referred to such a right in
precedents spanning the past century. But secondly, there are no established determinations on
the nature and limits of this right.293 Perhaps some of this confusion about the significance of the
marital tradition comes from the fact that marriage is somewhat intangible. While arguments can
be made about the benefits and legal status that come with marriage, the Court acknowledges
that marriage is also symbolic.294 This is demonstrated through Turner’s emphasis on the
emotional and spiritual aspects of marriage. The notion of marriage as a symbol provides an
interesting perspective in terms of its treatment within the Court. Although the majority of
individuals regard the symbol of marriage as highly important, “in no other context is a purely or
even largely symbolic reason enough to give special constitutional protection to an interest.”295
This demonstrates the gravity of the situation. There is so much value placed on marriage, a
largely symbolic institution. With the Court’s repeated claims that the tradition of marriage is
fundamental to individuals’ liberty interests, it becomes apparent that this right is an integral part
of every individual’s personal life.
With the understanding that the right to marry is one of the most valued and meaningful
traditions, the next question for the Court becomes: who has the right to marry? The answer to
this question returns back to the methodology in which the Court analyzes tradition. The
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narrowest understanding of the right to marriage looks to the most specific tradition of the man
and woman entering into the marital unit, procreating, and living as the “conventional” family.
This conservative methodology forces the Court to prove each new right is indeed fundamental
and is deeply rooted in tradition. For conservatives, the outcome of the theory of specificity does
not include same-sex marriage. When interpreting tradition from a more general standpoint, the
Court can extract the principles behind the tradition of marriage, in terms of its emotional,
spiritual, and symbolic meanings. Furthermore, the Court can analyze the tradition of family in
relation to marriage as being preserved in the case of same-sex marriage, just like it is preserved
in heterosexual marriage. At the most specific level, the tradition of the conventional family unit
includes married parents and their biological children. Yet, liberals would say that this antiquated
view of the conventional family is not the most constitutionally correct tradition. The principle
behind the tradition is that families should be stable, loving, and supportive units—and marriage
is one of the main features that define this stability. As such, a more general interpretation of
tradition looks at the symbolic meaning of marriage as holding true for same-sex couples just
like it does for heterosexual couples, just as it held true for prison inmates in Turner.
Furthermore, the liberal interpretation looks at the tradition of the family as being created by
married parents in order to question whether same-sex marriages would uphold the same
enduring principles of stability, love, and support. And this general view of tradition would
undoubtedly lead the Court to conclude that same-sex marriage is indeed just as capable of
creating stable, loving, and supportive family units.
So far, the future of same-sex marriage seems pretty simple. If societal trends favor it, the
liberal methodology will prevail in Court. Yet, the situation is more complex than this. Even with
explicit legislative support as a framework for the liberal jurisprudential agenda, the legality of
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gay marriage may not necessarily follow. Conservative jurisprudence relies on the use of the
most specific traditions, “which is, as Justice Brennan points out, manipulable and difficult to
maintain.”296 The conservative justices carry out this narrow interpretation of tradition to quell
their fears about the Court’s limitless interpretational freedom to expand liberty interests. They
argue that such generality mistakes the Court for a political actor. “The more specific the inquiry
into tradition, the more likely it is that a court is protecting something that already is in place,
rather than simply creating a tradition, or stretching an existing tradition further than is
historically permissible.”297 With this disposition, if liberal justices were to argue “the traditional
respect for the privacy of marriage [extends] to protect extramarital sexual relations,”298 the
conservative members of the Court would be quick to undermine such an interpretation on the
grounds that “specific traditions are more reliable guides to the contours of liberty than are
general traditions because they are more easily identifiable, and because they involve less danger
of countermajoritarian value choices by the judiciary.”299 While this argument certainly runs into
fundamental methodological problems, its strength is in its consistency across the board among
conservatives. The notion of deferring authority to the most specific tradition is a concrete
guideline that conservative justices can rely on as their uniform methodological structure. Liberal
opposition to the theory of specificity contains more constitutionally sound arguments, yet lacks
the coherence to establish uniform guidelines for a theory of generality.
Unfortunately, even if the same-sex marriage issue does make it to the Supreme Court, it
is likely that the conservative interpretation of the most specific tradition will win out. Primarily,
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if the liberal jurisprudential vision does not very strongly coincide with the nation’s political and
moral trends, a liberal attempt to win the same-sex marriage case will fall flat on its face.
If Lawrence tells us anything about the marriage battle, it is that the last thing proponents
of same-sex marriage should be hoping for is a Supreme Court case on the issue, since it
is unlikely to result in a favorable ruling. The Court eliminated sodomy laws when there
were almost no sodomy laws left and almost no support for those laws and their
enforcement. When same-sex marriage becomes as commonplace as sodomy laws were
rare, maybe then we will see the Supreme Court offering its constitutional blessing.300
Even if same-sex marriage becomes more commonplace, it will still take a substantial amount of
time for the collective societal morality to be in favor of the right to an extent powerful enough
to ensure that the Court will rule accordingly. The legacy of denying such a right will be too
strongly ingrained in societal norms even when the moral trend begins to shift. Thus, in the
foreseeable future, conservative arguments about specificity and tradition will have the political
fuel they need to emerge victorious. Regardless of the liberal justices’ wishes to protect same-sex
marriage, the liberal jurisprudential vision will not permit them to attempt to make such a ruling
at this time because the Supreme Court does not create social change. Its role is to recognize
shifting social and political attitudes, and decide cases based upon trends that have already
occurred. The Court will only legalize gay marriage when society has displayed a clear trend
towards legalization in such a way that a Court decision would largely be a formality rather than
a policy decision. Legal arguments advocating that the marital tradition is broad enough to
encompass the right for same-sex couples will only be strong enough to entertain a liberal
jurisprudential victory if proceedings are carried out in this context.
Overall, the future of gay rights is not entirely dependent on the political makeup of the
Court. The lesson to be learned is that “tradition, it thus appears, rather than solving our
problems, has proven to be a very troublesome concept. Traditions may be worthy or pernicious.
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Traditions may conflict. Traditions at a more abstract level may contradict traditions at a more
concrete level.”301 If the Court’s interpretation of tradition is the key to the outcome of these
substantive due process individual rights cases, a future characterized by rights expansion
necessarily depends on the coherence of liberal jurisprudence, and more importantly, on the hope
for an era when the collective moral trend of society shifts toward an embodiment of liberal
political ideals.
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